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The adage jura novit curia in contemporary France 
 
The Civilian adage jura novit curia – the court knows the law – for all that it is well 
recognised in France does not receive much scrutiny.  This is unusual first 
because some claim it expresses a fundamental principle of French law and 
secondly because rules and practices associated with jura novit curia are 
controversial.  The paper remedies the scholarly deficit, scrutinising seven 
definitions of jura novit curia to catalogue for the first time the divergent meanings 
associated with the adage and to analyse their status in French law and legal 
culture.  While many meanings are attributed to jura novit curia, no single 
definition attempts to capture its diversity.  The black-letter and ideological 
controversies that can be discerned in close readings of the adage are consistent 
with an enduring debate in France about the respective rights and duties of 
courts and parties in litigation and the role of the judge in French society.  The 
controversies of jura novit curia in France moreover are framed in the technical 
language of the processueliste, while the adage itself is avoided.  In this light, 
jura novit curia is not, as it might first appear, a self-justifying principle that 
speaks to an overarching judicial power.  Rather, jura novit curia speaks to 
prerogatives and duties that both empower and constrain the French judge.  An 
adequate account of jura novit curia therefore must account for the principles, 
rules and adages by which it is constrained.   
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Va savoir!  [Go figure!] 
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Va Savoir!: jura novit curia in contemporary France1
The three parts of Va savoir attempt to bring to Common Law and, hopefully, 
Civilian readers, an appreciation of the meaning, status and history of the adage 
jura novit curia in French law and legal culture.  Jura novit curia is commonly 
translated as the 'court knows the law', and this is not inaccurate.  As we will see, 
however, many other meanings are drawn from the three words of the adage. 
These meanings express presumptions and norms with distinct legal 
consequences and effects for parties, courts and French society.  These diverse 
phenomena constitute the dominant characteristic of jura novit curia: many of the 
consequences and effects to which the adage is said to give rise bear little 
relation to the words jura, novit and curia.
The three parts of Va Savoir construct a ‘doctrinal anthropology’2 of jura novit 
curia, that is, an account how of its normative structure interacts with legal theory 
and practice.  Va Savoir Part I, analyses seven definitions of jura novit curia,
presenting the first comparative analysis of the different presumptions, 
consequences and effects scholars attribute to the adage.  Va Savoir Part II 
concerns the legal status of judicial intervention jura novit curia (that is, sua 
sponte) in French law, including the controversial prerogative said to authorise 
the court to deny parties notice of the case they have to meet.  Va Savoir Part III 
challenges claims jura novit curia originated in ancienne jurisprudence, arguing 
the adage is modern, perhaps even of 20th Century origin.  
 
The common task of the three parts of Va Savoir is the identification of the 
essential guises and disguises of jura novit curia as found in their legal and 
cultural context in contemporary and ancienne France.  Jura novit curia is a 
nœud gordien, a dense matrix of ideological presumptions and attitudes, of 
principle and positive law which together interact to express enduring traditions 
and practices that manifest in French legal culture.  Va savoir attempts to 
trancher the nœud gordien, to reveal the place of the adage in a baroque and not 
unelegant system of contradictory adages that at once extols and deprecates the 
powers of the French judge.  In a systemic context, the iconic force of jura novit 
curia expresses no small degree of incoherence, even superficiality.  However, 
Va Savoir argues that beyond layers of superficiality and incoherence, jura novit 
curia speaks to a folk wisdom, an esprit contradictoire that distinguishes French 
process and legal culture from other Civilian legal systems.  
 
1 I would like to thank Professor M. Stolleis and the Max-Planck Institut für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte in Frankfurt and Professor L. Mayali and the School of Law at the University of 
California, Berkeley for generous fellowships that made the initial research into jura novit curia 
and pre-Revolutionary French law possible.  Above all, appreciation must be extended to Dr 
Anton Schütz of Birkbeck College School of Law, University of London for une certaine formation 
ineffable .
2 I have been using the phrase 'doctrinal anthropology' to describe a series of research projects 
that, on one hand, are resolutely concern black-letter law, hence the word, ‘doctrinal’.  On the 
other hand, the research has an anthropological dimension that concerns the interaction of 
doctrine and systemic phenomena that are of no obvious relevance to practising lawyers.  
Evoked here, is Mauss’s ‘total social fact’, an aspect of the genealogy of ‘doctrinal anthropology’.  
see [C. Levi Strauss, Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, translated by F. Baker 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul: London 1987) at 26, 29.]  The significance of both works for a theory of 
‘doctrinal anthropology’ is discussed in Part III of Va Savoir.
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The adage jura novit curia is certainly not unknown in French law.  The simple 
translation, la cour connaît le droit (‘the court knows the law’),3 is accurate 
enough to be the beginning and end of most discussion of the adage.  However, 
when definitions of the adage are scrutinised and compared, they reveal a variety 
of inconsistent, incomplete or contradictory meanings that in France have been 
the subject of no small controversy.  Jura novit curia, considered as the totality of 
meanings and consequences scholars impute to it, is Byzantine in its complexity.  
The absence of any real scholarship about the adage suggests that many of its 
guises and disguises are scarcely known at all.   
 
The resulting multiplicity of inconsistent and uncontested definitions make it 
difficult to distinguish aspects of jura novit curia that are fundamental principle, 
artefacts of French legal culture, formal rules of law, an occasional empirical fact 
of legal practice or some ever-evolving configuration of an unstated ‘total social 
fact’.  Each definition, however incomplete, does contribute to a larger picture of 
the many guises of jura novit curia in its many guises. 4 This paper argues that it 
is in the discordant unity of this unrecognised collective œuvre that we come to 
appreciate the functions and broader significance of jura novit curia.   
Difficulties understanding jura novit curia arise because, before all else, it is an 
adage, a species of legal folklore.  An adage, Cornu writes, is an “expression 
lapidaire”'5 dense with meaning, which states “une règle de droit, une sentence 
morale ou un fait d'expérience.”6 The paper attempts to penetrate the semantic 
pith of jura novit curia to identify how each of these characteristics arise through 
the intervention of scholars whose definitions attribute consequences that bear 
little direct relation to the bare words of the adage.  
 
It should be emphasised the objective is not to prescribe an ultimately 'correct' 
definition of the adage.  Rather the objective is to investigate and describe claims 
made about the presumptions, meanings, consequences and effects to which 
jura novit curia is said to give rise.  The enquiry aims to establish the conceptual 
 
3 Y. Merminod, Expressions et proverbes latins (Ides & Calendes: Neuchâtel, 1992) at 66. 
Merminod defines jura novit curia as an "adage essentiel de toute procédure aux termes duquel 
«le tribunal sait le droit» (Litt: «la Cour connaît les droits = les lois applicables»”; see also Roland 
& Boyer, Adages du droit français 4th (Litec: Paris, 1999) at 363, "La Cour connaît le droit".   
 
4 The phenomena of a series of definitions, each incomplete but each contributing to an 
understanding of a whole that is never perceived by the authors of each definition suggests the 
well-know story from the 12th Century Persian poet Rumi about the men who, each touching one 
part of an elephant, defined the elephant in terms of the part they had touched.  But, however real 
and necessary an elephant’s ear, trunk or leg may be, describing each part alone cannot convey 
the reality of the elephant. see J. al-Din Rumi, “Elephant in the Dark” in The Essential Rumi,
translated by Coleman Barks (Harper Collins: New York, 1995) at 252. “Each of us touches one 
place and understands the whole in that way.”  
 
5 G. Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique,4th (Quadrige/PUF: Paris, 2003) at 25. [a pithy saying]. All 
translations are the author’s unless otherwise noted.   
 
6 Cornu, ibid at 25 [a rule of law, a moral judgement or a fact of experience].  
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structure of the adage grounded in both doctrine and practice, the understanding 
of which will better facilitate comprehension amongst Civilian and Common Law 
scholars of the legal and cultural phenomena which definitions of jura novit curia 
obscure. 
 
The paper is in two sections.  The first section subjects six generally brief 
definitions and translations of jura novit curia to close scrutiny, to discern the rule, 
judgement or experiences of legal practice to which the adage refers.  The 
second section examines the definition of jura novit curia offered by the doyen of 
French procedure, Gérard Cornu, discovering in its laconic brevity a profound, 
but inspired ambiguity that connects jura novit curia to persistent doctrinal and 
traditional controversies of French legal culture.  
 
The paper develops five themes.  The first is self-evident: jura novit curia is rarely 
subject to critical scrutiny, an anomaly if the adage is, as some claim, a 
fundamental principle of French law.  Instead, the adage qua adage, (distinct 
from the claims which attach to it), stands as an unchallenged, largely 
unexamined, even neglected icon that speaks to ideological conceptions of the 
judicial power and, as a consequence, to the respective rights, duties and 
obligations of courts and parties during legal process. 
 
Secondly, as the Franco-German procedural theorist Henri Motulsky recognised, 
many legal and cultural assumptions, consequences and effects attributed to jura 
novit curia are misleading until understood in the context of opposing adages.7
The office du juge in French procedure has, by Motulsky’s account, traditionally 
been delimited by a quaternary of adages which constitute a system in which 
competing visions of judicial power and the status of parties cohabit both at a 
theoretical plane and at the level of the instant case.  In this system the more 
extreme legal consequences imputed to jura novit curia are constrained or even 
nullified by competing principles.   
 
Thirdly, while the phrase the 'court knows the law‘ may be reassuring, even 
happy news, as news goes, it is 'embarrassing' for its very enunciation 
presupposes the doubts which the adage exists to dispel.8 The presumption of 
empirically verifiable judicial knowledge of the law the adage posits is 
systemically refuted by France's 37 courts of appeal and the national Cour de 
cassation. The existence of these institutions raises a counter presumption that 
recognises the legal expertise of at least lower court judges in France is 
chronically fallible and must be closely monitored.  The counter-presumption is 
affirmed normatively by the doctrine of le double degré de jurisdiction which 
ensures everyone has a right for their case to be heard twice.  Empirically, the 
 
7 H.Motulsky, Ecrits, Etudes et notes de droit international privé (Dalloz: Paris, 1978) at 89.  see 
text infra note 28. 
 
8 F. A. Mann, "Fusion of the Legal Professions?" (1977) Law Q.R. 367 at 369 claimed that the 
“most spectacular feature of English procedure” was the absence of the rule curia novit legem, 
the twin of jura novit curia. Instead, Mann describes how English judges are presumed to know 
nothing about the case before it begins.  Mann calls this the 'principle of judicial unpreparedness' 
which expresses a ‘parties’ rule’ in that the judge relies on counsel for the points of law upon 
which the case will be decided.   
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counter presumption is affirmed because appeals are common in France. 9 
Every successful appeal, less than unanimous decision, or conflicting decisions 
of different chambres of a single cour challenge the empirical veracity of judicial 
knowledge jura novit curia presumes.   
 
Fourthly, in the absence of a modal verb, jura novit curia is without explicit 
normative force or consequences.  The bare descriptive presumption of the 
adage instead functions as a Quelle10 from which diverse propositions about the 
judicial power in France can be drawn.  Some legal consequences said to issue 
from the presumption of judicial knowledge are manifestly arbitrary, controversial 
for their denial of parties' fundamental rights, such as the right to notice and to a 
full defence.  Other imputed consequences are more innocuous pretensions, 
artefacts of French legal culture, than legal norms in se. These include the 
notion that parties, whose legal rights are the object of litigation, must avoid legal 
terminology when asserting these rights before the court because legal analysis, 
savants tell us, is the “monopoly” of the court.  Between extremes, jura novit 
curia supports workable, uncontroversial rules and practices, such as the power 
of a court to dispense with the necessity a party prove the rule upon which they 
rely exists as a valid law. 
 
Finally, I suggest that understanding jura novit curia as an artefact of French 
legal culture is facilitated by reference to a four part semantic structure.  The 
structure consists first of the adage nul n'est censé ignorer la loi that states a 
presumption 'everyone knows the law' providing an a priori justification of jura 
novit curia. The second element comprises the words of the adage itself and its 
twin curia novit legem, Latin words rich with meaning that is unexplored and 
relevant to contemporary French controversies.  The third element concerns the 
normative and cultural consequences scholars attribute to the adage, typically 
expressed as duties or prerogatives that inure to the concept of the office du 
juge.  The fourth element of the adage's semantic structure concerns the effects, 
legal and otherwise, that the preceding elements cumulatively exert in legal 
practice and theory on courts, parties and society.   
 
2. Six Definitions of jura novit curia 
 
Six definitions of jura novit curia are scrutinised in this section to identify the legal 
principles, norms, moral judgements and experiential facts said to issue from the 
adage.  The definitions reveal a jura novit curia that expresses formal rules of law 
and informal rules of practice or etiquette.  Mirijan Damaška describes a 
draconian jura novit curia, illegal in France because it denies a party’s right to a 
defence.  Yves Merminod’s innocuous rule of etiquette refers to the comportment 
of French advocates before the court.  Roland and Boyer’s jura novit curia, like 
 
9 see E. Steiner, French Legal Method, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002) at 29. In 1998, 
the French Cour de cassation heard some 25,000 cases. Roughly three quarters were civil cases, 
the remainder, criminal.  Almost 20%, or some 4,000 of the civil cases were successful.  The 
large number of appeals indicates a prevailing (and healthy) belief in the fallibility of judicial 
knowledge; the quantity of successful appeals, that the fallibility has an empirical basis.  
 
10 “die Quelle” is German for ‘spring’ (eines Baches, eines Flusses), or ‘source’; also used 
figuratively, as in the ‘fount of wisdom’, (die Quelle der Weisheit).  see The Oxford-Duden 
German Dictionary, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001 reissue) at 604. 
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Common Law judicial notice, permits a judge to relieve a party of the burden of 
proving the factual existence of the law on which they rely. 
 
Fox’s definition concerns the judge’s prerogative to undertake ‘research’ a 
euphemism that conceals issues relating to party rights and judicial impartiality.  
Engelman conceives of jura novit curia as a party’s right to rely entirely on the 
judge’s knowledge of the law, permitting the party to invoke jura novit curia as 
grounds for appeal.  Finally, Black’s Law Dictionary, reveals a duality inherent in 
the words of the adage, translating it first as ‘the court knows the law’ and 
secondly, as ‘the court recognises rights’, references to a judge’s power to 
decide in law or in equity.  Each definition offers a distinct approach to the adage, 
and so touches different aspects of the relationship between courts and parties.  
Only when the multiple dimensions of jura novit curia are considered as a whole 
does it become possible to speak of the meaning of jura novit curia.
2.1 Mirijan Damaška, Faces of Justice and State Authority 
 
Mirijan Damaška captures the most extreme black-letter consequence of the 
adage, writing that jura novit curia authorises a judge to reach a decision based 
on, "a legal theory that has not been subject to the arguments of counsel” for the 
parties. 11 Damaška’s definition expresses the most controversial legal 
consequence of the adage in contemporary France: jura novit curia denies the 
parties notice of, and the right to defend against the very point of law on which 
the litigation is found to ultimately turn.   
 
This technique of adjudication is uncontroversial in some Civilian jurisdictions, 
reflecting a distinct and authoritarian philosophy of the functions of courts, 
judges, parties and counsel.12 In France, however, Damaška's jura novit curia 
has been found to violate fundamental rights expressed by le principe de la 
contradiction and les droits de la défense.13 Both principles affirm the parties’ 
 
11 M. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority, (Yale University Press: New Haven, 
1986) at 116.   
 
12 Mann, supra note 8 at 370 criticises a decision of the European Commission of Human Rights 
[Application 3147/67, Yearbook of Human Rights or Collection of Decisions 27, 119] which stated, 
"it is a generally recognised principle of law that it is for the court to know the law (jura novit 
curia)…the practice of the German courts whereby the parties are not necessarily invited to make 
oral submissions on all points of law which may appear significant to the courts does not 
constitute an infringement of 'fair hearing' within the meaning of [Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights].”  Citing Mann’s article, the European Court of Justice in Jeroen 
Van Schijndel and Johannes Van Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1996] 
1 CMLR 801 [hereinafter referred to as “Van Schijndel”] recognised national jurisdictions of the 
European Community diverged on this point, stating, at §34, "…in many systems, if a court does 
raise a new point, it will, or must, invite the parties to address argument to the point, as would an 
English court."  The court also cites J.A. Jolowicz, "Da mihi factum dabo tibi jus: a problem of 
demarcation in English and French Law" in Multum non multa: Festschrift für Lipstein (C.F. Müller 
Juristischer Verlag: Heidelberg, 1980 at 79); reprinted in J.A. Jolowicz, On Civil Procedure,
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2000) at 185.  
 
13 Le principe de la contradiction [the principle of contradiction, or the ‘adversarial principle’] 
roughly equates with English Natural Justice and American Due Process, protecting fundamental 
party rights, inter alia, to notice of the case to be met and an opportunity to refute it.  Les droits de 
la défense [rights of defence] by many accounts incorporates le principe de la contradiction. A
detailed analysis of le principe de la contradiction and les droits de la défense and le principe 
d’égalité devant la justice appears in Va savoir Part II.   
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right to notice and the opportunity to present argument on all points of fact and 
law considered by the court in its judgement.  In France, both principles are 
considered ‘of constitutional value’.14 Damaška’s jura novit curia breaches le 
principe de la contradiction and les droits de la défense because the successful 
party receives judgement in her favour on legal grounds her opponent has been 
unable to challenge. 
 
Le principe de la contradiction and les droits de la défense do not, however, 
prohibit a court from intervening so as to decide according to its own point of law.  
In France, intervention jura novit curia may be required by le principe d’égalité 
devant la justice15 which is meant to guarantee that all citizens receive equal 
treatment from the courts and that no one should be treated either less 
favourably than anyone else.  Le principe d’égalité devant la justice may impose 
a duty on the court duty to intervene with its own point of law because it is the 
courts’ duty to decide according to the ‘applicable’ law in all cases, regardless of 
the legal argument on which parties base their case.16 
Damaška’s definition, however, fails to distinguish between the act of intervention 
jura novit curia and the manner and form requirements to which the court is 
subject when it raises a point of law propre mouvement. A less extreme version 
of the adage, not associated by Damaška with jura novit curia, speaks simply to 
the bare power of intervention.  This sense of jura novit curia relates to the 
court’s duty arising from le principe d’égalité to decide on the basis of the 
‘applicable’ law in all cases and, where necessary, to intervene, for example, to 
correct a party’s erroneous or inadequate legal argument.  Le principe d’égalité 
imposes a duty to intervene where the ‘applicable’ law so requires because 
otherwise some parties would be denied the benefit of the law that is the right of 
all French citizens. 
 
14 G. Bolard, “Les principes directeurs du procès civil: Le droit positif depuis Henri Motulsky”, Le 
Semaine Juridique [JCP] éd. G. no 30, 3693, 1993, at §13 writes that main element of les droits 
de la défense is the principe de la contradiction, which means that “le défendeur doit être averti 
du procès, chaque partie a le droit d’obtenu communication des pièces adverses, le juge doit se 
déterminer d'après les seules débats et documents produits à l'audience." [the defendant must be 
given notice of the action, each party has the right to copies of adverse evidence, the judge must 
decide only on the basis of documents and arguments introduced during process".]   
 
15 [the principle of equality before the courts],see Cornu, supra note 5 at 335; F. Eudier, Ordre 
public substantial et office du juge, (thèse, Rouen, 1994, [http://panjuris.univ-
paris1.fr/pdf/theseeudier.pdf link verified June 2005]), 115ff and 455ff.  
 
16 This dimension of le principe de d’égalité is perhaps less familiar to Common Law scholars and 
is not always understood by French scholars, (Eudier, supra at 458).  Eudier explains its 
relevance in terms of Article 12 alinéa 1 of the Nouveau code de procédure civile, (Dalloz: Paris, 
2001) [hereinafter referred to as "NCPC"] which requires the judge decide all cases according to 
the law that is ‘applicable’.  Le principe d’égalité requires all citizens receive the benefit of the 
applicable law in equal measure.  Where a legal rule is proven to be ‘applicable’ it must form the 
basis of the court’s decision.  ‘Equality’ here means that the judge does not have a discretion to 
apply an applicable rule in some cases but not in others.  A problem arises however where more 
than one rule may be applicable and at any rate determining whether the judge has breached this 
duty is a decision for an appellate court.  The most significant effect of this use of d’égalité may 
be to permit the Cour de cassation to more readily substitute its view of the applicable law, 
because discretionary acts of lower courts are not normally subject to cassation so long as the 
discretion was exercised properly.   
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After the ‘crisis of adversarial procedure’17 in the 1970's, it has been established 
that French courts contemplating a decision based on a point of law not put 
forward by the parties are subject to what is sometimes called the saine or 
healthy solution. 18 The saine solution requires the court to 'regularise' its own 
point of law by bringing it within the ambit of the parties’ debate.  The court must 
notify the parties of its intention to raise its point of law and provide the parties a 
real opportunity to debate its merits. 19 The saine solution thus ensures at least 
formal parity between the content of the court's reasons for judgement and the 
written and oral submissions of the parties.  As a consequence, in France, 
Damaška's jura novit curia is an illegal act because by definition it refers to a 
decision on a point of law upon which the parties have not been heard.  
 
Many are the decisions of the Cour de cassation affirming the saine solution, the 
necessity of respect for le principe de la contradiction, les droits de la défense 
and le principle d’égalité devant la justice.20 Paradoxically, however, the 
frequency with which the national Cour de cassation continues to find it 
necessary to re-affirm formally recognised legal principles suggests that local 
courts of first instance and regional courts of appeal (together, les juges du fond)
in France do not necessarily always act in accordance with the law that jura novit 
curia tells us they are presumed to know.21 
17 “La crise du contradictoire entre juge et avocat”, Gaz. Pal 1978 II Doctrine 419; see also 
Jolowicz, supra note 12 at 87 for a basic account of the controversy.  
 
18 The leading case is Conseil d'Etat, Assemblé, 12 octobre 1979 req. nos 1875, 1905, 1948 to 
1951; Rassemblement des nouveau avocats de France et autres, in (1980) 54 Semaine juridique 
(JCP), Pt II no 19288.  The decision was based on le principe de la contradiction and le principe 
d’égalité devant la justice. Eudier, supra note 15 at 115 notes that le principe d’égalité devant la 
justice has a “valeur constitutionnelle”. 
 
19 A. Benabent, "Les Moyens Relevés en secrèt par le juge" (1977) 51 La Semaine juridique Part 
I, no 2849 at §4, "…demeure la constance des principes généraux qui leur sont supérieurs et 
permettent de maintenir la solution saine.”…[a reference to the “stability of general principles of 
law which by their superior status allow the healthy solution to be maintained.”]. Bolard, supra 
note 14 at 333, §19 refers to the “heureuse solution” [the happy solution]  
 
20 Cour de cassation: generally see Dalloz annotation to NCPC Articles 4, 5, 12 and 16; R. 
Perrot, (1976) 74 Rev Trim de Dr Civ 825 at 826-27; lists 37 decisions of the Cour de cassation 
decided during the height of the “crise du contradictoire” of 1973-76; Benabent, supra cites five 
cases decided prior to the enactment of the NCPC; J. Norman, Rev. Tr dr civ 86(2) 390 at 392 
cites 5 cases.  The citations are representative only.  The case law by its extent and complexity 
suggest a parallel with American case law.  Cases also arise in the Conseil d’Etat. The leading 
case on the three principles is cited supra note 18; a second important decision concerns NCPC 
Article 1015: nº 21-893, 5 juillet 1985, Gaz. Pal. 1985, 2, 742; see also 16 juin 1999, R.F.D.A. 
2000 no 2 p 359, note Yves Brard, in which the Conseil overturned a decision of the 
Administrative Court of Appeal which decided on a point of law raised of its own motion without 
providing the parties with an opportunity to argue the point.    
 
21 Perrot decried “the unfortunate tendency of certain courts to forget too easily the elementary” 
[principe de la contradiction], R. Perrot, supra at 827. “la fâcheuse tendance de certaines 
juridictions à oublier trop facilement cette règle élémentaire.” 
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Thus is established an antinomy between the formal law relating to jura novit 
curia and the dissident practices of some French judges.22 French scholars 
acknowledge a strong tradition of the sovereign juges du fond a tradition that 
may support distinct regional judicial cultures.23 In France this is reinforced by 
the absence of a formally binding doctrine of precedent. 24 The result is that 
instances of Damaška's jura novit curia continue in local and regional courts 
notwithstanding their illegality, even though jurisprudence indicates national 
courts consistently overturn such decisions.  Where parties acquiesce to a 
decision taken jura novit curia, in Damaška's sense, and do not appeal, the 
decision stands as a valid chose jugée despite having been reached in breach of 
le principe de la contradiction. 
Damaška's jura novit curia also conflicts with the traditional quasi-principle, le 
dispositif which holds that, at least in private law, the substance of litigation is for 
the parties to decide.25 Consequently, a court in reaching its decision should 
normally stay within the bounds established by the pleadings and arguments of 
the parties.  This parity is the essence of the adages nea eat judex ultra et extra 
petita partium26 and judex secundum allegata et probata partium judicare 
 
22 A sense of the dynamic that informs the practice of French judges is seen when the following 
two comments are compared.  Eva Steiner, supra note 9 at 84, writes that “'imitation' is also 
forced upon judges in the lower courts in the sense that if they do not follow higher court 
decisions their own decisions are likely to be reversed, with the implicit stigma attached thereto 
that they do not 'know their law'." John Bell, French Legal Cultures, (Butterworths: London, 2001) 
at 71writes, “[t]hat same colloquium contains a discussion about the 'legitimate resistance' of the 
lower courts to the rulings of the higher courts…the role of the lower court judge is to be a rebel, 
but not too often…until there is a much great use of information technology, most of what is 
decided at levels below the Cour de cassation is unknown…"   
 
23 Cornu, supra note 5 at 850, defines “souveraineté” inter alia with reference to the sovereignty 
over the appreciation of fact of first instance and appellate courts, which in theory permits lower 
courts to avoid the control of the national Cour de cassation whose jurisdiction is restricted to 
questions of law.  However, R. Martin, "Retour sur la distinction du fait et du droit" (1987), Recueil 
Dalloz Sirey¸ Cahier 39, Chronique XLVIII at §8, quotes a former judge of the Court de cassation 
who observed that ‘the law is that which the Cour de cassation decides to examine, everything 
else is fact.’  As to regional variations, see P. Haegel, “L’Avènement du Nouveau Code de 
Procédure Civile: L’harmonisation avec le droit local alsacien-mosellan”, in Vingt ans après, (La 
Documentation Française: Paris, 1998) 35; see also M. Foulon, “La mise en état” in Vingt ans 
après, ibid, 161 at 173, ”Il n’est pas totalement faux d’opposer la rigeur du nord à un certain 
laxisme ou une certaine désinvolture du midi.” [It is not completely false to contrast the more 
rigorous attitudes of the north (of France) with the more understanding, free spirit of the south.]  
 
24 The philosophy of precedent in France is best expressed by the adage “une fois n’est pas 
coutume”. [a single occurrence does not a custom make] (see Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 
925.)  In France, precedents evolve, acquire status as objective law over a period of time, through 
adoption by the corps curiae. In this sense decisions become customary law, rather than self-
standing law that acquires binding force upon pronouncement of a new rule by a superior court, 
such as the House of Lords or the United States Supreme Court.  This account is simplistic, 
however, as Bell notes there are a number of distinct judicial ‘cultures in France.  see Bell, supra 
note 22 at 176-78 (Administrative Courts); 66-68 (Civil law).  It is less clear is how precedents are 
used publicly in process by parties and courts. see also Steiner, supra note 9 describing how 
French civil courts are not permitted to cite their own past decisions in the judgements as 
providing the basis of their decision.   
 
25 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 521; Cornu, supra note 5 at 308.   
 
26 [hereinafter referred to as “ultra petita”] Damaška, supra note 11 at 160, n.22.  Damaška 
describes the adage as preventing a court from awarding relief that exceeds that which a party 
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debet,27 both of which have been known in France since long before the 
Revolution. These adages, however, like jura novit curia, are not absolute.  
Practitioners and scholars debate when and how intervention jura novit curia is or 
ought to be permitted.  This means that while Damaška’s jura novit curia has 
been formally rejected in France, weaker forms, relating only to the act of 
intervention have not.  
 
Motulsky recognised that four adages have traditionally delimited the role of the 
judge in French private law.  Motulsky wrote that:28 
«Secundum allegata et probata judex judicare debet» - «Da mihi 
factum, dabo tibi jus» - «Jura novit curia» - «Audiatur et altera pars» 
voilà les maximes par lesquelles on a accoutumé, aux terme d’une 
longue évolution, de résumer les traits dominants de l’office du juge 
dans la procédure civile française.   
 
Motulsky described this quaternary of adages as “imagées et exactes” that is, 
‘colourful and correct’, but, also “incomplètes”.29 Motulsky’s work consisted of 
justifying a re-organisation of the traditional elements of party-judge jurisdiction 
so as to resolve the ‘litigation tension’ created by the interaction of the conflicting 
‘rules’ established by the quaternary.   
 
The tension arises because of the incompatibility of the requirement the court 
decide only according to that which had been “alleged and proven” (secundum 
allegata et probata) by the parties, and jura novit curia which may suppose the 
court’s power to intervene to supply its own, ‘unalleged and unproven’ points of 
law, even to the extent of disregarding le principe de la contradiction expressed 
by the adage audiatur et altera pars.  The tension is exacerbated by the adage 
da mihi factum which in its strongest formulation would absolutely prohibit parties 
from offering any arguments of law.  The substance of each of these adages is 
 
has demanded.  (for example, awarding £1000 in damages when only £500 had been asked for.) 
Ultra petita does not appear in Roland and Boyer, Cornu or Merminod but ‘ultra petita’ and ‘extra 
petita’ are used as section headings in the Dalloz annotation of Articles 4 and 5 of the NCPC.  
see Dalloz Art 4 and annotations at §§ 15, 16, 19, 21, 30.  A reference from before the Revolution 
in found in Pierre Jacques Brillon, Dictionnaire des Arrêts ou jurisprudence universelles des 
Parlements de France, Nouvelle édition, (Paris, 1727); at  t. III, item 925, "Le juge doit statuer une 
chose certaine et fixe, mais ne point aller au delà de ce qui est demandé par les parties”, and 
citing an arrêt from 1658, at item 926, “C'est ce que l'on appelle ultra petita." 
 
27 [hereinafter referred to as “judex secundum”] Roland & Boyer, supra note 3 at 351. define 
judex secundum to mean "Le juge doit statuer selon les allégations et les preuves des parties" 
[The court must decide according to the allegations and proofs of the parties.] or "le juge…ne 
dispose que sur ce que proposent les parties" [the judge disposes of the case only on the basis 
of that which the parties have proposed].  As for the history of judex secundum see, for example, 
B. Automne, 1 La Conference du Droict François avec le Droict Romain, 4th Edition. (Charles 
Chastelain: Paris, 1644) at 34, citing the ordonnance of Charles VII of 1453, art 123; see also A. 
Loisel, 2 Institutes Coutumières d'Antoine Loisel, M. Dupin, E. Laboulaye, eds. (Videcoq: Paris, 
1846) at §867 p. 228 
 
28 H. Motulsky, supra note 8 at 89.  [these are the maxims which have traditionally been used to 
summarise the dominant traits of judicial office in French civil procedure.]   
 
29 Ibid  
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considered below;30 here the point is simply that the competing tendencies of 
procedure expressed by Motulsky’s quaternary are well-recognised by scholars 
on all sides of the debate.  Different accounts of the meanings of the adages give 
the debate substance, even though it is a debate framed largely in the technical 
language of processuelistes, rather than the language of adages.  
 
Motulsky’s views have strong support in France and are acknowledged to be 
enshrined, in some form, in the NCPC. For others, however, the NCPC enacted 
a procedural tradition that existed independent of Motulsky’s efforts to give the 
judge a monopoly over the juridical analysis of the facts of a case.  In a speech to 
the 1979 session of the Conseil d'Etat which implicitly rejected Damaška's jura 
novit curia by affirming the superior status of le principe de la contradiction, the 
Commissaire du gouvernement, M. Franc, stated that French civil procedure has 
been traditionally been characterised, not by Motulsky’s quaternary of adages, 
but by "two principles, le principe dispositif and le principe de la contradiction" 
both of which constrain the scope of jura novit curia.31 French tradition, like 
inconsistent lower court compliance with decisions of national courts, is not 
monolithic in its expression, rather competing accounts of the tradition seem to 
vie to be the dominant tendency of any era.   
 
Typically, M. Franc avoids the use of adages, including jura novit curia.32 Nor is 
jura novit curia referred to in the judgement of the Conseil despite the central 
issue being the legality of Damaška's jura novit curia, that is, the power of a court 
to lawfully base a judgement on ‘a legal theory that has not been subject to the 
arguments of counsel’.  The recurring absence of the adage by name in French 
jurisprudence, its variable meanings and infrequent use in scholarship suggests 
that, whatever opinion may be about the assumptions, consequences and effects 
attributed to it, jura novit curia as an adage is of marginal significance in France. 
Inasmuch as the act Damaška imputes to it is illegal, this is hardly surprising.   
 
2.2 Yves Merminod, Expressions et Proverbs Latins 
 
30 see Automne, infra note 158 and supra notes 26 and 27.   
 
31 supra note 18. “Conclusions de M. Franc, Commissaire du Gouvernement” at §10. [While 
called the ‘government commissioner’ for historical reasons, the Commissaire is an independent 
advocate whose role is to analyse and challenge. see Cornu, supra note 5 at 172 and B. Latour, 
“Scientific Objects and Legal Objectivity” in Law, Anthropology and the Constitution of the Social:
Making Persons and Things, A. Pottage and M. Mondy, eds. (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2004) at note 17.  Latour writes that the Commissaire is, “in a sense, an airtight 
chamber for the avoidance of certainty, a kind of injunction to avoid agreement.”  
 
32 While he rejects the universal applicability of Damaška’s absolutist jura novit curia, M. Franc 
acknowledges the necessity of an intervention power, so long as le principe de la contradiction is 
respected. However, M. Franc goes on to distinguish between the moyen de pur droit and 
moyen d’ordre public, suggesting that so long as the moyen is one a judge is duty-bound to 
impose on all parties alike (i.e. its application is not discretionary) respect for le principe de la 
contradiction is not necessary. The Conseil d’Etat agreed, although subsequent developments 
such as the amendment to Article 16 of the NCPC (Décret 81-81500, 12 May 1981) and case law 
mean this distinction is no longer sustainable. See Eudier, supra note 15 at 455ff.   
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Yves Merminod describes jura novit curia as an adage "essentiel," 33 meaning it 
is very important, if not indispensable, to French law.  This is reinforced by his 
further claim that jura novit curia is applicable to "all procedure".34 Merminod’s 
definition of jura novit curia suggests a principle of universal application, as 
fundamental to French procedure as le principe de la contradiction or les droits 
de la défense. If the definitions of Merminod and Damaška are consistent, jura 
novit curia would mean that in French criminal, civil, and administrative courts, at 
all levels of the judicial hierarchy, the judge has unfettered discretion to decide on 
the basis of a legal rule imposed on the court’s own motion, without prior notice 
to the parties or subjecting the rule to party scrutiny.  
 
Merminod's claims about the fundamental status of jura novit curia are dubious to 
the extent he means to express legal rules.  Damaška's jura novit curia, as we 
have just discussed, has been specifically rejected in French civil law, as it has 
been also in administrative law.35 The saine solution has been held to be 
applicable to most types of judicial intervention propre mouvement, that is, sua 
sponte, including the moyen d'ordre public and interlocutory decisions relating to 
points of procedure.36 
In criminal law Damaška's jura novit curia seems scarcely conceivable.  In 
France, intervention jura novit curia in criminal actions by the deciding judge to 
formulate new charges would be an intrusion into the jurisdiction of the procureur 
and le juge d’instruction. 37 In terms of the parties to a criminal action, the court’s 
imposition of a legal rule without notice to the accused or to the prosecutor, 
 




35 The decision of the Conseil d’Etat, supra note 18, refers to civil law, actions within the purview 
of the NCPC. With respect to administrative law, the necessity of respect for le principe de la 
contradiction which negates Damaška’s jura novit curia and the possibility, following Merminod’s 
claim, the adage applies to all procedure, is affirmed in Conseil d’Etat No. 177075 (Lebon) 1999 
which concerns the application of Article 153-1 of the Code of Administrative Tribunals and 
Administrative Courts of Appeal which requires that “lorsque la décision lui paraît susceptible 
d’être fondée sur un moyen relevé d’office, le président de la formation de jugement en informe 
les parties avant la séance de judgement et fixe le délai dans lequel elles peuvent présenter leurs 
observations.” [when it appears as if a case might be decided on the basis of a point of law raised 
on the court’s own motion, the president of the court will notify the parties prior to handing down 
the decision and fix an adjournment during which the parties can present argument thereon.]  
 
36 NCPC, annotation to Article 16 at §38 (“l’obligation d’inviter les parties à présenter leurs 
observations s’impose comme préalable au relevé d’office de toute espèce de moyen de droit.  
L’obligation s’impose tant au relevé des moyens d’ordre public”) [the obligation to invite the 
parties to present their observations is required regardless of the type of point of law raised on 
the court’s own motion.  The obligation arises also with respect to moyens d’ordre public]and at 
§39 (“La même obligation s’impose aux moyens de procédure”) [the same obligation applies with 
respect to points of procedure]   
 
37 J. Bell, S. Boyron, S. Whittaker, Principles of French Law, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
1998) at 128-30, write that the investigating judge, the juge d’instruction, is bound by the ambit of 
instruction from the procureur.  The prosecutor, the procureur, decides whether to proceed and 
the charge to be laid.  
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would be to simultaneously charge and convict, ex post facto without hearing the 
accused's defence.38 
The adage audiatur altera pars, a element of Motulsky’s quaternary, is 
associated with le principe de la contradiction and les droits de la défense.39 
Roland and Boyer state both the adage and related principles “govern all 
procedure”40 and mean that “none may be condemned without having been 
heard or at least having been given an opportunity to present their defence.”41 In 
criminal matters, the necessity of affording a defendant the opportunity to present 
a defence to the charge formulated by the procureur and juge d’instruction 
precludes the court that decides the matter from intervening with its own charges. 
Damaška’s jura novit curia applied to criminal actions is draconian, evoking the 
inquisitorial procedures of ancienne France, procedures commonly thought to be 
extinct.  However, while we might excuse the rhetorical excess of Merminod for 
implying jura novit curia may arise in French criminal procedures, we must also 
understand how fundamental principles which negate Damaška’s jura novit curia 
are susceptible to rhetorical excess.  Passing from the level of high principle to 
practice, French criminal practice has recently introduced American-style ‘plea 
bargaining’, which involves negotiations between the defendant, prosecutor and 
ultimately the court to the charge, that is the point of law, upon which the case 
will be decided.42 Plea bargaining may result in situations in which the court 
takes a different view of the applicable law than presented as fait accompli to the 
 
38 Damaška’s jura novit curia, by definition, involves a point of law on which a party has not been 
heard.  It’s opposition with le principe de la contradiction and les droits de la défense as 
consequences of audi alteram partem arises because the adage and principles provide that 'none 
may have a sanction imposed on his person, liberty, rights or interests without a procedure 
permitting him to know with what he is charged and to prepare arguments in his défense.' “ 
Luchaire, Droits et libertés, 395 cited in (and translated by) J. Bell, French Constitutional Law,
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992) at 193. 
 
39 In Roland and Boyer, supra note 3, Motulsky’s audiatur altera pars, is cross referenced to its 
main entry under audi alteram partem. The latter adage is an accepted element of Common Law 
Natural Justice, see 1(1) Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Re-issue, (Butterworths:London, 2002) 
§95ff, and American Due Process, see C.J. Antieau & W.J Rich, Modern Constitutional Law 2d, 
(West’s:St Paul, 1997) at 301ff.  
 
40 Roland and Boyer supra note 3 at 39 
 
41 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 39. At 40, Roland and Boyer state that in criminal law the 
principle “revêt la plénitude de sa dimension”.  [reveals the full magnitude of its purview]  Its 
fundamental nature is such that its mere “enonce peut dispenser ici d’une longue demonstration.” 
[its invocation can dispense here with lengthy supporting arguments].  They cite a series of 
provisions of the Code procédure penal (Articles 346 al. 3, 410, 411, 114 al 3 and art 171) and 
also invoke the jurisprudence of the Cour de Cassation both of which hold that a violation of les 
droits de la défense renders a judgement null.  
 
42 see “Loi Perben: le paider-coupable à l’épreuve des tribunaux”, Lemonde, 20 May 2005, p1 
(French lawyers demonstrate against legislation enacted in October 2004 introducing the ‘guilty 
plea’ into French criminal justice, claiming that the law, which some lawyers see as an 
infringement of les droits de la défense, has been introduced and applied inconsistently across 
France. see also ibid, p8 “Le paider-coupable s’installe dans une grande confusion”, referring to 
discontent amongst judges who see the arrival of the American-style negotiated guilty plea, with 
an agreed penalty put to the court for confirmation  (homologation) as an intrusion by the 
prosecutors (procureurs) into the jurisdiction of the judge.   
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court by the defendant and prosecutor.  In these circumstances, intervention jura 
novit curia may be both possible and necessary.  
 
The notorious inquisitions of ancienne France initially arose to facilitate the 
prosecution of occulte or ‘secret’ crimes.  Damaška’s jura novit curia, applied to 
criminal law, likewise evokes secret procedures introduced in some western 
countries in the aftermath of the attack on New York City in September 2001 to 
facilitate the detention and conviction of ‘terrorists’. 43 The parallel between the 
ancien inquisition and anti-terrorist procedures suggests that however 
enthusiastic the rhetoric of adherence to the fundamental right to a 'fair hearing' 
may be, its substantive content is not immutable.  The substantive requirements 
of the ‘fair trial’ and the acceptability of Damaška’s jura novit curia may evolve in 
response to military, political or other challenges which condition the kind of 
process that a society tolerates or finds acceptable.  
 
In France, unequivocal affirmation of le principe de la contradiction and les droits 
de la défense is a relatively recent phenomena.  Bolard noted the thin and 
confused attention scholars afforded fundamental principles of procedure in the 
post-War years.44 The increasing attention to both principes suggests how they 
shadowed the ascendancy of Motulsky’s judge-centred theories of procedure 
which subordinated each principe to the court’s monopoly over the law.45 The 
interaction of the views of Motulsky’s and of those according le principe de la 
contradiction and le dispositif primary position culminated in the legislative 
confusion and controversy associated with the enactment of the NCPC. By 1979 
Motulsky’s views had been rejected by the affirmation that the le principe de la 
contradiction applied to party arguments of both fact and law.   
 
Da mihi factum, dabo tibi jus: fact - law federalism  
The rejection of Damaška's jura novit curia in formal law does not necessarily 
mean Merminod's definition is completely misguided.  Merminod's jura novit curia 
lacks the black-letter precision of Damaška's and, despite Merminod’s 
enthusiastic rhetoric, it is questionable whether he really conceived of the adage 
as a legal norm at all.  Merminod describes the consequence of jura novit curia 
more tentatively, writing that it is, "neither necessary nor useful for a party or their 
 
43 The most prominent case concerns a Mr. Moussaoui, being tried in the United States for 
complicity in the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City.  Mr 
Moussaoui was denied notice of much of the prosecution’s evidence and legal argument, a denial 
that would be prima facie violation of the ‘notice and defence’ provisions of le principe de la 
contradiction. see E. Leser, “Etats-Unis: la Cour suprême rejette l’appel de Zacarias Moussaoui”, 
Le Monde,23 March 2005.  see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld  124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (Justice 
Thomas, dissenting) (denying Due Process rights to “enemy combatants”)  
 
44 G. Bolard, supra note 14 at 330 §§1 and 13.     
 
45 Motulsky stressed the fundamental nature of le principe de la contradiction and les droits de la 
défense, but, had a narrower view of their scope.  While Motulsky would place an obligation on 
the court to ensure debate between parties on all party-raised issues, he did not consider that 
points of law raised by the court on its own motion were subject to le principe de la contradiction.
This view has been rejected in France, and is discussed further in Va Savoir Part II.
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counsel to spend much time on legal analysis when presenting their case to the 
court."46 
By this account, jura novit curia simply reflects attitudes, widely held, at least 
amongst scholars in France, that juridical analysis, the 'knowing' or appreciation 
of points of law, is a prerogative of the court.  This approach suggests a jura novit 
curia that is less black letter rule than expression of French attitudes and beliefs 
about the proper behaviour of parties or their counsel when appearing before a 
court.  While strongly suggesting a rule of courtroom etiquette, Merminod's 
account of jura novit curia also speaks to an assumption about the separation of 
functions or powers between judges and parties with respect to points of law that 
specifically permits party involvement in legal argument provided it is kept brief.   
 
Merminod's deprecation of the value of party argument of law falls short of far 
stronger accounts of jura novit curia and da mihi factum that conceive of the 
court’s power over juridical analysis to be an exclusive prerogative.  This 
common belief amongst Civilians constitutes a kind of 'fact-law federalism' that 
expresses a distinct philosophy of litigation.  The central catechism of ‘fact-law 
federalism’ is the exclusion of all party involvement in legal argument and the 
conferment upon the court of a monopoly with respect to juridical analysis.47 
Strict fact-law federalism elevates the adage da mihi factum to the level of 
fundamental legal principle.  This theoretical proposition was Motulsky’s primary 
technique for resolving the litigation tension expressed in a traditional reading of 
his quaternary of adages.48 Motulsky was the “inspirateur” of the NCPC, which 
most agree meant to introduce stronger, even authoritarian, judicial powers, 
which, if interpreted as allegedly intended, would have permitted free exercise of 
Damaška's jura novit curia. Motulsky’s fact-law federalism in its absolute form 
also denies M. Franc’s conception of the French procedural tradition because it 
specifically excludes the application of le principe de la contradiction or les droits 
 
46 Merminod, supra note 3. Ironically, in both Roland and Boyer and Merminod, the entry for jura 
novit curia is followed by the adage "jura vigilantibus, tarde venientibus":  [the law favours the 
vigilant, not those who neglect or delay in asserting their rights.]  Read in the context of 
Merminod's view of the marginal role of the parties with respect to legal argument, the interaction 
of jura novit curia and jura vigilantibus catches the parties in a double bind, requiring they 
promptly assert their rights by promptly commencing proceedings (which presumes knowledge of 
relevant law).  However, in the judicial forum, parties are directed by Merminod's jura novit curia 
to keep their accounts of the legal basis of their rights to a minimum or dispense with it altogether.  
 
47 The term 'federalism' refers to the separation of powers or jurisdiction implied by Motulsky's 
conception and application of the distinction between fact and law.  Its 'federalism' lies in the 
sharing of different aspects of a common task and the degree of autonomy with which each may 
exercise their power. The term federalism also suggests the institutional role of the parties and 
their legal counsel.  It is rare for parties to be considered ‘constitutional actors’ or to perform an 
institutional function as a class of legal actors.  Article 1 of the NCPC states clearly that apart 
from specific exceptions, the parties confer jurisdiction upon the court to decide by commencing 
and defending an action.  see J. Jacobs, The Fabric of Civil Justice, (Steven & Son: London, 
1987) at 7 referring to a “division of function” between courts and parties.   
 
48 Martin, supra note 23 at §2 "Le schéma du process, d'après Motulsky, peut être dessiné de la 
façon suivante: [l]a partie a la charge et le monopole de l'allégation de fait"…"[l]e juge a le devoir 
et le monopole de la qualification juridique."  [The model of procedure, following Motulsky, could 
be outlined in the following manner: the party is responsible for and has a monopoly over the 
allegation of fact.  The judge has the duty of and a monoply over juridical analysis.] 
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de la défense by insulating the court's own points of law from party debate, 
thereby authorising Damaška's jura novit curia.
The belief in the fact-law federalism of da mihi factum may be a prevailing view 
amongst scholars about how parties and counsel ought to behave.  The NCPC 
however does not expressly enact absolute fact-law federalism, so, however 
much its supporters argue the doctrine is strongly implied, absolute da mihi 
factum remains a rule of etiquette.49 There is near universal acknowledgement 
that in French practice parties invariably base their cases on a mixture of factual 
and juridical analysis.50 This suggests that the absolute fact-law federalism 
advocated by Motulsky is an ideology of judicial power that owes more to the 
legislative force of the beliefs of La Doctrine and party acquiescence than to 
formal legal requirements or actual practice.51 
Scholars and practitioners recognise legal arguments are "fort utiles" for a party’s 
successful claim52 and that a party's reliance on the equity of the facts alone is 
unlikely to be successful.53 Be this as it may, Jolowicz noted a tendency of some 
French judges to pay insufficient attention to the parties’ legal arguments during 
process and other scholars acknowledge a tradition of deference to the court on 
the part of the French bar with respect to the presentation of legal argument.54 
49 Some argue this is implicit from the section headings which appear in NCPC, Pt I, to apportion 
the 'facts' to the parties and the 'law' to the judge. see Martin supra note 23 §1   
 
50 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 137.  “Da mihi factum…reflète bien mal la réalité 
procédurale engendrée par la contestation.”  [Da mihi factum…reflects rather poorly the 
procedural reality engendered by adversarial process.]  
 
51 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 352 and 363 refer the Decree 98-1231 of 28 December 
1998 which amended the NCPC sections 56, 753 and 954, introducing explicit requirements that 
parties state “des moyens en fait et en droit” [arguments of fact and law] upon which their cases 
are based, in both their initiating documents and their conclusions.  see J.A. Jolowicz, 
“Adversarial and Inquisitorial Models of Civil Procedure”, (2003) 52 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 281 at [note 50].  
 
52 Roland and Boyer, Adages du droit français, 3rd (Litec: Paris) at 370.  Arguments of law are 
"fort utiles à qui veut gagner son procès" [very useful for she who would win their case]. (in 
Roland and Boyer 4th ed, supra note 3 at 363 this becomes “ce qui ne dispense pas les plaideurs 
d’alléguer tous moyens de droit utile, étant tenus de les faire valoir dans l’assignation (NCPC art 
156, al 1,2,) et dans les conclusions (NCPC art 753 et 954))  [this does not excuse the parties 
from pleading all points of law that further their cause being obliged to do so in initiating the 
claim…and in their concluding summaries…   
 
53 R. David, "Supereminent Principles in French Law" in The Role of Judicial Decisions and 
Doctrine in Civil Law and in Mixed Jurisdictions, J. Dainow, ed., (Louisiana State University: 
Baton Rouge, 1974) at 121-22  
 
54Jolowicz supra note 12 at 86 notes French judges "frequently postpone serious consideration of 
the law governing the case until after the ‘clôture des débats”.  This practice prevents the court 
from eliciting the parties' points of view on issues of law and also through interaction with the 
parties of drawing out possible issues and legal solutions.  Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 363 
allude to the genesis of the jura novit curia ‘moment’ illustrating a hypothetical judge signaling his 
lack of interest or impatience with a party's legal argument by saying, “Avocat, passez au fait, la 
Cour sait le droit."  [Advocate, move on to the facts, the Court knows the law].  
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The attitude, ‘let's go see what the judge says’55 suggests this deference, 
reflecting one traditional view of judicial office in France, that of the 'judge-
provider', a benign 'padre' who regards the parties and lawyers who plead before 
him as his 'enfants'. These phenomena suggest that aspects of fact-law 
federalism derive more from judicial attitude or professional practices of courts 
and lawyers than from the merits of a doctrine many criticise as incoherent or 
from any positive law.56 
Nor was the elevation of Motulsky's marginalisation of the parties' legal argument 
to high principle supported by any formal law prohibiting parties from arguing 
points of law.57 Characterising this approach to jura novit curia as a legal rule 
would, therefore, be incorrect, inasmuch as it is not illegal for parties to plead 
law.  Indeed since1998 parties in France are generally obliged to declare the 
points of law on which their case is founded.58 Even before 1998, Merminod's 
characterisation was also belied by French practice, in that parties invariably did 
argue points of law to support their claims and defences.   
 
The truth of Merminod's definition of jura novit curia, then is not that it is 
normatively 'correct' or 'incorrect' but that it may accurately express pervasive but 
not necessarily universal attitudes about courts and parties held in France by the 
legal community.  In the result, Merminod's jura novit curia describes a tendency 
of practice, a phenomenon of legal culture and behaviour rather than a formal 
principle or positive rule.  Accordingly, confirmation of Merminod's jura novit curia 
must be found in an empirical examination of cases in courts of first instance, 
regional courts of appeal and in France's national courts, the Conseil d'Etat and 
the Cour de cassation to determine the extent to which the beliefs which 
Merminod associates with jura novit curia manifest in practice.  
 
The association of fact-law federalism with jura novit curia gives rise to another 
problem: the doctrinal incompatibility of jura novit curia and da mihi factum.  If da 
 
55 Mann, supra note 8 at 375 describes two hypothetical parties who say, "let us see what 
happens - the court will tell us."   
 
56 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 141 describe "une distinction très nette" [a very fine 
distinction] and how it is "très delicat voire impossible de separer le fait du droit".  [very trickly, 
even impossible to separate matters of fact from matters of law.] Damaška, supra note 11 at 114 
dismissed the viability of the distinction writing any "procedural system that entrusts the definition 
of factual issues to the parties and the formulation of legal issues to the adjudicator…invites 
serious trouble."  see Roland and Boyer, at 137: While at the time of the Revolution the distinction 
was imposed in criminal law to separate the jurisdictions of the jury and the judge, it was soon 
recognised the system was unworkable and an informal practice of sharing jurisdiction arose until 
the law of 25 November 1941 formal cooperation between judge and jury with respect to matters 
of fact and law.  The civil jury was rejected by the Revolutionary assembly because of the 
difficulty of distinguishing between questions of fact (for the jury) and questions of law (for the 
court) in civil matters.  see A. Duport, Principes et plan sur l'établissement de l'ordre judiciaire,
(Imprimairie Nationale: Paris, 1790); A. Padoa-Schippa, “Le jury d'Adrien Duport“ in 2 La 
Revolution et l'ordre juridique privé, rationalité ou scandale? Actes du Colloque d'Orléans, 11.-
13.9.1986 (Paris, 1988) at 609. 
 
57 Jolowicz supra note 12, in 1980 supported Motulsky’s strict fact-law federalism, but would later 
write, “”In fact, there never was, in France, an actual prohibition against the pleading of law….” 
see J.A. Jolowicz (2003), supra note 44, text at note 52. 
 
58 Roland and Boyer, supra note 51.  
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mihi factum precludes the parties from offering legal analysis of their facts 
because the law is the "monopoly"59 of the judge, and if jura novit curia involves 
the rejection of the parties points of law and their substitution by the court's own, 
the two adages are mutually exclusive.  Jura novit curia requires party arguments 
of law, if only to reject them, whereas da mihi factum precludes party arguments 
of law.  Both adages cannot be 'correct' unless the specific circumstances in 
which each is 'correct' are identified.  Yet it is common for the two adages to 
taken to express similar rules, despite the obvious incoherence of this position 
when the interaction of doctrine and practice is considered.60 
Adages as a genre 
The illogic of the opposition between the adages jura novit curia and da mihi 
factum, however is symptomatic of the irrationality to which adages as a genre 
may give expression.  Merminod's tentative expression of the normative 
dimension of jura novit curia, is at least consistent with the fluid quality of adagic 
meaning.  Adages are a species of legal folklore and even where they state a 
legal rule, formal legal status of that rule is acquired through independent 
legislative or judicial pronouncement.  Adages do not normally give rise, propre 
mouvement, to the kind of norm stated by Damaška.  To the extent an adage 
may in practice achieve legal status, without support from formal law, a legal 
system reveals its folkloric foundations arising from usage and attitudes to which 
practitioners may be serenely oblivious or savants hesitant to acknowledge.   
 
An adage may express, as Merminod expresses, cultural beliefs or tendencies of 
behaviour observable in legal practice.  In this case, an adequate account of the 
behaviour, beliefs or tendencies would require a sociological quantification of 
their pervasiveness and identification of opposing beliefs and behaviour.  
Motulsky’s quaternary is well-known to French legal culture, but discussion of it, 
as Motulsky himself illustrates, tends to the prescriptive in which adages are tools 
of argument, citations invoked to support scholarly propositions.  The quaternary 
and other adages are infrequently analysed in terms of their systemic and 
doctrinal interaction.    
 
Adages, moreover, are inconsistent with the traditional tenets of logical legalism, 
a distinction that might explain the infrequent use of adages in the writing of 
French procedural scholars.61 This tendency is recognition that the technical 
language of practitioners and scholars is preferred to a system in which legal folk 
 
59 Martin, supra note 48. summarises Motulsky's position stating, "Le juge a le devoir et le 
monopole de la qualification juridique".  [The judge has an exclusive duty with respect to juridical 
qualification.] 
 
60 Jolowicz, supra note 12 treats both adages as identical: at 81 “the applicable rule should be for 
the judge, not the parties, da mihi factum….” and at 84, citing Mann, supra note 8, curia novit 
legem means that “the ultimate responsibility for the law is the court’s.”   
 
61 Damaška, supra note 11 at 35-37 describes the Continental tradition of 'logical legalism,' the 
idea that law was considered to be a science.  Logical legalism extolled the precision, certainty 
and the written Code, the application of which in adjudication was a mechanical process, a "mere 
'subsumption' of facts to norm with no further elaboration (interpretation) of the part of the 
adjudicator" (37) being necessary.  The value of legal certainty, seen as an essential Civilian 
value contrasts the agonistic function of the Commissaire du Gouvernement as described by 
Latour, supra note 31.   
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sayings give rise to formal law or frame scholarly debate.  The result is that the 
significance of jura novit curia is diminished not only by its questionable 
normative claims but also by its very status as an adage.   
 
2.3 Henri Roland and Laurent Boyer, Adages du droit français 
 
Henri Roland and Laurent Boyer present three distinct approaches to 
understanding jura novit curia, two of which will be considered here.  First, they 
identify jura novit curia as a presumption about judicial knowledge of the law 
which receives a priori justification and validation from the adage “nul n’est censé 
ignorer la loi’.  Secondly, Roland and Boyer emphasise the function of jura novit 
curia as an interlocutory rule relating to the proof of the existence of a legal rule 
as a matter of fact, distinct from the rule’s interpretation or application to dispose 
of a case.  The third aspect of Roland and Boyer’s definition, which will be 
considered in Part II of Va Savoir, concerns the association of jura novit curia 
with Article 12 of the NCPC.
Jura novit curia as emanation of adage nul n'est censé ignorer la loi 
 
Roland and Boyer's definition begins with an uncontroversial claim that jura novit 
curia is simply a consequence of another adage, nul n'est censé ignorer la loi.  
The latter adage expresses the rule 'no one is supposed to ignore the law' from 
which issues a presumption that everyone is deemed to know the law.62 The 
association between jura novit curia and nul n'est censé ignorer la loi arises 
because, as Roland and Boyer explain, the judge is duty bound to decide 
according to commandment of the law.  As all citizens are deemed to know the 
law, it must be presumed the judge likewise knows what the law commands.63 
The adage nul n'est censé ignorer la loi gives rise to an empirical-normative 
antinomy similar to that seen in jura novit curia. In jura novit curia the antinomy 
turns on conflicting senses of novit as either a descriptive reference to empirical 
legal knowledge, or as a normative reference to the court’s jurisdiction to ‘take 
cognisance’ of a matter.  As it applies to nul n’est censé, the issue is whether the 
knowledge of the law everyone is deemed to possess has any empirical basis or 
whether it is a legal fiction with a real normative dimension because it states a 
rule prohibiting a defence based on ignorance of the law.  The antinomy, as it 
arises in interpretations of nul n’est censé, is different than that of jura novit curia 
because the est censé element of the adage imports an explicit normative 
element.64 However, taking est censé in its sense of ‘is supposed to’ implicitly 
 
62 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 579, "Les citoyens de la République française, comme les 
Romains de l’Empire, doivent connaître la loi." . [citizens of the French republic just like those of 
the Romans during the Empire are obliged to know the law.] 
 
63 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 363  "…ainsi que de l'objet de la mission du juge qui est de 
faire observer le commandement de la loi, ce qui suppose que celle-ci lui sont connue."  
[Inasmuch as the mission of the judge is to ensure the observation of that which the law 
commands, it must be supposed that the judge knows what the law commands].  F.A.R. Bennion, 
Statutory Interpretation 2d. (Butterworths: London, 1992) at 71 says much the same, writing, 
“Having been sworn to apply the laws and usages of the realm, a judge is presumed to have 
knowledge of what he has thus bound himself to administer.”  
 
64 Concise Oxford Hachette French Dictionary, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995) at 93. 
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suggests a divergence between that which the theory of the adage tells is 
supposed to happen and that which may actually arise in practice. 
The presumption of perfect legal knowledge imputed to all citizens may seem the 
most blatant of fictions.  Even if this is so, it is a fiction with real legal 
consequences for the adage means that ignorance of a law is not a valid defence 
to a claim based on the breach of that law.65 A citizen has a duty therefore of 
finding out what the law demands of them.  The fictional quality is also refuted by 
the many citizens whose legal knowledge, while very far from perfect, perhaps 
even ‘rustic’, is nonetheless sufficient to recognise a legal wrong has occurred for 
which they may find a remedy in court, even if the assistance of a lawyer is 
necessary.  
 
The presumption ‘everyone knows the law’ is not a total fiction for it derives from 
the requirement that enacted legislation be published in the Journel officiel which 
is readily accessible for citizens to consult.66 The presumption 'everyone knows 
the law' is justified and, in this sense, empirically grounded, because the law is 
publicly accessible and through the Journel officiel, all citizens are given factual  
notice of new law.  Yet few citizens likely read the Journel officiel regularly or at 
all and it this anthropological reality on which understanding of the fictional 
quality of nul n’est censé is based.67 
The Divergence of the court’s law and the parties’ law 
 
The availability of the Journel officiel, however, is only one dimension of 
accessibility.  Steiner notes that in France accessibility also refers to 
"comprehensibility", that is, that the law be "intelligible," or 'knowable'.68 The 
measure of this arm of the requirement of accessibility is that a citizen reading a 
loi should be able to understand what it requires of her.  The empirical dimension 
of this dimension of knowability is that the more frequently intervention jura novit 
curia occurs, the more frequently parties and counsel for both sides have got the 
law 'wrong'.  
 
65 See Recueil Dalloz Sirey, 1993, 21 Cahier - Jurisprudence, 306, note H. Vidal.  This report 
concerns an arrêt from the Cour d'appel de Montpellier in which the failure of court officials to 
properly register a 1975 statute changing the law of divorce resulted in the law being found non-
existent and a claim for a divorce was rejected as “irrecevable”.  [inadmissible] The Court stated 
that necessity of registration meant that the adage nul n'est censer ignorer la loi is based on a 
reality and not on a fiction.   
 
66 The Journel Offficiel is the French government’s publication announcing all formal acts of the 
executive and legislative branches of government.   
 
67 Antony Allott in The Limits of Law (Butterworths: London, 1980), at 294 quotes the French 
scholar Roger Granger who wrote, "…la majeure partie des français ignore le droit qui les regit." 
[the majority of French people ignore the law which governs them].  The extent to which people 
comply with the law is a distinct issue from their knowledge of it.  Many laws will be obeyed not 
because people have a knowledge of them but because the law reflects (or does not) a people's 
habitual practices.   
 
68 E. Steiner supra note 9 at 35-36, referring to a decision of the Conseil constitutionnel, 99-421 
DC, 16 December 1999, JO 22 December 1999 p.19041, which “ascribed constitutional value to 
the objective of making the law more accessible and more intelligible.”  
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Frequent intervention jura novit curia suggests the degree to which the law has 
become incomprehensible in a very empirical sense, not just by lay citizens but 
also by trained professionals. Endemic intervention jura novit curia casts a pall in 
this way over the health of the legal system. A system in which courts must 
intervene frequently to 'correct' the flawed legal arguments of parties, advocates 
or lower courts faces fundamental problems with respect to knowability of its 
laws.  As parties are ideally represented by professionals, the adequacy of the 
legal profession also becomes suspect.   
 
The divergence between the law invoked by parties and court undermines the 
legitimacy of the system.69 The system comes to rely on the brut authority of the 
judicial act, rather than its legitimacy as a convincing and informed solution to a 
dispute.  As Roederer observed, the knowing of law becomes the preserve of an 
elite cadre with the vocation or resources to know its complexity, an elite from 
which even legal professionals may be excluded.70 An implicit sense of jura novit 
curia is that the law is the ‘property’ of a judicial elite.  The metaphor evokes 
earlier eras of French history in which judicial office was real property, a capital 
asset, that could be bought and sold, and which produced an income stream 
from the collection of le droit (in an ancien sense) from litigants who prosecuted 
or defended a claim before the court.   
 
Scholarly recognition that the French citizen is subject to 'too much law' suggests 
the claim that an individual may know the law in any exhaustive sense is 
empirically implausible.  Even legal professionals who develop high levels of 
specialist expertise must make efforts to keep abreast of all that the law 
commands.  Continuous legal research is an important professional duty for 
lawyers and judges and presupposes the complexity of law, its susceptibility to 
contrary interpretation, to frequent change and, consequently, the difficulty of 
'knowing' the law.  
 
Roland and Boyer write that “today the law has become infinite”71 and in the 
context of too much law, le droit nouveau, the presumption of jura novit curia that 
the court knows the law may be intended to offer reassurance.  Conceiving of 
jura novit curia as an expression of reassurance hints at the adage's ancillary 
function as an exclamatory locution.  As if in response, to the challenge of 'va
savoir', jura novit curia responds, Coué-esque, as if to say 'someone knows the 
law, and that someone is the curia!'72 In the context of too much law, law that is 
incomprehensible or ambiguous, and the frequency of appeals in France, jura 
 
69 see H. Vidal note, supra note 65 who writes that “le législateur français essaie de compenser 
son déclin par sa prolixité.” [the French legislator attempts to compensate for her decline by long-
windedness] 
 
70 Roland & Boyer, supra note 3 at 580.  Allott, supra note 67, cites R. Granger’s phrase, 
"l'inflation juridique galopante" [roughly translated, “hyper-inflation of the quantity of law”] 
 
71 Roland and Boyer, ibid, at 584 
 
72 Mann, supra note 55  
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novit curia may simply be a touching affirmation 'the law is knowable by 
someone' while a sotto voce chorus confesses how frequently this is not so.73 
Democracy 
 
Despite these problematic aspects of the relationship between jura novit curia 
and nul n'est censé ignorer la loi, the association between the presumptions of 
the two adages is important because it expresses the fundamental connection 
between courts, parties and all citizens.74 The two presumptions refer to a 
shared knowledge that, in litigation, supports what Cadiet describes as the 
principe de la coopération,75 the anti-thesis of Motulsky’s rigid fact-law 
federalism.  The shared knowledge supposed by the interaction of the two 
presumptions speaks to the connection between courts and all citizens.  The 
judgements of many French courts begin with the phrase ‘In the name of the 
French people’.  This locution is the judicial equivalent of a statute's enacting 
clause, expressing the underlying authority from which legal status is derived.   
 
Under successive Republican constitutions the judicial power in France expressly 
derives from the people, the ultimate sovereign.  This is not insignificant in a 
democratic republic, however much la Doctrine tends to conceive of the judicial 
power as a toute puissance modelled along the lines of the unlimited 
prerogatives of Divine Right.  The 1956 Constitution incorporates the right of all 
citizens to participate in law-making, “either personally or through their 
representatives.”76 This is significant, at least in theory, for if the court's inchoate 
jurisdiction derives from a Constitution and legislation enacted by citizens’ 
representatives, it is theoretically coherent to acknowledge a party’s the right to 
participate in law-making directly in individual cases. 77 
73 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 584 write more caustically that the obligatory force of law 
derives not from a knowledge of it but that it is the act of a sovereign power.  [But the problem to 
which Motulsky responded – at start of his thesis -  
 
74 see Le Nouveau stile de la court souveraine de Parlemen & forme de palider & proceder en 
icelle, tant és causes civiles que criminelle; Reveu, corrigé & reduict par tiltres, selon l’advis des 
plus ordinaires Practiciens de ladicte court. Paris 1577 (no author or editor credited) at feuille 61 
[Heading "Quelle chose est la cause, on matière de droit] Ch II  "une cause dressee, ou 
demenable en iustice est l'acte qui se fait selõ les ordonnances de droit, par trois personnes.  
C'est assavoir le iuge, l'acteur, et le defendeur" [sic]  
 
75 Loïc Cadiet, "Le Code" in Vingt ans après, supra note 23, 45 at 64-65.  "Vingt ans après, 
l'opinion croissante, sinon unanime est que les Articles 1er à 13 du nouveau code définissent, en 
vérité, un authentique principe de coopération du juge et des parties dans l'élaboration du 
jugement vers quoi est naturellement tendue la procédure civile.  [Twenty years after [the code] 
the ascendant if not unanimous opinion is that Articles 1 through 13 of the NCPC truly establish a 
veritable principle of co-operation between the judge and the parties with respect to formulating 
the solution to be expressed in the judgement, a development that reflects the natural tendencies 
of civil procedure.] 
 
76 Constitution of 1958, Title 16, II Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789 
Article 6, in Bell, French Constitutional Law, supra note 38 at 245ff. 
 
77 There is no general theory at common law of the democratic basis of judicial process. Indeed, 
one of the most persistent issues of 20th Century legal scholarship in North America, attempting 
to justify the judicial power in a democratic society was based on a rarely challenged assumption 
that courts were inherently undemocratic.  There is some Civilian literature that explores the 
democratic nature of legal process.  R Martin, "Un autre procès possible ou est-il interdit de 
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Parties are hardly supplicants before the court applying for favours as if to the 
Foundation Eva Peron.  Parties saise the court by the act of initiating and 
defending a claim, in default of which the court is without jurisdiction.  The 
parties’ conveyance of saisine is an election that perfects the court’s inchoate 
jurisdiction thereby authorising the court to consider and decide the parties’ 
case.78 The status of parties’ as autonomous grantors of jurisdiction is clearly 
stated in Article 1 of the NCPC which enacts as positive law the traditional 
principe dispositif.79 
The jurisdiction of the court is thus delimited by the jurisdiction conferred by the 
parties in an instant case.  In this light, judex secundum is not merely a rule that 
governs the conduct of decision-making, it is a rule that delimits the judicial 
power.  In principle and in the light of the two primary constitutional sources of 
the courts’ jurisdiction, deciding outside of the bounds of the case established by 
the parties grant of jurisdiction is analogous to deciding outside the bounds of an 
act of parlement. Judex secundum, however, co-exists in Motulsky’s quaternary 
of adages with a jura novit curia that likewise, by some accounts, establishes the 
court’s jurisdiction and duty to decide according to law, preventing the court from 
acquiescing to collusive suits of parties that would be contrary to law.   
 
The supposition a court has a duty to 'know' the law itself presupposes that 
where the parties have both presented legal arguments the court finds 
unsatisfactory, the court may or must intervene jura novit curia to apply the 
'correct' law.  This justification is sound in principle because restricting the court 
to deciding only according to the legal arguments presented by the parties could 
require a court to decide at times according to manifestly incorrect legal 
argument.  On this basis, intervention by the court with its own points of law can 
be justified, not universally but in cases of error, omission or suspected collusion.   
 
By this reasoning, jura novit curia is better seen as a rule for exceptional or 
anomalous cases rather than as a general principle.  However, accounts of jura 
novit curia are confused about whether the adage refers to specific judicial 
powers, such as intervention, or whether the adage is an expression of belief in 
the desirability of a strong judicial power.  It is one thing to approve of 
 
rêver?", RTD-civ, (3) juill-sept.1994 at 559 quotes Calamandrei, (Process and Democracy, 1956, 
at 151) who wrote that “the dialectic of legal process is the dialectic of parliamentary democracy."  
Lon Fuller, Forms and Limits of Adjudication, (1978) 92 Harvard L.R. 353, at 364 wrote of how 
adjudication confers on the parties, “a peculiar kind of participation in the decision, that of 
presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favour.”    
 
78 see H. Kelsen, An Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, [1934], translated by S. 
Paulsen, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992) at 46, ”…even the subjective right of private law 
is a political right, for here, too, the right-holder participates in forming the will of the state.  The 
will of the state is expressed no less in the individual norm of the judicial decision than in the 
general norm of the statute.  And if both the subjective right of the private law and the political 
right can be subsumed under one and the same concept of legal right, it is simply because the 
same legal function – the law-creating function – is expressed in both; that is to say, in both 
cases, those subject to the law participate in creating the law.”  
 
79 NCPC, Article 1, "Seules les parties introduisent l'instance, hors les cas où la loi en dispose 
autrement….” [Only the parties may commence an action, except where a law otherwise 
provides…].   
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intervention jura novit curia in individual cases as a solution to a problem a 
particular case poses.  It is quite different to promote jura novit curia to status as 
systemic principle expressing the court’s general monopoly over juridical 
analysis.  Despite this difference, using jura novit curia to extol the virtues of a 
powerful judiciary obviates the need for jura novit curia to express particular 
norms, because such a use implies it is the court’s prerogative to do whatever it 
likes. 
 
Jura novit curia as an interlocutory rule of evidence: le droit  
 
After their introduction, a single paragraph (which includes a brief reference to 
the association of jura novit curia with Article 12 of the NCPC), Roland and Boyer 
proceed, to detail, over three pages, two exceptions to their primary conception 
of jura novit curia.  The discussion is a distinct departure from other definitions of 
the adage not only because of its length.  More importantly, their definition 
supposes that the most relevant and controversial aspect of jura novit curia is as 
a rule of evidence, relating to the proof of law, rather than to its interpretation or 
application, or its relation to le principe de la contradiction or les droits de la 
défense.
The two exceptions to jura novit curia Roland and Boyer discuss are that in 
matters of international law and matters of French customary law, the judge’s 
power to intervene to 'recognise' the existence of la loi or le droit, is restricted.80 
The general principle is that the existence of la loi étrangère and le droit 
coutumier cannot be presumed (jura novit curia).  The judge must rely on the 
party invoking a rule of international law or French customary law to lead 
evidence proving its existence.81 This is the general principle only and Roland 
and Boyer describe exceptions to this exception, for example, where the pleaded 
customary right is ‘notorious,’ where it is known to the judge personally, or where 
the coutume has been established by jurisprudence.82 
The technical details of the exceptions do not concern us here, other than to 
indicate the precise normative consequences of jura novit curia are unsettled.  
The more relevant aspect of Roland and Boyer’s account concerns the necessity 
le droit coutumier be alleged and proven by a party.  The requirement speaks to 
the relationship of la loi and le droit in its various forms, a relationship that will be 
examined in subsequent discussions concerning the nature of that which the 
court ‘knows’. and the nature of its ‘knowing’.   
 
80 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 364-367.  “Le juge français – sauf exceptions, Chambres 
spécialisées par exemple, - ne peut pas connaître la loi étrangère…[l]a jurisprudence unanime 
exige que le plaideur don’t la prétention repose sur une loi étrangère rapporte l’existence and la 
teneur de ladite loi.”  [the French judge, with exceptions such as specialised Chambres, cannot 
recognise foreign law…the case law is unanimous in requiring the party whose pleadings rely in a 
foreign law to account for its existence and tenor]   
 
81 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 366, “la preuve de la coutume incombant normalement aux 
plaideurs” [the burden proof of a custom normally falls on he who pleads it]. In their subsequent 
analysis however, the number of exceptions seems to diminish the generality of the general rule.    
 
82 Roland and Boyer, Ibid  
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At issue is the meaning to be assigned to the Latin jura. Jura novit curia can 
mean the court knows jura in its sense as la loi, the existence of which a court 
may recognise without formal proof, the consequence Roland and Boyer impute 
to the adage. Jura novit curia may also mean, in some cases, the court knows 
jura in its sense as le droit coutumier. However, le droit coutumier is a “droit 
populaire”83 not formally promulgated in the Journel Officiel and, apart from 
exceptions, its existence accordingly must be proven by the party relying on it.  
 
Jura novit curia as a rule relating to the proof of the existence of law refers to le 
Droit objectif which consists of le droit coutumier and la loi.84 Le Droit objectif 
contrasts with le droit subjectif, which refers to an “individual prerogative” which a 
party may assert as the basis of its claim.85 Le Droit objectif and le droit subjectif 
are complemented, and united in la règle de droit which refers at once to the 
existence of a rule of law and its to application by a court to resolve a dispute.86 
The significance of the relation between le Droit objectif, le droit coutumier, la loi 
and le droit subjectif is that the ‘knowing’ of each type of droit by a court involves 
distinct burdens of proof.  The existence of le Droit objectif is an interlocutory 
factual determination, an essential precursor to a successful claim, but not a 
guarantee of its success, for the existence of le droit objectif on which each party 
relies will typically not be contested.  More importantly, a successful claimant 
must prove an ‘entitlement’ to the application of le Droit objectif to her own 
particular circumstances.  This second burden of proof concerns the proof of le 
droit subjectif. At issue is whether and how jura novit curia extends beyond proof 
of the existence of le Droit objectif, as Roland and Boyer describe, to the proof of 
le droit subjectif, that is, proof a claim should succeed. 
 
Recognition of the existence of a law is distinct from its interpretation and 
application.  A party’s allegation, or a court’s judgement that a law confirms or 
denies a party’s alleged right is not a preliminary matter of proof, but of the 
essence of the merits of claim.  Roland and Boyer refer to the sequence of 
evidential issues and the substantive interpretation and application of a 'proven' 
 
83 [folk law] Ibid, 108, describing the adage “Consuetudo legis habet vigorem” (La coutume a 
force de loi) [custom has the force of law]  
 
84 Cornu, supra note 5 at 322-23, "Droit: 1. Droit objectif (on écrit Droit – avec une majuscule – 
par opposition au droit subjectif) a/ ensemble de règles de conduite socialement édictées et 
sanctionées, qui s'imposent aux membres de la société.”  [Right: Objective right (written Right 
with a capital, as opposed to subjective right) a/ that body of rules of conduct promulgated and 
approved by society and to which its members are subject.] 
 
85 Cornu, supra note 5 at 323. “une prérogative individuelle reconnue et sanctionnée par le Droit 
objectif qui permet à son titulaire de faire, d’exiger ou d’interdire quelque chose dans son propre 
intérêt” [an individual prerogative recognised and affirmed by Objective Right which permits its 
holder to do, require or prevent some act in furtherance of their own interest.] Examples of le droit 
subjectif include individual rights or interests arising under contracts or through testamentary 
dispositions.  see generally, Introduction au droit civil. [web link] 
 
86 Cornu, supra note 5 at 758, “Règle 1. Règle de droit: designe toute norme juridiquement 
obligatoire (normalement assortie de la contrainte étatique), quels que soient sa source….”  
[Rule: 1. Rule of right: refers to all norms juridically obligatory (normally a type state constraint) 
regardless of its source….) (note the source does not include subjective right.)   
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loi or droit to dispose of a party’s claim.87 In France, these aspects of 
adjudication involve the proof of the existence, entitlement and application of le 
Droit, le droit and la règle de droit, distinctions that are problematic for a 
Common Law translation restricted only to the words ‘law’ or ‘right’.  These 
matters of proof involve different types droit and, at least to la mentalité 
«Common law», suggest that whatever the nominalised or conceptual meanings 
assigned to le droit, its forms also function effectively as verbs describing the 
interaction of courts and parties.   
 
The immediate point is that, unlike Damaška's dispositive jura novit curia, Roland 
and Boyer’s is exclusively an interlocutory rule permitting a court to relieve a 
party of the burden of proving the existence of the rule upon which they rely.  As 
an interlocutory rule this manifestation of jura novit curia permits a court to deem 
as proved matters so notorious as to be beyond real controversy.  In this guise, 
the adage is not a dispositive rule at all.  Where an arguable case is made out 
that the rule upon which a party relies does not exist, the court must refrain from 
recognising its existence jura novit curia but must insist that the issue of its 
existence be debated and either proved or disproved.88 Real controversy, in 
these circumstances, therefore, precludes the use of jura novit curia.
This conception of jura novit curia, like Common Law judicial notice,89 is a sound 
rule.  It promotes the efficient unfolding of process by excluding from contention 
matters that are obvious and, at any rate, is a presumption which, in the face of 
real controversy, can be rebutted.  This type of intervention jura novit curia will 
only arise where the existence of the law upon which one party relies is 
challenged by an adversarial party, making party proof a necessity.  Intervention 
jura novit curia to deem the rule to exist is thus a judgement summarily 
dismissing the objecting party's allegation her opponent’s case relies on a non-
existent law.   
 
The interlocutory dimension of jura novit curia may be arbitrary for it requires 
distinguishing that which is notorious from that which is sufficiently contentious so 
as to require party debate.  Substantive issues relating to party rights must be 
distinguished from those that are frivolous or dilatory manœuvres.  The 
distinction can be difficult, however, 'liberal' process would tend to permit debate 
 
87 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 363.  Ce qui n’empêche pas, non plus, les avocats de 
discourir sur le sens ou la portée controversée d’un texte, mais alors on s’évade du domaine de 
la preuve pour entrer dans celui de l’interpretation.”   
 
88 Cour d’appel de Montpellier, 8 February 1993, Recueil Dalloz Sirey, 1993 21e Cahier, 
Jurisprudence  306. The judgement states, “faute d’un tel enregistrement, la preuve de mise à 
disposition du public peut être rapportée par tout moyen, la charge de la preuve incombant à la 
partie qui se prévaut du texte nouveau.” [absent registration, proof of having been made available 
to the public may be raise, responsibility for proof of registration falls to the party who relies on 
the law in question].  A similar case, from the United States raised jura novit curia, i.e. sua sponte 
issues concerning the validity of an act of Congress: United States National Bank of Oregon v. 
Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. 124 L.Ed. 2d 402 (USSC, 1993); 955 F. 2d 731 
(DC Cir, 1992).   
 
89 see 17(1) Halsbury’s Laws of England, supra note 39; Evidence, title 3(4); F.A. R. Bennion, 
supra note 63 at 70, “Under the doctrine of judicial notice, a court….will in certain circumstances 
accept the existence of a law or a fact relevant to the interpretation of an enactment without the 
necessity of proof. 
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rather than forestall it.  In these circumstances, even Roland and Boyer's 
interlocutory jura novit curia power would be a power to be used with restraint.   
 
Today the public promulgation of legislation means the proof of the existence of a 
law is rarely an issue that warrants adversarial debate.90 Historically, however, 
the existence of a law could not be so easily be assumed.  Before the redaction 
of le droit coutumier in ancienne France law was an unwritten oral custom, 
ordonnances of the King were not readily accessible and the publication of the  
arrêts of cours souveraines was generally forbidden.91 Va Savoir Part III will 
argue that this aspect of jura novit curia originates in the power of the court to 
recognise without proof rules expressed in the written coutumiers. The adage 
itself, and other rules associated with the adage, however, do not appear to have 
emerged until well after the Revolution.  
 
Roland and Boyer’s work is the definitive compilation of French adages.  It is 
surprising that Roland and Boyer alone amongst those defining the adage speak 
to its interlocutory dimension.  Surprising also is the amount of space they devote 
to this dimension, passing over in silence the controversies in which Articles 12 
and 16 of the NCPC have been engulfed and the other rules of law that form the 
central thrust of other definitions of jura novit curia.
In their brief treatment of jura novit curia as a dispositive rule, to which I return in 
Va Savoir Part II, Roland and Boyer illustrate jura novit curia with a lengthy quote 
from a provision of the NCPC. They scarcely comment on the provisions of 
Article 12, the meaning of which has been the subject of intense debate since 
first promulgated in 1975.  Not only this, but one alinéa quoted by Roland and 
Boyer’s quotation was repealed by the 1979 decision Conseil d'Etat, that is, over 
two decades ago. Roland and Boyer ignore these facts of black-letter law and 
the controversy in which jura novit curia has been embroiled.  Even lengthy 
definitions of jura novit curia such as theirs, therefore, may be incomplete, 
suggesting all accounts of the adage should be approached critically and 
cautiously, for if we understand jura novit curia by touching only one part of the 
adage, it is not possible to even imagine that other parts remain unseen. 
 
2.4 J. R. Fox, Dictionary of International and Comparative Law 
 
90see Montpellier case, supra note 88 on this issue; The 1979 decision of the Conseil d’Etat 
“annulled” alinéa 3 of Article 12 of the NCPC which provided authorisation for the court to 
intervene jura novit curia with its own points of pure law.  The decision does not appear to be 
universally accepted.  see Eudier, supra note 15, at 101 who writes, "nombre d'auteurs 
considèrent qu'il conserve une "autorité officieuse" (Heron n.3) ou même une "existence vivace 
quoique fantomique" (H. Croze & C. Morel, n.4) pêut-être à titre coutumier"  Eudier at 101 note 6 
cites a case from the Cour de cassation invoking the repealed alinéa 3.  The section appears as 
‘alinéa 3’ in the 2001 Dalloz NCPC with a footnote referring to its repeal in 1979.  At least two 
scholars have, unofficially, renumbered the original 4th and 5th alinéa of Article 12 to fill the gap 
left by the repeal of alinéa 3. see Blondel, supra note 186, in Vingt ans après supra note 23 at 
109 and Eudier, supra note 16 at 43, 99, note1. 
 
91 see T. Sauvel, “Histoire du jugement motivé”, (1955), Revue de droit public et de la science 
politique en France et l’étranger, 5; T. Sauvel, “Les demandes de motifs addressées par le 
Conseil du Roi aux Cours souveraines”, (1957) Revue Historique de droit français et étranger 
529.   
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Fox offers what in some respects is an admirably concise and accurate definition 
of jura novit curia. Fox states that the adage refers to a "presumption that the 
court knows the law"92 with the "consequence" that "the court is not restricted to 
the law presented by the parties, but is free to undertake its own research."  For 
many lawyers, this is the full extent of jura novit curia: namely that a court is not 
absolutely bound by the law pleaded and argued by the parties.  Fox's definition 
is salutary to the extent it expresses this single principle and leaves open 
questions about the manner and form requirements to which a court is subject 
when its research discloses a relevant point of law not raised by the parties.   
 
While Fox's definition of jura novit curia is admirable, it is not beyond criticism. 
Fox, like Roland and Boyer, structures his definition as a presumption that gives 
rise to a consequence, correctly distinguishing between the meaning of the bare 
words of the adage and rules to which the presumption may give rise.  Fox, 
however, does not justify his consequence by associating it with an a priori 
presumption such as ‘everyone knows the law’ by which Roland and Boyer justify 
jura novit curia.
The association, as we have discussed, is important because conceptually the 
presumption ‘everyone knows the law’ connects 'judicial knowledge', not only 
with the parties but with the 'everyone' who in democratic states are, in theory, 
the ultimate sovereign and source of law.  The connection provides jura novit 
curia and by extension the court, with a legitimacy derived from the association of 
the judicial power both with the ultimate sovereign and the parties who saise the 
court, permitting the court to hear and decide their case. 
 
Fox can also be criticised because he is not explicit in his description of the legal 
effects the judicial 'research' power has for the parties.  Fox therefore does not 
reach issues critical to understanding the legal effects of the principle he 
postulates.  The controversial issue is less that the court undertakes its own 
research, than whether and how the research is revealed to the parties during 
process and how it is applied to decide a matter.93 These omissions have 
recursive effects which subvert Fox’s definition. 
 
92 J. R. Fox, Dictionary of International and Comparative Law (Oceana Publishing Inc:Dobbs 
Ferry, New York, 1992. “…the presumption that the court knows the law.  This maxim controls the 
manner in which the International Court handles questions of international law.  As a 
consequence, the court is not restricted to the law presented by the parties, but is free to under 
take its own research.”  see also, J. Bell, “Comparing Precedent”, (1997) Cornell LR 1243 at 
1274.  “…many civilian systems operate with the principle curia novit legem, the judges will 
conduct their own research on precedent.”  Bell, ibid at note 136 defines curia novit legem as 
“Courts become acquainted with the law.” [citing J Bell, “Reflections on the Procedure of the 
Conseil d’Etat, in Droit sans frontières, G. Hand & J. McBride, eds. (Holdsworth Club: 
Birmingham, UK, 1991) 211 at 216-17]  
 
93 B. Miller, “Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to 
be Heard”, (2002) 39 San Diego L.R. 1253 at 1256 describes the options of American appellate 
courts when the court considers an issue has not been ‘framed correctly’ or was ‘missed’ by the 
parties.  The options are, first, ignore the issue; secondly, mention the issue but treat it as either 
not properly raised or as waived; thirdly, note the issue and remand it to a trial court for 
consideration; fourthly, ask the parties for supplemental briefing before reaching its decision; 
fifthly, decide the issue without briefing; and sixthly, mention the issue in the judgement but treat it 
as dicta.
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An explicit definition of jura novit curia would clearly state the consequences of 
judicial research, namely, the possibility a court may: 
 
a) intervene  
b) on its own initiative 
c) to reject the parties’ points of law, and  
d) to raise its own new points of law discovered in the course of its 
independent research; and  
e) base its decision on them.   
 
These five distinct elements of intervention jura novit curia are concealed within 
the word ‘research’ which serves as a euphemism.  Spelled out, 'research' refers 
to a type of jura novit curia that permits a court to participate in the parties’ 
adversarial proceeding without prompting from the parties themselves.  Where 
the intervention proceeds in the manner of Damaška’s jura novit curia, its five 
elements must be supplemented by a sixth, the denial of notice to the parties, 
and a seventh, the denial of an opportunity to debate the rule of law on which the 
court bases its decision.   
 
It follows, then, that how and when the 'research' is raised and applied or the 
types of cases in which this is permitted are necessary elements of any 
understanding of jura novit curia.  Fox’s definition does not address whether the 
court is required to put its own points of law to the parties for argument, that is, to 
comply with the saine solution. Even where the saine solution is respected, its 
meaningfulness relies on the extent to which it is psychologically possible for a 
court to impartially consider the parties' objections to the point of law the court 
has raised of its own motion.   
 
The court that raises its own point of law and, invoking jura novit curia, tells the 
parties that its mind is made up: the ‘court knows the law’.  Yet, simultaneously, 
respecting the saine solution by putting its own point of law to the parties for 
debate, the court invites debate about the applicability of its own point of law.  
This profoundly mixed message renders party debate at best, a formality, and at 
worst, a sham.  Authentic debate on a court’s own point of law presumes a real 
possibility that valid objections to the court’s own point of law may exist and that 
party debate will contribute in a meaningful way to the discovery of these 
objections and an evaluation of their relevance to the instant case.  Intervention 
jura novit curia, however, can only be the judgement because the presumption 
‘the court knows the law’ denies the possibility valid objections may exist. 
 
The Nature of Judicial Research  
 
A second criticism, not to overlook the obvious, concerns the contradiction in 
Fox's statement that, because the court is presumed to know the law, it is free to 
undertake its own research.  A contradiction arises because a court that really 
knows the law would not have to undertake its own research.  Apart from the 
lapse of elementary logic, the contradiction is significant because the divergent 
circumstances which may prompt a court to undertake independent research are 
not necessarily co-extent with all forms of intervention jura novit curia. This 
further suggests the way in which the word ‘research’ functions as a euphemism 
at odds with the bare words of the adage.   
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Judicial research will often be unnecessary to identify a patent error or omission 
in the parties' arguments for a court will often intervene with a spontaneous 
display of its knowledge of the law.94 Most would consider judicial intervention 
for the purpose of remedying a patent error or omission to be an example of the 
type of legal consequences which properly issue from jura novit curia.95 To the 
extent that jura novit curia refers only to judicial research, however, intervention 
not requiring research is, strictly speaking, outside the parameters of Fox's 
definition.   
 
The act of judicial research need not involve or imply a complete absence of 
knowledge.  It does however imply partial knowledge, legal uncertainty, 
complexity or judicial dissatisfaction with the parties' legal argument.  To the 
extent judicial research is a response to legal uncertainty, complexity or 
dissatisfaction, however, party debate on the court’s own point of law is more 
rather than less important.  The function of debate is to clarify the ultimate issues 
which just resolution of the litigation requires.  Judicial policy-making, no less 
than legislative or executive policy making benefits from a thorough analysis of 
the issues including representations from those directly affected.  In addition, 
party debate fosters the parties’ sense that justice has been done.   
 
Apart from intervention to correct obvious errors or omissions or just to verify the 
adequacy of the parties' arguments96, more complex, potentially less innocent 
circumstances may prompt judicial 'research'.  One extreme may be illustrated by 
the legal ‘research’ for which England's Lord Denning became famous.97 In 
 
94 For example, identifying an obvious limitation defence not argued.  Intervention may, however, 
be precipitated not by the existence of an unpleaded defence but by the characteristics of the 
party omitting it.  A court may be more inclined to raise the unpleaded defence where the 
omission is made by an unrepresented defendant that where represented by a skilled advocate.  
(but waiver of unpleaded defences issue)  
 
95 The principle was expressed by a maxim found under the heading, “ut quae desunt avocatis” 
in, Codex Iustinianus in II Corpus Iuris Civilis, P. Krueger, ed. Bertolini, 1963 at 102. The text 
reads, "non dubitandum est iudici, si quid a litigatoribus vel ad his qui negotiis adsistunt minus 
fuerit dictum, id supplere et proferre, quod sciat legibus et iuri publio conveniure."  This was 
explained by English writer George Bowyers, Commentary on the Modern Civil Law, (V&R 
Stevens & GS Norton: London, 1848) at 321 as meaning “the judge must decide upon his own 
knowledge of the law, though it not be relied upon or alleged by the parties.”  A equivocal 
explanation is given in, J. Voet, 2 The Selective Voet, Percival Gane, trans. (Butterworth & Co: 
Durban, 1956) at 60-61.  The maxim dates to the reign of Diocletian and Maximus, was known to 
the French jurist Merlin; but has disappeared from 20th Century scholarship.  The meaning of the 
maxim and the significance of its disappearance is discussed in Va Savoir Part III. 
96 see NCPC annotation to Article 12 at §26, referring to the court’s “…rechercher de son propre 
mouvement la tensure des règles invoquées par les parties.” [researching on its own motion the 
tenor of the legal rules invoked by the parties.]  
 
97 see Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad [1958] AC 379.  This was Denning’s first judgement as 
a Law Lord and according to A. Paterson, The Law Lords (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 
1982 at 39 Denning, “spent the better part of the summer” undertaking independent research in to 
the law.  Denning joined a unanimous court as to the outcome of the case, but based his 
judgement on issues and points of law that had not been considered either by counsel or by the 
lower courts.  Denning justified his action, stating, (at 423-24)that, “the law on this subject is of 
great consequence and, as applied at present, it is held by a great many to be unsatisfactory.  
The four other Law Lords participating in the decision however unanimously rebuked Denning’s 
independent research and dissociated themselves from his judgement specifically on the grounds 
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Denning's case judicial research was motivated by a desire to change the result 
that would have followed from the application of the law that had been pleaded 
by the parties or to rewrite what he consisted to be “bad” law.  I don’t mean to 
praise or criticise Denning’s decisions, rather to associate the doing of equity or 
judicial law-making with jura novit curia through the rubric of ‘research.’  The 
association permits jura novit curia to perform a highly personalised, even 
idiosyncratic function, legitimising the kadijustiz and associating the adage with 
equity.98 
Judicial research, à la Lord Denning, was a radical departure from the Common 
Law adversarial tradition of judicial reliance on party argument, which F. A. 
Mann’s described as the ‘principle of judicial unpreparedness.99 Key decisions of 
Denning, based on his own research, were criticised or overturned on appeal 
because they violated the parties’ rights to notice and a full defence.100 These 
rights in England comprise Natural Justice, which is comparable to le principe de 
la contradiction and les droits de la défense.101 While Mann would claim the 
 
that the parties had not been heard on the points that formed the basis of Denning’s judgement 
and also that now lower had passed on them.   
 
98 see “Palm Tree Justice and the Lord Chancellor’s Foot”, in Justice Lord Denning and the 
Constitution, P. Robson, P. Watchman, eds. (Gower: Farnborough, 1981) 1 writes that, “Lord 
Denning combines a legendary distaste for precedent which does not accord with his intuitive and 
idiosyncratic sense of justice with his predilection for policy-making which at times has given the 
Court of Appeal the appearance of a legislative rather than a judicial body.”  Whether associated 
with a ‘parties’ rule’, the adage judex secundum or ultra petita, with Natural Justice or Due 
Process, or les droits de la défense, restricting a court’s power to decide according to points of 
developed in the course of its own independent research serves to reduce the likelihood of 
idiosyncratic decisions based on inadequate consideration of either legal or policy issues.   
 
99 N. Andrews, “The Passive Court and Legal Argument”, (1988) Civil Justice Quarterly, 125 at 
128-29 associates Denning with only three cases raising jura novit curia issues: Rahimtoola v. 
Nizam of Hyderabad, supra; Lloyd’s Bank v Bundy, [1974] 3 All ER 757 at 763-66 (CA) and 
Goldsmith v Speering [1977] 2 All ER 557 (dissenting).  Andrews discusses a fourth case, The 
Laconia, because in it Denning ‘relents’ and confesses that a passage from his judgement based 
on unargued points of law had been omitted at the urging of Lawton and Bridge L.JJ.  I have not 
encountered any publications closely examining Denning’s decisions in term of his research and 
intervention jura novit curia. That Denning’s reputation as an innovative judge transcends issues 
narrowly focussed on independent research and intervention jura novit curia suggests a body of 
Denning judgements in which innovation was possible within what Andrews, at 128 describes as 
“the straight-jacket of party argument”.  
 
100 In Hadmore Productions v. Hamilton [1983] A.C. 191 at 233 the House of Lords, overturned 
Lord Denning’s judgement in the Court of Appeal, [(1981) 2 All E.R. 724] and chastised Denning 
because he had research and used in support of his judgement a passage from Hansard, a 
source which, at the time, both courts and parties were not allowed to use.  Lord Diplock 
described this as a breach, “of one of the most fundamental rules of natural justice: the right of 
each to be informed of any point adverse to him this is going to be relied upon by the judge and to 
be given an opportunity of stating what his answer to it is.”  In Goldsmith’s v Speering Ltd. Lord 
Bridge criticised the research that led to Denning’s dissenting judgement.  Bridge wrote, 
Denning's, “private research demonstrates the law, as stated in the leading text book, to be not 
only wrong, but unarguable.  Such a claim is untenable.” and Denning’s judgement, “decides 
against the plaintiff on a ground on which…the plaintiff has not been heard…there is a breach of 
the rule audi alteram partem…[which]… in a court of inferior jurisdiction would be a ground for 
certiorari.”   
 
101 see Jolowicz (2000), supra note 12 at 191ff.  see also A. Zuckerman, Review of Jolowicz On 
Civil Procedure, (2000) LQR 687 at 688 which illustrates an unusual reticence amongst some 
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absence of curia novit legem was the most spectacular feature of English 
procedure, these decisions of Denning illustrate not just the undertaking of 
judicial research, in Fox’s sense of jura novit curia, but also the application of 
Damaška’s extreme form of the adage.102 
Cases decided after Damaška’s jura novit curia are not difficult to find in French 
law.103 With some frequency the Cour de cassation overturns decisions of 
regional appellate courts decided on the basis of Damaška’s illegal jura novit 
curia.104 Apart from these cases, however, French judgements are not very 
informative about the circumstances of the intervention jura novit curia. The 
doctrine of le secrèt du délibéré and the laconic, legislative style of the French 
judgement prevent readers from learning much about the circumstances 
precipitating intervention.105 Dissenting and concurring judgements, in the 
Common Law style, reasoned on the basis of alternative theories of the case, are 
largely unknown in French practice.   
 
At Common Law dissenting and concurring judgements are an important source 
of information about jura novit curia intervention, often the only readily accessible 
record that the court has decided on the basis of an unpleaded argument of law 
and that debate on the court’s own point of law has either not taken place or 
been inadequate.106 An effect of this form of jura novit curia is that, unless a 
 
English processuelistes to deny the content and construct of what 1(1) Halsbury’s Laws of 
England, supra note 39 at §95ff describes as “Natural justice.”   
 
102 see Broome v. Cassells [1971] 2 All E.R. 187 at 202 (C.A.) where Lord Denning declined to 
follow a House of Lords precedent in Rookes v. Bernard [1964] 1 All E.R. 367, on the basis that it 
had been decided per incuriam, in that the decision in Rookes was, inter alia, based on points of 
law that had not been put to the parties for debate.  see Paterson, supra note 97 at 48, to the 
contrary.  
 
103 see cases cited supra note 20. 
 
104 With the exception of Juge Magnaud, ‘le bon juge de Château Thierry’ an example of the 
idiosyncratic judge and a marked departure from the collegial anonymity of the French curia, no 
French judge has acquired the notoriety of Lord Denning, although Mimin, infra, suggests a 
thorough enquiry into the manifestation of judicial personality in French judgements might prove 
rewarding. With respect to Juge Magaud see T. Legendre, in "Graines d'histoire, la mémoire de 
l'Aisne”, automne 1999, N°7.  
105 J. Bell, French Legal Cultures, supra note 22 at 70, writes "…the decision hides many of the 
contentious arguments which have been considered by the judges."  see also Steiner, supra note 
9 at 149-151 who confirms what are commonly seen as the most significant tendencies of the 
French judgement style, (“terse…cryptic…laconic…formalistic…depersonalised…”) but also cites 
Mimin who “castigates, sometimes vehemently, [French] judges’ attempts at inserting into their 
decisions policy arguments, personal views, alternative approaches, or what he calls, 
‘humanitarian nonsense.”  see P. Mimin, Le style des jugements (LibrairieTechnique: Paris, 
1978); P. Mimin, “Hésitations du formalisme dans les jugements”, Sem.jur., 1956, I. 1447; F-M. 
Schroeder, Le nouveau style judiciaire, (Dalloz: Paris,1978). 
 
106 In Arcadia Ohio v. Ohio Power Company, 112 L.Ed. 2d 374 (USSC, 1990) Mr Justice Scalia, 
for a unanimous court, decided in the manner of Damaška’s jura novit curia basing the decision 
on an interpretation of legislation that had neither been put forward by the parties nor debated 
prior to judgement.  In a separate opinion, Mr Justice Stevens (Justice Marshall, concurring) 
points out that, “neither the parties, the interested agencies, nor the Court of Appeal considered 
the construction of §318 that the Court adopts today.”.   
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party objects to such a decision by appealing, intervention jura novit curia is 
typically a concealed, secret act, which, with the acquiescence of the parties, 
nevertheless results in a valid and binding judgement.  
 
For all that Denning was controversial, his interventions jura novit curia and his 
breach of fundamental principles, were public acts.  Legal process and 
judgement are supposed to be fora of open debate and public record.  Common 
Law notions of fair process and precedent assume each party has notice of all 
matters of fact and law that inform the decision, prior to judgement.  In the case 
of jura novit curia, however, a recurring problem is determining when such a 
decision has been reached.  Contrary to the 'principle of publicity' there is a 
tendency for jura novit curia decisions to be secret until judgement, resulting in 
what lawyers term "surprise"107.
Even where parties are 'surprised' by the judgement, their knowledge of a jura 
novit curia intervention derives only from their personal knowledge of the legal 
arguments presented.  Future readers of the judgement, including courts 
undertaking research, will be denied access to the nature of the court's moyen 
secrèt. This may be less important in jurisdictions with a weak system of 
precedent, but is of concern in jurisdictions in which litigation presupposes a 
connection between the material pleaded by the parties and the material 
contained in the judgement.  The testing of legal hypotheses through full 
adversarial debate at Common Law is one important measure by which a judicial 
decision acquires status as precedent.108 
Fox’s use of the word “research” is has a strong Common Law feel to it, 
inasmuch as in Civilian jurisdictions such as France with a judicial process 
typically in two stages, “research” is an ordinary task of the juge rapporteur or 
juge de mise en état that prepares the case for presentation to the full curia.109 
107 'Surprise' is a term of art that describes the effect on the parties of an act taken by a judge 
without prior notice, such that they are unprepared and unable to respond.  Cornu, supra note 5 
does not define “surprise”.  In the introduction to the predecessor to the NCPC, the Nouveau style 
de la proceudre civile dans les cours d’appel, les tribunaux de première instance, de commerce 
et dans les justices de la paix, ou Le Code judiciaire (Hacquart: Paris, 1806), M. LePage writes at 
769 that the Code presents a "marché fixe et qui présente des garanties contre les erreurs and 
les surprises." [a level playing field which offers guaranties against error and surprises] Benabent, 
supra note 19 at §3 uses the term in quotation marks, "«surprise»”, the quotations suggesting a 
colloquial association has attached to the word since the era of LePage. 
108 Debate affirms that the parties have been heard, demonstrating compliance with party 
procedural rights.  Debate also indicates that the Court’s decision is informed by the ‘advice’ 
counsel provide. These policy-related factors do not impact fully on the doctrine of precedent, 
however.  No firm rule is established, rather the absence or inadequacy of argument itself 
becomes an argument courts may consider in evaluating the weight to be given to a precedent.  
see R. C. Cross, Precedent in English Law,3d (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1979) at 148-50 
(sub silencio decision); and A. Milani and M. Smith, “Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte 
Decisions by Appellate Courts” (2002) 69 Tennessee L.R. 245 at 298 n. 291 (on practice of 
ordering supplemental briefing) and at 308 (analogy between precedent value if dicta and sua 
sponte decisions).   
 
109 Bell, supra note 22 at 161.  One possible meaning, perhaps of historical significance, is that 
jura novit curia asserts the right of the full curia to decide, a reference to the necessity of a 
decision reflecting the majority of curia members.  see Code de la Justice de Paix, Quatrième 
Edition, (A Bourdeaux, chez Pallandre l'aîné, Citoyen, Place Saint-Projet, No. 3, 1791) at Book I, 
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In the context of Fox’s publication – international and comparative law – 
independent judicial “research”, a less common but hardly rare event, functions 
to explain to Common Lawyers what Civilians take for granted: the judge is 
actively involved in examining all aspects of the parties case including arguments 
of law.  This activity does not invariably involve intervention jura novit curia but 
speaks instead to the court’s duty to decide correctly, a duty which may at times 
require intervention jura novit curia, particularly where party argument is not fully 
developed.   
 
Duty and Discretion  
 
Fox’s statement that a court is "free" to conduct its own research touches a 
controversy with respect to intervention jura novit curia in France.  By the word 
"free" Fox likely means that there are no restrictions on the power of the court to 
conduct its own research, to reject party arguments of law, to intervene and apply 
the fruit of the research to its decision.  Fox, in this view, describes intervention 
jura novit curia as an unfettered discretion, a prerogative power, as opposed to a 
duty, which parties can insist be discharged.  
 
The effects of the duty-discretion question may be significant in France because 
if the power is a discretion, it is less overtly amenable to review by superior 
courts.110 French courts are duty bound to dire droit, to decide according to the 
'correct' legal rule applicable to the facts, a duty most agree includes, where 
necessary, the power to intervene, jura novit curia. A lacuna arises between 
intervention-as-discretion and intervention-as-duty because of the difficulty of 
distinguishing between cases in which the duty of the judge requires intervention 
d'office to apply the 'correct' legal rule from cases in which intervention to apply 
the correct legal rule is a discretion that permits, but does not require, 
intervention.  The lacuna embraces conflicting conceptions of the nature of 
judicial office, referring at once to notions of the activist or passive judge and the 
selective application of equity.111 
Cahier 5 in which the Justice de Paix is instructed to keep secret decisions reached contrary to 
the majority of the court.   
110 see R. Martin, "L'Article 6-1 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de 
l'homme contre l'Article 12 du nouveau code de procédure civile" (1996, Recueil Dalloz Sirey, 
Chronique Jurisprudence) 20, at §1 writes, "…il semble que la Cour de cassation, de Chambre 
en Chambre, décide qui l'art 12 contient une obligation quand elle veut casser, ou seulement une 
facultée quand elle ne veut pas casser." [… it would seem that overall the Cour de cassation has 
decided that Article 12 expresses an obligation when the court wishes to quash, and simply a 
discretion when the court does not want to quash].  This flexibility arising from inconsistent 
jurisprudence and a reluctance to definitively state whether the intervention is a duty or discretion 
suggests that two valid interpretations of Article 12 are co-extent in jurisprudence.  Common 
lawyers will recognise in Martin's comments the use made by appellate courts of the distinction 
between question of fact (appeal not allowed) and question of law (appeal allowed).  The 
distinction served as a justification for what essentially was a discretionary decision of the court, 
that does not, in the case of rejection, require the court address the merits of the case in its 
reasons for judgement. 
 
111 The distinction between duty and discretion is blurred in the case of Roland and Boyer’s 
interlocutory jura novit curia to waive the necessity of proof a law exists.   
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The effects on jura novit curia are radically different when jura novit curia 
intervention is seen as a duty.  If a duty, parties may challenge a decision on the 
grounds the judge below breached its duty by not intervening to apply the 
'correct' but unpleaded rule the judge should be presumed to have “known”.  In 
the hands of a party, jura novit curia may be a plea112 that the lower court did not 
know the law, a error the higher court should rectify by applying the correct but 
unpleaded rule.  Where a higher court agrees, it not only affirms both the 'correct' 
legal rule but also acknowledges that the legal knowledge of the court below was 
erroneous, normatively and empirically.  In effect, characterised as a duty, jura 
novit curia permits evasion of the general rule against the raising of new issues 
on appeal.  The rule, meant to encourage parties to plead their full cases at first 
instance, is subverted when parties can invoke jura novit curia, as ground for 
appeal on the basis that the lower court did ‘not know the law’.   
 
In France, the 1979 Conseil d'Etat NCPC decision annulled Article 12 alinéa 3, (a 
provisions which authorised intervention) specifically because the alinéa had 
been famed as a discretion.113 The Conseil stated that alinéa 3 contravened the 
fundamental principle égalité devant la justice which guarantees the equal 
treatment of all citizens before the courts.  Because alinéa 3 was framed as a 
discretion,  a court was permitted to intervene or not, at its discretion, depending 
on its own sentiments rather than upon the basis of the law governing the case.  
Fox's claim the court is “free” to conduct its own research, i.e. intervene with its 
own points of law, does not reflect French law, notwithstanding contrary practice.  
 
Fox's use of the word "free" may also suggest there are no important distinctions 
between types of cases or in which intervention jura novit curia is permitted.  
Without qualification, this 'freedom' leads to an incorrect or misleading account of 
the power.  In French law, rules expressed by principle, positive law and tradition 
constrain the freedom to intervene jura novit curia. The French judge is generally 
'free' to apply, where appropriate, a moyen d'ordre public, however, application of 
le principe de la contradiction which negates Damaška’s jura novit curia is itself a 
moyen d’ordre public.
The Dalloz annotation of the NCPC reports many cases, particularly under 
Articles 4 and 5, describing situations in which French courts are not free to 
intervene and decide on the basis of their own ‘research’.114 To the extent such 
rules derive from la jurisprudence, or are rules subject to the interpretations of 
individual judges, a weak doctrine of precedent in France means they are better 
understood as guidance rather than binding rules.115 In France, courts have a 
 
112 As was the case in Van Schijndel, supra note 12. see also the Guerra case, infra note 233. 
 
113 see 1979 Conseil d’Etat decision, supra note 18, “en laissant au juge la faculté de relever 
d’office des moyens de pur droit et en le dispensant alors de respecter le caractère contradictoire 
de la procédure, le Gouvernement a apporté à ce principe des limites illégales.”  [in leaving the 
judge with a discretion to raise points of pure law on its own motion and in doing so dispense with 
adherence to the adversarial nature of procedure the Government has carried this principle to 
illegal limits]; see NCPC, text of alinéa 3.  
 
114 See NCPC, Articles 4 and 5; and annotations thereto.  
 
115 The weak but not impuissant doctrine of precedent in France, see supra note 24, is to a large 
degree the consequence of the values expressed by Article 5 of the Code Civile, see infra note 
200.  French courts may not ‘legislate' insofar as the matter relates to civil law.  
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certain freedom to disregard precedents, which, formally, are not absolutely 
binding.  This freedom, if precedents are law of some kind, itself suggests how 
jura novit curia may permit a court to pick and choose the law it knows, subject of 
course to a party challenging this knowledge on appeal.   
 
2.5 A. Engelman, A History of Continental Civil Procedure  
 
As noted earlier, jura novit curia, by some interpretations, is incompatible with da 
mihi factum.116 The incompatibility arises because, following Fox’s definition, jura 
novit curia involves a court rejecting all party points of law and substituting its 
own.  However, absolute da mihi factum, by which parties may plead no law 
whatsoever, means there is no law for the court to reject, and therefore, 
intervention jura novit curia, at least in Fox’s sense of the adage, cannot arise.   
 
The incompatibility may be resolved by non-absolute forms da mihi factum.
Merminod’s jura novit curia, for example, does not preclude party legal argument 
of law and foresees the substitution that arises with intervention jura novit curia.
Another variant of jura novit curia, however, holds not that the parties are 
excluded from arguing law, but that it is not necessary for them to do so.  
 
The consequence of this form of jura novit curia is significant because the 
possibility of intervention jura novit curia is made contingent on an election of the 
parties rather than the judge.  Where parties elect not to plead law, complete 
responsibility for the law is placed with the court.  While this might be seen as a 
form of (enforced) jura novit curia, in this case there are no party arguments of 
law to reject.  Consequently, the court is entirely responsible for the identification 
of the applicable law and cannot be said to ‘intervene’. 
 
Engelman, in the oldest definition I’ve encountered, conceived of jura novit curia 
along these lines, writing that the party’s “rule of law need not be expressly 
averred because ‘jura novit curia’”.117 Engelman’s jura novit curia expresses the 
presumption the ‘court knows the law’, which has the consequence of permitting 
parties to rely entirely on the court’s legal knowledge or research.  A further 
consequence of Engelman’s definition is that it authorises the parties to elect to 
plead only the facts of their case, resulting in an ad hoc absolutist da mihi factum 
arising by party election.  The result of Engelman’s definition is that, where 
parties elect to plead no law, Fox’s conception of jura novit curia as an 
expression of the judge’s ‘freedom’ to conduct its own ‘research’ is negated 
because the court loses its freedom if obliged to identify the applicable rule 
without party assistance.  
 
Engelman’s definition of jura novit curia while perhaps expressing a principle 
valid in some jurisdictions is less relevant in contemporary France.  Since the 
Decrèt-loi of  28 December 1998 it is obligatory for parties to explicitly state the 
 
116 supra, section 2.2 at note 60  
 
117 A. Engelman, et al, A History of Continental Civil Procedure, translated by R. Millar, (Little 
Brown: Boston, 1927)(Reprinted for Augustus M. Kelly, New York, 1969) at 547. “The rule of law 
[pleaded by a party] need not be expressly averred for “jura novit curia”…”   
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juridical bases of their claims and defences. 118 As a consequence, it is no longer 
possible for parties to elect to plead no law.  Even before these reforms, 
Engelman’s principle was not applicable in actions before the Cour de cassation 
which necessarily involve legal argument, the court’s jurisdiction being limited to 
issues of law.119 Likewise before 1998, as already mentioned, French practice 
was inconsistent with Engelman’s principle in that parties most often would 
include legal argument in their submissions.120 
Regardless of its relevance in contemporary France, theoretically, Engelman's 
party-driven jura novit curia has interesting doctrinal and practical consequences.  
The key aspect of Engelman’s phrasing of his principle – ‘it is not necessary for 
the parties to aver their points of law’, is that it hints at the reciprocal relationship 
between rights and obligations generally, how the exercise of a party right 
imposes an obligation on the court.121 A certain 'push and pull' arises between 
courts and parties in that both jura novit curia and da mihi factum, in addition to 
describing prerogatives or duties the courts, may also refer to rights or 
prerogatives plaintiffs and defendants can manipulate to strategic advantage.   
 
It is difficult, perhaps, to imagine situations in which a party would elect to plead 
only fact unqualified by legal argument.  The practice is common, even typical, in 
small debt claims brought by litigants in person acting without legal advice from 
counsel.  In these circumstances, however, the absence of legal argument arises 
by way of imperative rather than by way of election.  The practice might also 
arise in actions where a party, particularly a defendant, is unable or unwilling to 
expend considerable amounts of money to purchase legal representation. 
 
A party may intentionally withhold legal argument where some strategic 
advantage is seen, for example, to reserve a particular legal argument for an 
anticipated appeal, or to evade an opponent’s strongest defence.  A party may 
withhold legal argument where there are potential multiple ‘theories of the case’ 
or causes of action, one of which, for example, is subject to a limitation period 
defence to which one party does not wish to draw the other’s attention.122 
118 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 363 
 
119 The formal jurisdiction of the Cour de cassation is flexible to the extent that parties and the 
Court can characterise issues as matters of fact or matters of law.  see  Martin, supra note 23 at 
§8, for a Legal Realist-style account of how the Cour de cassation distinguishes between fact and 
law. 
120 Norman, supra note 20 at 392-3, notes the ‘incontestable orthodox view’, that the judge raises 
its own point of law only when applying a rule that has not been pleaded by a party.  In these 
circumstance provisions of the NCPC relating to intervention d’office [i.e. jura novit curia] fall 
outside of provisions of the NCPC requiring respect for le principe de la contradiction. This 
argument could be taken further in that where parties plead no law, and the court therefore is not 
required to put to the parties the points of law that form the basis of its decision, Damaška’s jura 
novit curia, which refers to points of law not argued by the parties, will arise.   
 
121 for example, H. Kelsen, An Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, [1934], translated by 
S. Paulsen, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992) at §§19ff  
 
122 One difficulty discussing jura novit curia from a comparative perspective is that the 
hypothetical 'typical' case that frames scholarly discussion is different in France than at Common 
law.  For Common lawyers educated in the 'case method', the typical case is not the continuous 
oral trial, one of Mann's characteristics of Common Law adjudication, but the appellate hearing, 
29081-text.native.1130701669 
Created: 30 October, 2005 Printed: 17 November, 2005 40
 
In complex cases, in the interests of economy, counsel may advise that only one 
of several viable legal bases for a claim be put forward.  Andrews notes that 
incomplete arguing of the possible legal bases of an action may be a form of self-
censorship on the part of counsel, acting perhaps in the interests of client 
economy or in the spirit of ‘case management’ rules.123Fully developing and 
considering all possible legal argument in a case is expensive for both parties 
and the court and can be used strategically by a well-funded party against an 
opponent who is not.  
 
The conceptual validity of Engelman’s jura novit curia can be questioned, 
however, because, arguably, it is impossible for a party not to plead law.  This 
argument holds that legal argument is implicit in all pleading, because claimants 
must ask the court to perform some legal act.  In Common Law terms, this 
means invoking a legal remedy.  French parties may ask for a divorce,
dommages et interêt, or résolution and each of these categories of legal right are 
comprised of elements that must be proven by the claimant or defendant.  These 
‘remedies’, as it were, however skeletal, nonetheless constitute the parties’ legal 
argument.   
 
French terminology speaks of the cause de la demande and objet du litige which 
arise, or at least are alleged, in every action.  The cause de la demande, le 
fondement du litige or the more recent, objet du litige however may give rise to 
different ‘theories of the case’, to use the American phrase.124 It is in this 
intermediate realm of litigation where the merits are reached, between facts and 
remedy on one hand, and the debated and declared solution, on the other, that 
French procedural scholars debate in technical language the extent of the power 
of the courts to substitute its own point of law for those put forward by the parties. 
 
Different conceptions of the cause de la demande in France have turned on the 
degree of to which parties may engage in juridical analysis of their claim.  
Motulsky, an advocate of a strong jura novit curia and an absolutist, systemic da 
mihi factum, conceived of the cause de la demande as complexe des faits,
devoid of all juridical analysis.125 In one sense, Motulsky’s da mihi factum and 
his fact-based conception of cause are different ways of stating the same thing: 
an absolute prohibition on party argument of law.  Both conceptions fail, 
 
more specifically the appellate judgement which contains extensive reference to the parties 
arguments of law.  In France, by contrast, the typical case seems to be the case of first instance, 
where courts are more likely to encounter parties acting without representation and in which the 
issues and consequences have less collective impact than would a fully argued appellate case.  
Hence the emphasis on issues relating to the qualification of the parties’ facts by the judge in 
French analysis, a largely first instance phenomena, as opposed to the appellate emphasis of 
Common Law scholars and the importance of legal argument.   
 
123 N. Andrews, “The Passive Court and Legal Argument”, (1988), 7 Civil Justice Quarterly, 125 
 
124 R. Martin, “Le juge devant la prétention”, (1987) Recueil Dalloz Sirey, 6e Cahier, Chronique 
VIII at §6 describes a case from the Cour de cassation [14 mai 1985, com., Bull. civ IV, no 147, 
p126.] in which la Cour refused to quash a court of appeal decision that had granted résolution of 
a sale under Article 1184 of the Code civil notwithstanding the party having claimed résolution on 
the basis of  Article 1641. 
 
125 see Jolowicz, supra note 12 at 82 canvassing three conceptions of cause de la demande.
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however, the moment a party characterises the facts of a dispute in terms of a 
legal remedy.  Motulsky’s definitions, or anyone else’s, are not innocent 
descriptions of natural phenomena, but rather are prescriptive instrumentalities, 
serving ideological ideals. 
 
The traditional debate in France has contrasted a judicial power that is a 
sovereign toute puissance with a power that is a puissance nulle.126 Some 
elements of the ideology of toute puissance, however, do not sit well together.  If 
pleading one’s cause by definition is to state only fact, the imperative voice of da 
mihi factum – ‘give me the facts and I’ll give you the law – is curiously redundant, 
for no instruction need be given to do that which must be done as a matter of 
course.  Where party argument of law is permitted, as it always has been in 
France, Engelman’s jura novit curia as party election while inconsistent with 
Motulsky’s da mihi factum that precludes party argument of law altogether, is 
also impossible with Motulsky’s strict fact-based conception of the cause.  Once 
cause de la demande is defined to include some degree of juridical analysis, 
however minimal, the party takes himself out of Engelman’s jura novit curia which 
supposes a party’s ability to plead no law whatsoever.   
 
In any case, assuming it is possible for a party to elect to plead no law, following 
Engelman’s jura novit curia, the court must become actively involved in 
considering, i.e. researching, the legal arguments available for and against one 
or both parties.  This duty, necessitated by the requirement that the court give 
reasons for its judgement,127 forces the court to assume functions otherwise 
performed by advocates.  Forced to evaluate the strongest and weakest aspects 
of each party’s legal argument without assistance, the knowledge base of the 
court is attenuated and subject to less intense scrutiny.  Where juridical analysis 
of the cause is an exclusive judicial prerogative a potential for bias arises, 
because nemo judex in sua causa: no one must be judge of their own cause. 128 
Objections raised by intervention jura novit curia therefore include not only the 
denial of notice and the right to be heard on the dispositive point of law that are 
the consequence of Damaška’s absolutist jura novit curia. Objections to jura 
novit curia also include the apprehension of judicial bias that may be shown 
when the court introduces a point of law that permits one party to be successful 
on the basis of a claim that, without the assistance of the court, would have 
 
126 see O. Cayla, Office du juge: part de souveraineté ou puissance nulle? (Librairie Générale de 
Droit et de Jurisprudence: Paris, 2001) “Avant-propos” 1 at 2, “la tradition judiciaire de la 
Monarchie française, revendique alors sa «part de souveraineté» de l’autre côté une vision 
hiérarchisée, qui tend à réduite la fonction du juge à celle d’exécutant, avec l’idéal ou le risque 
d’en faire, selon l’expression fameuse de Montesquieu, une puissance «nulle».   [the judicial 
tradition of the French monarchy, asserts its “share of sovereign power”, while on the other hand, 
is a hierarchic conception that reduces the judicial function to that of an executant, with the aim – 
or risk – according to the well-know phrase of Montesquieu – of making the judicial power a 
nullity.] 
 
127 NCPC, Articles 454,455. Steiner supra note 9 at 159 
 
128 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 502, "nemo judex in re sua" "Nul n'est juge en sa propre 
cause" [No one may judge their own cause] see The Institutes of Gaius, translated by W. Gordon 
& O. Robinson, (Duckworth:London, 1988) at 443, 452 describing a case in which a judge “makes 
the dispute his own” (452) and associating this with decisions in which a party is granted more 
than asked for, that is, ultra petita, see also supra note 26. 
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inadequate.129 Bias, or its apprehension, may arise even where the court, 
respecting le principe de la contradiction considers the arguments of the parties 
on its own point law because if jura novit curia, meaningful debate is not 
possible.130 
Writers sympathetic to an expansive view of the power of the judge to intervene 
with its own points of law argue that the power is necessary because otherwise a 
court would be required to reach a decision it considered ‘incorrect’ merely 
because a party had failed to put that point in issue.131 This is correct, but 
signals the inadequacy of party argument as the justification for intervention, 
rather than the existence of a “better” solution.132 Denning spent an entire 
summer researching one case, a level of judicial scrutiny that is difficult to justify 
with respect to single case and systemically impossible to sustain.  Determining 
the appropriate level of scrutiny in any case is particularly difficult, at least 
doctrinally, in France because le principe d’égalité envisages all citizens will 
receive equal treatment before the courts.   
 
Compliance with le principe de la contradiction may also breaks down inasmuch 
as the principe presumes informed debate amongst parties and the court.  The 
absence of party argument of law becomes a method to evade the notice 
function of pleadings which forms a part of le principe de la contradiction and les 
droits de la défense. In all, the action proceeds with less than full and timely 
disclosure because parties must interpret each others’ facts in order to discern 
the implicit legal arguments that arise therefrom. 
 
This indicates how absolutist da mihi factum truncates debate, creating a 
pantomime in which arguments of fact, laden with implicit juridical relevance are 
permitted while explicit reference to law is prohibited.  This vision of process is 
contrary to one of the central purposes of the NCPC, which was to forestall 
 
129 Martin, supra note 110 at 20.  “En effet le moyen relevé d’office par le juge contribuera au 
succès de l’une des parties au détriment de l’autre…”  [In effect the point of law raised by the 
court on its own motion contributed to the success of one party at the expense of the other.] 
 
130 see Martin, supra note 110 at §2, “Sa proposition ne peut être innocente à l’égard du résultat 
qui dépend de lui.  Le jeu est alors biasé, comme arbitre d’un match de football poussait le ballon 
dans un but.”  [the judge’s point of law cannot be seen as innocent of the result than depends on 
him.  The game is thus biased, as if the referee of a soccer match pushed the ball into the goal 
himself.]  also see Damaška, supra note 11 at 114.  There are very few reports of cases in which 
a court did anything but base its decision on the point of law raised of its own motion.  My 
research to date in England, France and the United States has uncovered one case, in the United 
States, cited in Milani and Smith supra, note 108 at n. 291, Paterson v. McLean Credit Union 485 
U.S. 617 (1988) and 491 U.S. at 171.   
 
131 Jolowicz, supra note 12 at 81-82. 
 
132 This point has more meaning at Common Law where it is expected a court will give reasons 
for rejecting the law argued by the parties as opposed to reasons only for the points of law on 
which the decision was reached  While the decree of 28 December 1998 requires the French 
judge to state the parties points of law in its judgement, (s. 753) there is no tradition of explaining 
why the parties points of law have been rejected.  Some Common Law books on judgement 
writing, stress the need to address the arguments of the unsuccessful party in particular because 
it is she that must be convinced justice has been done. see R. Komar, Reasons For Judgement,
(Butterworths: Toronto, 1980) at 9.  
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dilatory and evasive strategies by parties.133 The absence of party legal 
argument also injects an unnecessary element of uncertainty into process 
because the saine solution requires a court to invite party debate on all points of 
law that have not been raised by the parties. Engleman’s jura novit curia and the 
saine solution pull in opposite directions.  The application of the saine solution in 
cases where parties’ plead no law would require the court to coax, cajole or order 
parties to clarify their positions with respect to the applicable law, if only to 
facilitate the adequate formulation of their opponent’s defence.  Considering 
these problems, a healthy and co-operative conception of litigation would require 
each party to state the factual and legal bases of their case clearly, concisely and 
completely, and in this model there is little room for Engleman’s jura novit curia. 
The situation may be different where parties jointly agree to plead no law.  In 
France this gives rise to situations in which jura novit curia – as ‘the court knows 
the law’ – does not apply.  Article 12 alinéa (v) of the NCPC permits the parties to 
appoint the judge as an amiable compositeur or “honest broker”.  The procedure 
is a form of judicial arbitration and while the use of alinéa (v) does not appear to 
be popular in France,134 it is nonetheless one of clear legislative authorisation 
permitting the judge to decide in equity.  The procedure suggests a second 
dimension of jura novit curia which refers, not to ‘knowing the law’, but to 
‘recognising’ parties’ ‘rights’, that is, les droits. Significantly, the procedure of 
alinéa (v) is an election of the parties acting jointly to confer a particular 
jurisdiction upon the court which the court does not have the power to evade. 
 
It is wrong to conclude, as a matter of general theory, that there are no 
circumstances in which a party may act on the basis of either da mihi factum or 
jura novit curia to his advantage.  A party who acts da mihi factum, pleading no 
law at first instance acts pursuant to Engelman’s jura novit curia. On appeal, 
however, the same party may elect to positively plead jura novit curia, pointing 
out the errors of law committed by the judge of first instance and going so far 
perhaps as suggesting the legal arguments the appellate court should adopt.  In 
France, unlike at Common Law, a party generally has greater leeway to raise 
new points of law on appeal and may ask the court to recognise a theory d’office, 
that is, to intervene jura novit curia.135 
Jura novit curia as a party plea on appeal or in cassation is anomalous because 
an important rationale of the jura novit curia-related provisions of the NCPC was 
to promote efficiency in the administration of legal process by reducing the 
number of appeals.136 This value is not promoted by broadening the scope of 
already generous rights of appeal in France by permitting parties to raise issues 
 
133 see G. Cornu, “L’Avènement du Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile: La codification”, in Vingt 
Ans Après supra note 23, 19 at 21.  
 
134 Eudier, supra note 15 at 41 Bell, French Legal Cultures, supra note 22 at 91-92. writes that 
“French business people seem more willing to resort to commercial courts that businessmen in 
common law countries.”   
 
135 generally see J. Bell, S. Boyron, S. Whittaker, Principles of French Law, (Oxford University 
Press:Oxford, 1998) at 103ff.  
 
136 Conseil d’Etat decision 1979, supra note 18.  
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that should have been raised at first instance.137 In France, the seriatim process 
of first instance segues, it seems, into seriatim recourse to higher courts, 
weakening the force that the invocation jura novit curia – the court knows the law 
– is meant to affirm.   
 
Party election is an important aspect of jura novit curia because any prerogative 
or legal right of the parties impute either obligations on the judge or establish 
constraints which limit the judge's freedom.  Accounts of the jura novit curia 
provisions of the NCPC suggest the adage imposes an duty on the court to 
decide 'correctly'.138 This implies that superior courts of review may consider 
with relative freedom alternative legal solutions not argued before lower courts 
where an appellant or respondent alleges the failure of the lower court to act on 
this duty, that is, to intervene with its own point of law.   
 
The parties' right to compel the action of the court in these situations means that 
it is wrong to speak of jura novit curia systemically as an unlimited judicial 
prerogative. The theoretical significance of Engelman’s definition is to explicitly 
conceive of jura novit curia as a party right. The responsibility for identifying the 
applicable law that some attribute as the systemic rule of jura novit curia is, by 
Engelman’s jura novit curia apportioned to the court through an election of the 
parties.  On this basis, the precise meaning of the adage as it speaks to the roles 
of parties and court in the identification of the governing law, is determined by the 
circumstances of each case, a point on which other definitions of the adage are 
silent.  
 
Finally, the effect of legislation on Engelman’s principle of jura novit curia should 
be emphasised.  If Engelman is correct as to the meaning of jura novit curia it 
means that his jura novit curia ceases to be lawful when legislation, such as the 
decree of 28 December 1998, precludes the possibility of a party relying entirely 
on the court’s knowledge of the law by withholding explicit legal argument.  Just 
as Damaška’s jura novit curia is illegal in France, Engelman’s jura novit curia, if it 
has not disappeared completely from practice in France, is less far significant 
today than before 1998. 
2.6 Black's Law Dictionary  
 
Jura novit curia qua adage is not found in the judgements of Common Law 
courts, although the adage is found in scholarly writing that compares Civilian 
and Common Law procedural traditions.139 Not surprisingly definitions of jura 
 
137 Jolowicz, 2003, supra note 51 at note 61 writes that in the 20 years since the enactment of 
the NCPC appeals have increased by over 200%.  
 
138 NCPC Article 12 alinéa: 1. Le juge tranche le litige conformément aux règles de droit qui lui 
sont applicables. [1. The judge decides the litigation on the basis of the legal rules that are 
applicable.] 
 
139 see J.M.J. Chorus, “Civilian Elements in European Civil Procedure” in The Civilian Tradition 
and Scots Law”, D.L. Carey Miller, R. Zimmermann, (eds.), (Dunker & Humbolt: Berlin, 1997) 295 
at 301.  also see Bell, “Comparing Precedent”, supra note 92, Jolowicz, supra note 12, Mann 
supra note 8.  The Denning cases referred to above, supra note 99, 100, indicate that, while the 
adage itself is not used, cases decided according to the jura novit curia of Fox and Damaška’s 
are known, confirmed by Paterson, supra note 97.  In the United States none of the three leading 
articles concerning judicial intervention jura novit curia refers to the adage but all cite extensive 
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novit curia and its twin curia novit legem are rare in Common Law legal 
dictionaries.  One definition, however, appears in the 6th edition of the American 
Black's Law Dictionary. The definition is of some interest because alone 
amongst those we consider, it associates jura novit curia with the distinction 
between law and equity.   
 
Significantly, Black’s translation suggests how the distinction between law and 
equity may issue from the original Latin of the adage, and how jura novit curia,
by unstrained alternative interpretations, may refer to decisions in either law or 
equity.  This Janus-like quality of the adage demonstrates the inherent semantic 
possibilities of the adage and is essential to understanding Cornu’s account of 
jura novit curia discussed in section 4.  Understanding how jura novit curia 
embraces both law and equity touches on the interplay between the ius and 
legem of jura novit curia and curia novit legem and their French counterparts law, 
la loi and various forms of le droit.
Black's translation of jura novit curia reads in full, "the court knows the law; the 
court recognises rights."140 The first section confirms the obvious, that ‘the court 
knows the law’ is an acceptable translation, for with minor variations this is the 
phrase we have derived from the definitions of Merminod, Roland and Boyer and 
Fox.  Little more need be said about this translation, for it is the second element 
of Black's definition, “the court recognises rights” that is of primary interest for the 
way it draws our attention to the very different interpretations of two key words of 
the adage jura and novit.
Jura, the plural form of jus, like the word droit can be translated without strain 
either as “laws” or as “rights”.141 Similarly, novit can be translated as ‘knows’ or 
‘recognises’, although, in English, the use of ‘know’ in the sense of ‘recognise’ is 
distinctly antiquarian.  Unlike this sense of the English ‘know’, the French 
‘connaître’ as a reference to ‘competence to decide’ is still in use, for example, in 
the NCPC. The result is that the French la cour connaît les droits, following the 
corresponding translations, can be translated as both ‘the court knows the law’ 
and as ‘the court recognises rights’.   
 
The problem that arises for the Common Law reader is the difficulty of 
understanding how a single French phrase la cour connaît le droit may give rise 
to English translations that turn on the fundamental distinction is between law 
and equity.  The key difficulty is that while le droit can reasonably be translated 
both as ‘law’ and ‘right’ neither English translation adequately reflects the 
richness of the French conception of le droit, let alone any connection le droit 
may have with equity.   
 
case law involving decisions decided jura novit curia, that is, sua sponte. See A.D. Vestal, “Sua 
Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review” (1958-59) 27 Fordham L.R. 477; A. Milani & M. Smith, 
supra note 108; B. Miller, supra note 93. 
 
140 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (West Publishing: St Paul, 1991) at 852.  
 
141 Cornu, supra note 5 at 509 defines jus as encompassing le droit subjectif and well as le Droit 
objectif with a capital “D”. It is the latter which is associated with, but not exclusively referring to, la 
loi. The co-relation between jus and le droit, however was not without important ambiguities. 
Roland & Boyer, however, write that "Le droit est l'art du bon et de l'équitable" (373) [Right is the art 
of the fair and equitable] 
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The problem le droit poses for la mentalité «Common law» can be illustrated by 
looking at some consequences of Black’s association of jura novit curia with both 
law and equity.  The association should be apparent to all Common Law 
scholars because the translation "the court recognises rights" ought to 
spontaneously evoke the venerable maxim of Common Law Equity, "no wrong 
without a remedy".142 This latter maxim is generally taken to say that the 
absence of an applicable legal rule is not necessarily fatal to the success of a 
meritous claim.  A Common Law judge may, in a proper case, provide an 
equitable remedy to right a factual wrong, creating, as it were a ‘rule of law’ or 
legal ‘right’ and remedy for a plaintiff.  In essence, this translation characterises 
jura novit curia as providing for situations in France that fall within the doctrine of 
la silence de la loi, but that at Common Law could be described as the 
application of equity.143 
This comparison between the French doctrine of la silence de la loi and Common 
Law equity is inexact, even misleading.  Nonetheless, looking more closely at the 
imperfections of the comparison casts some light on concepts of French law that 
are most baffling to those with the la mentalité «Common law».  The comparison 
permits some appreciation of common underlying issues that are obscured by 
divergent French and English concepts and terminology.  The point to seise is 
how conventions of French legal discourse establish relatively formal accounts of 
the judicial task and the relation of the judge to law so as to avoid the use of 
terminology associating the judicial task with acts the French judge may not 
officially perform.   
 
Two areas of avoidance are most relevant.  The first is that French procedural 
terminology avoids the term ‘equity’ in systemic descriptions of the judicial task.  
Formally, French judges appear to have little scope to decide in equity: they 
must apply the law.  Yet in practice, or by the use of other terminology, equity 
pervades French adjudication.144 Secondly, French judges are formally 
 
142 Bennion, supra note 63; Snell’s Principles of Equity 29th, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) at 
28, “’Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy’….underlies the whole jurisdiction of 
equity”. cited in Westdeutsche Landesbank v. Islington Council [1996] A.C. (H.L.) 669 at 695 
(Lord Goff).  The translation of jura novit curia as ‘the court recognises rights’ suggests the 
difficulty of claims made by comparativists, such as P. Legrand, “How to compare now” (1996) 16 
Legal Studies 232 at 237, that “English Common law…does not know the notion of ‘right’ (in the 
sense of individual prerogatives that can be asserted in a court of law).”  It may be more accurate 
to state that at Common Law distinctions between ‘right’ and ‘law’ perform different functions in 
legal process including functions relating to permissible ways of speaking about legal process.  
Martin infra note 185 at §31and Merminod, supra note 3 each equate ‘right’ and ‘law’ implying a 
similar absence of the distinction in France.  The problem may be that which is clearly absent 
from Common Law and problematic for those educated in its tradition: the distinction between le 
droit subjectif and Droit Objectif 
143 Cornu, supra note 5 at 835 defines la silence de la loi as the "absence de règle écrite, de 
disposition expresse dans la loi" [an absence of a written rule or express provision in the law] 
 
144 David, supra note 53. Equity plays, “a role in law that is not apparent if one considers only the 
legislative texts.”.  Some insight into the operation of equity in France is provided by P. Legrand, 
“Judicial Revision of Contracts in French Law: A Case Study”, (1988) 62 Tulane Law Review, 963 
and P. Legrand, “The Case for Judicial Revision of Contracts in French Law (And Beyond)”, 
(1989), 34 McGill Law Journal, 909.  
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precluded from interpreting statutes, yet statutory interpretation in practice is 
ubiquitous in France, as it must be under any system exalting the legislative 
Code.  French scholars certainly write about equity and interpretation, but unlike 
Common Law, neither subject is consider to be a formal ‘head’ of law giving rise 
to specialist texts from which practitioners can glean legal argument to be 
subsequently argued before a court.   
 
A hint of these issues is seen in how the association of jura novit curia with 
equity145 severs the relationship between the adage nul n'est censé ignorer la loi 
and jura novit curia described by Roland and Boyer.  Black’s translation, ‘the 
court recognises rights' (la cour connaît les droits) refutes the presumption 
'everyone knows the law' because in cases of silence de la loi there is no law for 
the citizen to know.  We say that ‘ignorance of the law is no defence’ and on this 
basis, in cases of silence de la loi, a defendant might reasonably plead that, the 
law being silent, there is no case to answer.  Prima facie, a defendant in these 
circumstances would seem to possess a right to succeed.   
 
The translation the 'court recognises rights' and its association with the maxim 
'no wrong without a remedy,' however, invalidates a defence based on the 
absence of law by legitimising a decision based on a judge-created rule imposed 
ex post facto to remedy a wrong, notwithstanding no law was breached.  The 
factual wrong alleged in this application of jura novit curia is found by a court 
nonetheless as sufficiently egregious to justify ‘recognising’ protection from the 
wrong as a ‘right’ leading to the provision of a remedy in equity.  At Common 
Law it is less problematic to consider this judge-made rule ‘law’ but it is not loi in 
the French sense of a written legislative text.    
 
The second strand of the Black’s definition therefore challenges the logic of 
Roland and Boyer's claim that jura novit curia is simply a consequence of nul 
n'est censé ignore la loi because distinguishing between droit and loi 
accentuates the asymmetry between the two adages.  As nul n'est censé refers 
specifically to loi it follows that it would be more consistent for it to be associated 
not with jura novit curia but with curia novit legem which refers to the more 
narrow legem or loi.  However, the doctrine of le silence de la loi tells us that 
French judges are not restricted to deciding according to la loi (curia novit legem)
but may also decide according to le droit in cases either of le silence de la loi, or 
where le droit derives from sources other than legislative texts.  (There is, 
however, no doctrine of le silence du droit.)
Alternatively, if we accept the use of jura novit curia, the adage from which 
Roland and Boyer say it issues would be better expressed as nul n'est censé 
ignorer le droit. A problem with this interpretation is that this form of the adage is 
unknown in Civil Law, unlike the pair jura novit curia and curia novit legem. Le 
 
145 It is well to keep in mind that equity has two senses at common law, only one of which is 
comparable to France. The type of equity found in France, England and the United States refers 
to the underlying fairness of a decision, the just result, even where this requires that a court 
ignore the applicable law or chose from amongst multiple legal solutions.  However, unique to 
Common Law is Equity with a capital E, relating to the former system of Courts of Equity known in 
the United States and England.  Courts of Equity were and continue to be governed by rules and 
principles and while the Vice-chancellor had (and still has) broad discretionary powers these were 
not completely unfettered.  In the United States, the Delaware Court of Chancery is one of the 
few remaining self-standing Courts of Equity.   
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droit furthermore is a far more encompassing and elusive concept that la loi. Le 
droit is distinguished from le Droit and also gives rise to subordinate concepts 
such as le Droit objectif and le droit subjectif.146 Faced with the expansive le 
droit, the hypothetical nul n’est censé ignorer le droit, would be better read as a 
plea (or warning) to respect the rights of others.  Such an interpretation may set 
out sound moral guidance (‘do unto others as thy would be done’) but in a court 
of law seems to provide for unlimited kadijustiz, associated with equity at 
Common Law, by failing to establish the clear and certain guidance that would 
permit citizens to determine the behaviour expected of them. 
 
The reference in Black’s definition to equity also poses difficulty for Fox's claim 
that jura novit curia refers only to the court's power of research.  The research-
intervention power described by Fox implies that a court may research the law to 
overcome omissions or deficiencies in the parties' legal arguments by identifying 
and applying the 'correct' legal rule.  The use of jura novit curia in its sense as 
'the court recognises rights' takes the judicial research-intervention power 
beyond the bounds of law, effectively stating that the court is not necessarily 
bound by law at all.147 In this case, the protection nul n'est censé ignorer la loi 
offers to citizens is confirmed as a perverse fiction, for a citizen may have a 
sanction imposed on the basis of a legal rule fashioned by the judge that was 
unknowable at the time the events giving rise to the litigation arose.  
 
Paradoxically, the problem of la silence de la loi and decisions in equity, exists 
concurrently with the problem of there being 'too much law'.148 The role of 
interpretation in Common Law legal analysis would suggest, to those of us with 
this mentalité, that la silence de la loi ought to be more a theoretical problem 
because instances of la silence de la loi ought to be rare in a legal system with 
so many Codes. 149 It would seem to follow that cases involving jura novit curia,
as a form of silence-related equity, would be equally rare.  By this assessment, 
jura novit curia as the ‘recognition’ of rights in equity would arise only in 
exceptional or anomalous cases.   
 
This suggests the possibility that jura novit curia, often used to the same effect 
as da mihi factum, also shares what Roland and Boyer describe as the original 
meaning of da mihi factum, namely an adage that provides only for situations 
where there is no applicable law to plead.150 Roland and Boyer describe this, in 
its Roman origins, as an action in factum, a fact-based exceptional action raising 
 
146 P. Legrand, supra note 143 at 237 
 
147 A sufficiently clever and motivated judge may also spend the summer researching the law in a 
particular case, as Denning did in Rahimtoola, supra note 97, to develop a train of legal argument 
that serves the same purpose as equity.   
 
148 see Allott, supra note 67 
 
149 Cases of silence de la loi in France do not appear to be rare.  An electronic search of the 
jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation conducted on 17 June 2005 through the official 
government website, http://www.Legifrance.gouv.fr, returns 90 cases in which the phrase ‘silence 
de la loi’ occurs.’ see Cour de Cassation, Chambre commerciale, 2004-12-14, 01-10780; Publié 
au bulletin; Chambre civile 3, 2004-04-07, 02-16283, Publié au bulletin; Chambre sociale, 2003-
06-04, 02-60630, Inédit titré. 
 
150 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 135. 
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a claim not envisaged by Roman droit civil.  The action in factum spoke to the 
silence de la loi (legem) that arose in the absence of a relevant formula and was 
a device used to do equity.   
 
As logical as this may be, there does not seem to be scholarly support for an 
interpretation that restricts jura novit curia to cases of la silence de la loi. The 
equitable dimensions of jura novit curia raised by Black’s definition are not 
explicit nor easily discernible in the other five definitions considered so far.  In 
France, however, this absence is consistent with the low-profile of equity and the 
orthodox assessment that descriptively and prescriptively, the judicial task 
concerns the application of the law.  These equitable dimensions of jura novit 
curia while not explicit in Gerard Cornu’s definition, that follows, as they are in 
Black’s, nonetheless, from the perspective of la mentalité «Common law» seem 
to echo through the concept of le droit and its manifestations that are otherwise 
difficult to understand.   
 
As for Common Law equity, if jura novit curia means the ‘court recognises rights’, 
the adage is not only a presumption about judicial legal expertise, or about a 
power that may permit a court to intervene on its own motion to reject the parties’ 
legal arguments and decide according to its own understanding of the law.  The 
‘court recognises rights’ more clearly concerns jurisdiction, what a court does, 
whether considered descriptively or prescriptively.  The two strands of Black’s 
definition suggest alternatives available to Common Law courts – and parties: an 
action and a decision in law or in equity.  As the distinction is based on how the 
case is framed when initiated, and, law and equity for most purposes being 
merged, the choice between the alternatives is the election of the parties.  
 
3. Gérard Cornu, Vocabulaire Juridique 
 
The definition of jura novit curia that appears in Gérard Cornu's Vocabulaire 
juridique is significant in contemporary France.  This is, in part, because Cornu 
was the most prominent drafter of the NCPC – “Le code Cornu”151, with which 
jura novit curia is associated.  Vocabulaire juridique is also an essential legal text 
for law students and practitioners.  More substantively, Cornu’s definition, despite 
its relative brevity is by far the most complex attempt to encapsulate the essence 
of jura novit curia in a few pithy words, and justifiably warrants extended 
consideration.   
 
Cornu translates jura novit curia as follows:152 
Le juge est censé connaître le droit (et l'appliquer d'office) V. NCPC art 12 
& 16. 
 
This is probably clear and uncontroversial for most French lawyers today.153 
From the perspective of la mentalité «Common law», a close reading of the 
 
151 J. Foyer, “Synthèse des travaux”, in Vingt ans après, supra note 23, 321 at 323 
 
152 A workable translation is, "The judge is supposed to know the law (and apply it as a matter of 
course).  see Articles 12 and 16 of the NCPC" This translation makes a number of interpretive 
choices in its selection of words which, as the discussion indicates, raise issues relating to the 
nature of judicial power in France taken to be expressed by the adage.   
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words of the adage and Cornu's translation, poses a number of very basic 
questions, the answers to which will permit the reader to better understand the 
diverse threads of French legal culture that converge in jura novit curia and 
Cornu’s translation.   
 
Cornu's definition is divisible into eight semantic elements.  Each element raises 
issues relating to the meaning, justification, consequences or effects of jura novit 
curia as these relate to their doctrinal or institutional referents and their functions 
in legal culture.  Just as the words jura novit curia resist a single and certain 
meaning, so each element of Cornu's definition is ambiguous or vague, in ways 
that connect the adage to issues involving the delineation of the judicial power, 
the court-party relationship and the meaning and functions of different types of 
droit the court is supposed to know.  
 
3.1 Le juge 
Cornu translates the reference in the adage to the collective curia154 or court, as 
le juge, an apparent reference to the individual judge.  This is not really a mis-
translation, for in French usage le juge commonly is used to refer generically to 
judicial bodies with decision-making power.  This use in one sense is preferred 
because le juge can refer to bodies with different names and status, le tribunal, la 
cour, le conseil, so translating curia as la cour could be misleading where judicial 
bodies not strictly “cours” exercise any power associated with the adage.155 
The use of le juge for "curia" rather than ‘la cour’ is therefore a statement about 
the jurisdictional purview of jura novit curia. Cornu defines la cour to refer to 
'courts' at the higher levels of the judicial hierarchy, for example, la cour de 
 
153 However, this may be less because of an general agreement than because, as Martin has 
claimed, “most French lawyers are not aware of the problem” (Martin, supra note 23 at §14) that 
arises with respect to the jura novit curia provisions of the NCPC. It is worth noting nonetheless, 
that in 1977 French lawyers demonstrated in the streets of Paris to protest the sudden 
emergence in French practice of decisions taken pursuant to Damaška’s jura novit curia. Mann, 
supra note 8 at 369 notes that “[m]ost English lawyers are unaware of the specific effects of this 
principle”, namely, the principle of judicial unpreparedness, which expresses the absence of curia 
novit legem/jura novit curia.
154 Max Radin, Handbook of Anglo-American Legal History (West’s: St Paul’s, 1936) at 46-48, 
wrote, "The word curia in classical Latin is used in a number of ways. Apparently, it meant at first 
a subdivision of the people... in the early Middle Ages, ‘curia’ was a common word to describe 
both the groups of men who generally were found in attendance on pope, emperor, king or 
prince, and the groups which were summoned by him to give him counsel. The curia in the latter 
sense, however, was not really a casual group of persons, summoned spasmodically to advise 
the king or any other person. It had come to be in Feudal Europe the ordinary Latin word for the 
general meeting of the lord's vassals, which itself grew out of the Germanic mot or thing.... The 
Curia of the king was in theory a larger and more important example of the same kind of 
assemblage." 
 
155 Cornu, supra note 5 at 500.  Cornu’s use of the word juge, also invites clarification of the 
position of officials at the lower end of the judicial hierarchy.  see O. Pfersmann, “A Quoi bon un 
«pouvoir judiciaire»?”, in O. Cayla, Office du juge: part de souveraineté ou puissance nulle? 
(Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence: Paris, 2001) 181 at 191 n.18 on whether or not 
the French procureur [prosecutor] is a ‘juge’ see also J-H Robert, “De la nécessité d’un ministère 




Created: 30 October, 2005 Printed: 17 November, 2005 51
cassation or une cour d'appel.156 Translating curia as la cour would have 
suggested the powers and presumptions of jura novit curia are exercisable only 
by higher courts.     
 
Contrary to Cornu, Roland and Boyer translate curia as "la Cour "157 implying, 
perhaps, the presumptions, consequences and effects associated with the adage 
accrue only to higher courts.  However, in their definition, Roland and Boyer also 
refer to le juge, suggesting the imprecision of the juge-cour distinction and a lack 
of attention to the jurisdictional issue.  Merminod, who claims the adage applies 
to all jurisdictions refers in his definition to la cour and le tribunal, which is 
generally used to refer to courts of inferior jurisdiction.  Le tribunal, le juge and la 
cour, it would seem, are not always used with great precision, an elision that 
fosters ambiguity with respect to the jurisdictional reach of jura novit curia.
Historically, the juge-cour elision is significant because it speaks to the way in 
which the meaning of an adage may change over time.  The 17th Century savant 
Bernard Automne claimed that the cours souveraines – the parlements – were 
not bound by judex secundum, the adage which expresses a limitation on the 
power of a judex to decide on the basis of its own points of law.158 Automne 
claimed that only judges of lower courts, were obliged to decide secundum 
allegata et probata. Automne wrote prior to the Revolution, but it Automne's 
claim was accurate, and if all 'courts' in France today may exercise jura novit 
curia powers, it follows that the contemporary French juge has come to know 
powers denied lower court judges in the Ancien Régime.159 Because 19th 
Century France is considered to have been a period of judicial passivity,160 
inimicable to the exercise of jura novit curia-like powers, the origin of the adage 
acquires of more modern provenance.  This suggests that the purview of jura 
novit curia is capable of adapting itself to reflect prevailing perceptions about the 
nature or extent of the judicial power.  
 
The use of the le juge to refer to collegial institutions such as la cour, le tribunal 
or le conseil is co-extent with the use of le juge in other contexts to refer to le 
 
156 Cornu, supra note 5 at 240 "Nom donné à certaines juridictions en raison du degré élevé 
qu'elles occupent dans la hiérarchie judiciare (Cour de cassation, cour d'appel)"  [the name given 
to certain jurisdictions because of the higher degree they occupy in the judicial hierarchy.] 
 
157 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 363 
 
158 B. Automne, supra note 27 at vol. 1, 34.  M. Automne was Jurisconsulte & Advocate au 
Parlement de Bordeaux. He supports his argument citing Guy Pape, a celebrated 15th Century 
French jurist, and conseilleur of the Parlement du Dauphiné. 
159 An accurate account may not be possible and at any rate, a nuanced historical account 
precludes a stark contrast between before and after the Revolution.  J-L Halpérin, “La 
souveraineté de la Cour de cassation: une idée longtemps contestée,” in Cayla, supra note 126, 
151 at 153ff, describes the ebb and flow of conceptions of the powers of the Cour de cassation as 
a law-declaring institution and in relation to appellate and first instance judges.  At 154 Halpérin 
writes of the revival of the word 'sovereignty' to describe the powers of judges of first instance and 
appeal under Napoléon.  At 161, Halpérin quotes Ernest Faye, writing in 1903, that the lack of 
originating jurisdiction meant the Cour de cassation did not possess the «pouvoir souverain» 
[sovereign power] of a lower court judge with jurisdiction over fact.   
 
160 E. Glasson, Les Sources de La Procédure Civile Française, (Paris: Larose et Forcel, 1882) 82 
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juge unique, a single judge deciding alone.  Le juge unique is a departure from 
the tradition of the collegial curia still maintained in France.  Collegiality refers to 
the belief that legal decisions will be fairer and more likely “correct” when a 
decision is made by a panel of judges rather than a juge unique deciding 
alone.161 Collegiality presupposes a belief the juge unique is more apt to act on 
erroneous legal knowledge or personal bias than would a panel of judges.   
 
The value of collegiality in French law is expressed by the adage juge unique, 
juge inique, that tells us the judge deciding alone is an iniquitous, unfair judge.162 
Notwithstanding the traditional aversion to le juge unique in France, no definition 
of jura novit curia distinguishes between a jura novit curia power exercised by a 
collegial court or by an juge unique. Roland and Boyer moreover describe the 
diminishing force of the adage juge unique in the face of an increase in the types 
of cases in which decisions are made by a decision-maker sitting alone.163 Its 
diminishing force is understandable because no legal system, faced with such 
change could continue to invoke an adage which would effectively declare that 
because more cases were being decided by juges unique more iniquitous 
decisions were being reached.   
 
The process by which an adage loses force is obscure.164 Roland and Boyer 
simply acknowledge the declining relevance of the adage juge unique as the 
powers of le juge unique expand.  The decline of juge unique somehow mirrors a 
consequential 'metamorphosis' of the office du juge which Roland and Boyer 
explain as a response to an increase in the volume of litigation, and a tendency 
towards the personalisation of power and its more autocratic exercise.165 This 
transformation illustrates the interaction between the historical and conceptual in 
which the dynamic of adages permits their definition to evolve to better reflect 
prevailing but changeable perceptions of supporting legal concepts. 
 
The process by which la doctrine adapts its pronouncements to changes in legal 
culture is difficult to precisely map.  On the basis of the authority of Roland and 
Boyer, however, we can suppose the result of the decline of juge unique is that 
jura novit curia, quite literally evoking the value of collegiality of the learned 
 
161 Calamandrei, supra note 77 at 45 also describes how collective responsibility may, “serve for 
each of its members as a convenient screen, shielding his conscience from the weight of an 
unjust decision and permitting him to cloak with a certain anonymity his agreement to a decision 
for which he would be unwilling to assume full responsibility.”  
 
162 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 359. 
 
163 Chapitre III of the NCPC concerns the juge unique. see P. Pédrot, Les juges uniques,
(Dalloz: Paris, 1996).  see also, N. Guibert, “Le CSM apparaît divisé sur le dossier des juges de 
proximité”, Le Monde, 6-7 February 2005, p8 discussing the resistence of professional 
associations representing French judges and magistrates to the introduction of a new cadre of lay 
judges (le juge de proximité), citing, inter alia, problems with respect to their legal competence 
and impartiality.  
 
164 Some adages may disappear as a consequence of legislative initiative.  For example, when 
the Revolution abolished all forms of feudal land tenure and deemed land to be held as free 
alods, the opposing adages, nul terre sans seigneur and nul seigneur sans titre became 
immediately obsolete.  see Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 562 
 
165 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3, 359 at 363 
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judges of higher courts, extends its reach to the lower courts, to le juge unique 
jurisdictions where it may once have been excluded.  The remarkable feature of 
these transformations and evolutions, a kind of 'adagic desuetude', is that they 
arise through the vague legislative force of scholars such as Roland and Boyer, 
Automne or Cornu whose accounts of their legal tradition effortlessly reflect 
institutional and cultural changes, disputes or abeyances.166 
3.2 est censé 
 
The second element of Cornu's definition is the phrase est censé, ordinarily 
meaning 'is supposed to'167 and giving rise to the translation 'the court is 
supposed to know the law'.  The main issue arising from Cornu’s use of est 
censé is that it introduces a normative element to the adage that is already 
implicit in novit and connaître and used to refer to the judicial power to 
‘recognise’ la loi or le droit.  Novit is expressed in the ordinary present indicative 
and unlike judex secundum or ultra petita, jura novit curia is without a modal 
verb, which means that the alternative non-normative reference to empirical 
knowledge remains a possible interpretation.   
 
Cornu's gloss, est censé, transforms the force of the adage, both when connaître 
is read as a descriptive affirmation of judicial legal expertise and when connaître 
is read to result in the translation the ‘court recognises rights’.  Jura novit curia is 
made unexpectedly tentative because est censé imports a sense of the 
speculative to the adage, telling us 'the judge is supposed to know the law'.  The 
manœuvre, perhaps wisely, raises a distinction between the theory of what a 
court should know and what a court may actually know in practice.  The result is 
a tacit admission that the legal knowledge jura novit curia presumes is not 
invariably present in every judgement of a court.  Also tacitly admitted is the 
possibility that the court may recognise something other that le droit or la loi in 
reaching its decision.  
 
A problem with Cornu’s 'is supposed to' is that it refers first to an expectation or a 
belief that something will transpire (the court will know the law) and secondly to a 
sense that the court has an obligation to know the law.  The problem is less the 
ambiguity of the implied 'should' of 'is supposed to' than the way in which est 
censé invites us to question the nature of the knowing the court will or must do 
and what it will or must know.  It is not clear whether est censé refers to actual 
knowledge one might reasonably expect at least seasoned higher courts to 
possess (in an ideal world), or whether it refers to the application of the courts’ 
knowledge, as a power to pronounce judgement on the issues put to it, that is, a 
reference to connaître as the competence and duty to decide.   
 
Vocabulaire juridique defines the phrase est censé in a way that suggests the act 
of the curia or le juge unique in 'knowing' the law (whether empirically or 
 
166 on this theme see A. Allott, "Popular law-making in western society" in People's Law and 
State Law: The Bellagio Papers, A. Allott and G. R. Noodman, eds., (Foris Publications: 
Dordrecht, 1985) at 21; M. Foley, The Silence of Constitutions, (Routledge: London, 1989).  
 
167 supra note 64; Pluri dictionnaire larousse, (Librairie Larousse: Paris, 1977) at 243 'supposé, 
réputé' (syn. considéré comme) [assumed to, reputed to, synonym, ‘considered as’]  
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normatively) is conceived as a legal fiction.168 Applying Cornu's definition of est 
censé to jura novit curia means he effectively states the court is 'presumed by 
law to know the law' or 'the court is considered as knowing the law by virtue of a 
fiction of the law'.  The two accounts, particularly the latter, point to a circularity in 
the justification of the adage because the legal fiction appears to be self-
referential: it gives birth to itself, as if an act of auto-saisie.
The circularity is evident from the statement, 'the court is considered as knowing 
the law [fiction 1, jura novit curia] by virtue of a fiction of the law'  [fiction 2 est 
censé].  The problem is that the second fiction which gives rise to the fiction ‘the 
court knows the law’ is expressed only in the phrase est censé, which is Cornu’s 
gloss.  Cornu could thus be taken to state "there is a legal fiction that 'the court 
knows the law' because there is a legal fiction 'the court knows the law.'"  There 
is nothing wrong with legal fictions for they often justify an act or principle 
considered to have merit.  Here, the double fiction seems only to accentuate the 
element of auto-saisie effectively characterising Cornu’s jura novit curia as a self-
conferred prerogative power.   
 
The manner in which Roland and Boyer impute normativity to jura novit curia is to 
be preferred to Cornu's because it avoids self-reference.  Roland and Boyer 
derive jura novit curia from nul n'est censé ignorer la loi, which provides the 
justificatory fiction (if fiction it be), from which issues jura novit curia. While this 
source is absent in Cornu's definition, this is not to say that Cornu is unaware of 
the connection between the two adages, only that stating the connection 
between the two adages is important to the legitimacy of jura novit curia.   
 
The association of jura novit curia with nul n'est censé ignorer la loi expresses 
the connection between the knowledge and power of the court, its jurisdiction, 
with French citizens generally, and with those citizens who, by appearing before 
a court confer jurisdiction on the court to decide the legal matters raised.  The 
connection between parties and judge is essential to legal process.  It is a 
connection that strong accounts of jura novit curia sever by conceiving of the le 
juge as a superior and separate actor, jura novit curia as a self-standing, self-
regulating prerogative inherent to office du juge.
The effect of the double fiction arising through Cornu’s use of est censé can be 
drawn from a somewhat strained translation of jura novit curia.  One meaning of 
le droit is “prerogative”, which perhaps is still more widely used in English than in 
French, describes a wholly discretionary power appurtenant to an institution of 
the state.169. Novit (connaître) in this translation is taken in the slightly archaic, 
even Biblical sense of “knows” as meaning “possesses”.  The resulting 
translation is “the court knows prerogatives” which suggests the toute puissance 
of the judge that Motulsky or Merminod sought to associate with jura novit curia 
and office du juge.
168 Cornu, supra note 5 at 135, defines the phrase 'est censé' as reference to that which is 
"'considéré comme' en vertu d'une fiction de la loi…'presumé par loi…". [considered as… 'y virtue 
of a legal fiction…presumed by law]  
 
169 The English monarch’s coat of arms still bears the motto, “Dieu et mon droit”, which invokes 
the Deity and the Royal Prerogative as the essence of the English Office de la Reine.
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3.3 connaître  
 
The third element of Cornu's definition is the word connaître, translation of the 
Latin verb novit (third person singular of the infinitive noscere).  Connaître like the 
English verb ‘to know’ and noscere, has a wide range of meanings.170 The 
essential dilemma of jura novit curia concerns two senses of connaître, which we 
have considered in earlier definitions and which give rise to similar ambiguities in 
Cornu’s definition. 
 
One sense of connaître is decidedly empirical.  To say the court knows the law in 
this sense means the court has a particular expertise in the law.171 This sense of 
connaître speaks to the legitimacy of judicial power as a consequence of this 
expertise.  The legitimacy of judicial power would suffer – and does suffer – when 
courts reach decisions based either on the application of incorrect law or unjust 
interpretations so as to demonstrate a level of legal knowledge inadequate to 
their mission.  
 
The second meaning of connaître is more a legal term of art which is normative 
because, as found in legislation, it constitutes a grant of power.  This sense of 
connaître (and novit) means “to have jurisdiction”172 and might best be translated 
into English as 'to hear,' 'to have competence to take cognisance of' or, as stated 
in Black's definition of jura novit curia, ‘to recognise’, a legal claim brought before 
the court.173 This sense of connaître speaks to the power or authority of the 
court, rather than its legitimacy. Thus, to say le juge connaît la loi (or le droit, or 
le Droit) speaks to the judge’s power to decide, issue judgements binding on 
parties with respect to matters the court has power to “recognise”.  This sense of 
connaître makes Cornu's interpolation of the phrase est censé otiose because 
normativity is inherent in this sense of connaître. In some circumstance it is the 
only possible interpretation.174 
170 2 Grand Larousse de la Langue Française, (Librairie Larousse: Paris, 1972) 908-909; 2 
Oxford Latin Dictionary, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 19) 1190 
 
171 Merminod supra note 3.  Merminod uses savoir to translate noscere, which, considering that 
connaît historically has been used as a term of art meaning ‘jurisdiction,’ means the translation of 
noscere may refer to the court’s empirical knowledge or to its jurisdiction, or power.  Roland and 
Boyer, supra note 54, also use savoir in their illustration of the impatient judge admonishing 
counsel for dwelling too long on the law.  Savoir is not used to express a conveyance of 
jurisdiction.   
 
172 Cornu, supra note 5 at 204 'connaître - synonyme de "juger" [also] "competent pour juger".  
Connaître in this sense appears, for example in statutes enacted during the Revolution and can 
be interpreted as a synonym for the word 'decide'.  see Code de la Justice de Paix, Quatrième 
Edition, (A Bourdeaux, chez Pallandre l'aîné, Citoyen, Place Saint-Projet, No. 3, 1791), which 
contains numerous examples of this use of connaître.
173 Black’s Law Dictionary supra note 141. 
 
174 Connaître is used in both senses in the NCPC. Compare Article 23, which refers to the 
judge’s ability to understand (connaît) a second language used in court, with Article 38 which 
uses connaître to describe the competence of a judge to hear cases involving a certain amount of 
money. Art 23. “Le juge n'est pas tenu de recourir à un interprète lorsqu'il connaît la langue dans 




Created: 30 October, 2005 Printed: 17 November, 2005 56
 
The distinction between the empirical and normative senses of connaître is 
important because the two meanings are at once related but pull the adage in 
incompatible directions.  To the extent a judicial decision is legitimate because it 
is decided according to 'correct' law, the power conferred on the court to decide, 
referred to by the normative sense of connaître is justified.  A problem arises 
when judicial decisions are incorrect, because the incorrect decision represents a 
divergence between the empirical and normative senses of connaître. A court 
may demonstrate by its decision it did not know the 'correct' law in an empirical 
sense, even though its knowing of the law, that is, deciding, resulted in a formally 
valid judgement.   
 
A difficult aspect of the relationship between the two senses of connaître is that 
at the time of judgement, the authority of an incorrect decision is no less than a 
correct decision.  The divergence between an incorrect but legally valid 
judgement casts doubt on the legitimacy of the normative power to 'know’ in the 
sense of ‘take cognisance of’ the law.  Generally, only an unsuccessful party who 
elects to appeal an ‘incorrect’ decision can initiate the procedure that leads to its 
correction.  Thus the correction of erroneous judgements relies on a subsequent 
saisine arising at the election of a party, an implicit plea that the court is 
supposed to know the law, but didn’t.  
 
The problem this poses in France, as was discussed earlier, is that the French 
legal system seems to presume the likelihood that empirical judicial knowledge 
will be faulty by providing generous rights of appeal.175 This presumption of 
judicial fallibility is empirically affirmed in practice: parties exercise their rights of 
appeal frequently in France and their claims the court below did not know the law 
are frequently affirmed by superior courts.176 Thus both normatively and 
empirically there is a systemic presumption in France that questions the 
legitimacy of judicial knowledge.  It is in this light that the adage jura novit curia is 
something of an embarrassment, for the claims it makes are systemically 
impugned, suggesting, perhaps the wisdom of a system of judicial precedent far 
less binding that is known at Common Law.  
 
3.4 le droit 
 
The fourth element of Cornu's definition is le droit, the most formidable obstacle 
to understanding Cornu’s definition.  The challenge of explaining le droit to la 
mentalité «Common law» is as daunting as the challenge of explaining Equity to 
the Civilian. 177 As we have seen, le droit has senses and functions which give 
 
175 Motulsky’s account of les droits de la défense included the obligation of the legislature to 
provide adequate routes of appeal.  see Bolard,  supra note 14 at 332 §16 citing “Les principes 
directeurs du procès civil: le droit positif depuis Henri Motulsky”, La Semaine Juridique (JCP) ED. 
G, no 30. at 332 §16, (citing H. Motulsky, "Le droit naturel dans la pratique jurisprudentielle" in 
Mélanges Roubier, 1961 at t. 2 n.13ff note (27)) 
 
176 E. Steiner, supra note 9. Jolowicz, (2003) supra note 51 at [note 60, 61] “Between 1975 and 
1995, the number of cases started at first instance rose from what was an already high bases, by 
122% and those taken to appeal by 208%.”  Increased efficiency was an important policy 
rationale behind the NCPC attempts to restrict party argument of law and also of the imposition of 
the mandatory requirement parties plead law in 1998.   
 
177 Damaška supra note 11 at 42 n. 51 
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rise to difficult, if not baffling, distinctions.  Just as Common Law makes a 
distinction between Equity and equity, in French legal culture le Droit is 
distinguished from le droit. This supports the distinction between le droit subjectif 
and le droit objectif both of which interact in adjudication to arrive at la règle de 
droit applicable, the rule applied to decide the case. 
 
Cornu's choice of le droit in his translation while unremarkable in French usage is 
significant because, as object of the verb connaître, the choice defines either that 
which the court is supposed to know in an empirical sense, or that which the 
court has a jurisdiction to ‘recognise’ in its decision.  Le droit is usually 
considered a more expansive term than la loi and so suggests a jurisdiction of 
greater breadth.178 In terms of empirical knowledge, however, it is less clear how 
the court acquires its knowledge of le droit as distinct from le Droit, that is, la loi 
published in the Journel officiel or a droit coutumier proven by a party.   
 
Le Droit is distinct from le droit. Cornu's primary definition of le Droit refers to le 
droit objectif, that is, a "body of rules of conduct promulgated and approved by 
society and to which its members are subject."179 In this use le Droit is a 
superordinate, a collective noun referring to a subordinate body of discrete norms 
that, being ‘socially sanctioned’, need not, strictly speaking, be legislative.180 Le 
Droit may be equated primarily with la loi which by definition is legislative in 
nature and expressed in a text such as a code or décret-loi issuing from the 
French parlement or executive.  Le Droit, that is, le droit objectif, also refers to le 
droit coutumier described by Roland and Boyer as ‘folk law’.181 Paradoxically, le 
Droit may also include la loi that has been subject to the force of desuetude, that 
is, repealed by ‘negative’ droit coutumier.182 
Cornu, however, translates jura as le droit rather than le Droit or la loi. The 
choice invites a comparison of jura novit curia with its near twin, curia novit 
legem. Curia novit legem, considered simply as a statement about jurisdiction, 
on its face, would restrict the court to decisions based only on legem, written 
legislative rules, that is la loi. This approach to the meaning of the adage would 
seem to preclude decisions grounded in le droit as 'subjective right', in equity, 
unwritten droit coutumier law or in cases of la silence de la loi or desuetude.   
 
178 For example, customs or usage may give rise to droit which is not sanctioned by any law, 
such as local rights of pasturage, or the requirement the wife’s use of the husband’s surname.  
see Roland and Boyer, supra note 80 discussing the exception to jura novit curia that arises with 
certain types of custom and usage. 
 
179 Cornu, supra note 5 at 323: "droit: ensemble de règles de conduite socialement édictées et 
sanctionées, qui s'imposent aux membres de la société.”  
 
180 If le droit is translated as ‘right’, a problem also seems to arise in that Cornu refers to a body 
of rules to which members of a society “are subject”, referring not to right but to obligation. 
 
181 supra note 83 
 
182 Cornu supra note 5 at 294; desuetude as ‘negative customary law’ is Paulson’s translation of 
Kelsen.  see Kelsen, supra note 78 at 63 n. 46. 
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The Code civile, however, compels the French judge to decide, specifically 
precluding the judge from justifying a failure to decide on the insufficiency or la 
silence de la loi. While formally phrased as a prohibition relating to acceptable 
reasons for judgement, the provision suggests that in the absence of loi, a court 
may nonetheless recognise and decide according to le droit.183 To the extent 
there are meaningful distinctions in contemporary France between le droit and la 
loi, and between le Droit and le droit, jura novit curia provides greater support for 
decisions based in le droit-that-is-not-loi, in equity or to fill gaps arising from la 
silence de la loi than does curia novit legem. In this jura novit curia appears 
more consistent with French practice and indeed, it is hard to imagine any legal 
system in which a court could base its decision on written law alone.     
 
Unlike Common Law, however, France is heir to the tradition of le culte de la loi 
that arose with the Revolution, which attempted with some severity to eliminate 
the judge’s margin of manœuvre by restricting courts solely to decisions founded 
in la loi.  While observance never reflected the rhetoric of the Revolutionaries,184 
the Republican tradition in France still mandates terminology respectful of the 
values of the Revolution concerning limitations on the judicial power.  The 
Common Law scholar, particularly those raised in the tradition of American Legal 
Realism, might easily overlook how language descriptive of the judicial function is 
less a statement about the empirical reality of judicial process than a 
conventional understanding about how it is permissible to describe the judicial 
task. 
 
A sense of this convention might be seen in how, despite obvious tensions, few 
overt controversies in France today turn on the distinction between le droit and la 
loi or between jura novit curia and curia novit legem. Martin writes that “[d]ans 
notre système, le droit, c'est la loi”185 and Merminod writes that "le droit = les lois 
applicable." 186 Roland and Boyer similarly treat jura novit curia and curia novit 
 
183 Code Civil, (Dalloz: Paris, 2003) Article 4, Le juge qui refusera de juger, sous prétexte du 
silence, de l'obscurité ou de l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra être poursuivi comme coupable de déni 
de justice.  [The judge who fails to decide citing as a reason the silence, obscurity or insufficiency 
of the law may be found liable for this failure]  Precisely, this provision means that silence, 
obscurity or insufficiency is not a valid reason for refusing to decide.  This suggests a distinction 
between the bare judgement or disposition of a case – who wins what - and reasons that can, or 
cannot, be given to support the disposition.   
 
184 The complex relationship between the force of tradition and the force of positive law is 
described by A. Mater, in “L’histoire juridique de la révolution”, (1919) 11 Annales 
Révolutionnaires 429.  Mater’s paper describes the survival of customs, usages and Roman law 
in France well into the 19th Century despite their formal abolition by the National Assembly.  In 
England, the Magna Carta remains the sacred text of the British Constitution, notwithstanding the 
repeal of all but four sections.  see 8(2) Halsbury’s Laws of England, supra note 39 at §1 n.13. 
 
185 Martin (1974) “Le fait et le droit ou les parties et le juge”, 48 Semaine Juridique Pt I §31. 
Martin, discussing the purview over loi of the Cour de cassation writes of the necessity of 
considering loi in its largest sense as including "toute les règles du droit positif, y compris les 
principes générales qui sont inscrits dans le contexte des lois, et qui s'expriment souvent en 
maximes."  [all rules of positive law [droit], including general principles contained within the 
context of law [loi] which are often expressed as maxims] 
 
186 Merminod, supra note 3.  
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legem as identical, giving pride of place to the form of the adage more common 
in Europe, jura novit curia.187 
A problem with Martin’s statement ‘le droit, c’est la loi, is that the verb est (être)
establishes an equivalency between la loi and le droit. This means that it is 
equally possible, grammatically at least, to invert the structure of the phrase and 
say, ‘la loi, c’est le droit’. This is not implausible, but as we will see, the French 
judge in deciding is required to dire le droit, a reference to le droit subjectif.  It is 
implausible to say that the French judge in deciding is required to dire la loi or 
dire le Droit, because each refer to declaring the law in the sense of legislating or 
interpreting a loi, powers that le culte de la loi did not allow the judge to exercise.  
 
With all respect for the autochthonous authenticity of Martin’s  statement that ‘le 
droit, c’est la loi’, significant differences are possible, even necessary to account 
for the relationship of le juge, le droit and le Droit. It is in the interstices of 
different senses of droit, internalised by the native French lawyer, that we might 
look to acquire a basic understanding of the full plenitude of the meaning of le 
droit and how this plenitude conceals ambiguity within Cornu’s definition.   
 
The parameters of the ambiguity are marked by a dichotomy between the 
judgement, the result of litigation and process, that is, the conduct of an action 
from commencement to the close of the debates.  As we will see below, the le 
droit is pressed into service to apportion rights and duties in litigation between 
courts and parties, in much the same way that Motulsky used the distinction 
between fact and law.  Le droit, in its sense of ‘subjective right’ seems at best a 
claim based on factual allegations which it is the purpose of litigation to affirm or 
deny.  It is only at the moment of judgement that factual allegations of le droit put 
forward by the parties can be perfected by the court in its judgement in a quasi-
sacerdotal ritual: the ‘application of the law’.  The transubstantiation of fact into 
law is central to the catechism of French legal process, something which defies 
comprehension if translations of le droit are restricted to ‘law’ and ‘right’ alone.   
 
3.5 (et l'appliquer d'office)
The fifth element of Cornu's definition is the phrase (et l'appliquer d'office).
Before discussing the phrases ‘l’appliquer’ and ‘d’office’, a few words are in order 
about the brackets because, by different interpretations of their use, they affect 
the relationship between the original Latin of the adage, Cornu’s core translation 
and the significance of the bracketed phrase l’appliquer d’office. The issued 
raised by the brackets is whether the phrase they contain is meant to be a part of 
translation of jura novit curia or whether the bracketed phrase is meant to be a 
distinct consequence of the adage and its translation.   
 
The significance of the distinction is that if l’appliquer d’office is a consequence of 
the adage, the recursive effect may require characterising the adage simply as a 
presumption about the judge’s empirical knowledge of law.  In this interpretation 
connaître = savoir, rather than the normative sense of connaître = juger, that is 
‘to recognise’ or ‘to have competence’ to decide.  If ‘l’appliquer d’office’ is 
 
187 My research and conversations with indicates a preference amongst Common Law scholars 
for the adage curia novit legem rather than jura novit curia. Neither Cornu nor Merminod make 
reference to curia novit legem in the publications cited in this paper. 
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considered part of the translation, it simply restates jura novit curia and le juge 
est censé connaître le droit. By this interpretation, Cornu translates the adage in 
terms of what many consider its essential meaning: the duty of the court to 
decide according to the correct applicable rule.  
 
Cornu's use of brackets is not remarkable, except that in writing about jura novit 
curia it is more common for the adage to be bracketed.  Roland and Boyer, for 
example, write, "there is no doubt that the litigant is not required to prove the rule 
upon which he relies (jura novit curia)."188 As a citation, jura novit curia, within 
brackets, establishes a relation between a distinct proposition about judicial 
power and the authority (jura novit curia) invoked as support.  Unlike Roland and 
Boyer's use of the adage as a bracketed citation, however, Cornu's use of 
brackets is ambiguous because they may be used either to indicate a citation for 
an independent proposition or as an aside meant to clarify the preceding 
translation of the adage. 189 
The use of jura novit curia as a citation supports powers deemed self-evident, or 
inherent, arising office du juge as a consequence of the presumption jura novit 
curia.  However, ‘inherent powers’, by definition, are implicit, without clear textual 
references, explaining, perhaps, the citation of an adage rather than positive law.  
The use of jura novit curia to affirm unexpressed ‘inherent powers’ explains the 
structure of a core meaning to which consequence may be imputed.  It also 
explains the divergence between the many consequences attributed to the adage 
and its literal words because virtually any judicial power without a source in 
positive law could be attributed to jura novit curia.
However, the words jura novit curia do reasonably translate as le juge connaît le 
droit. The question arising from Cornu’s use of the brackets is whether jura novit 
curia and le juge connaît le droit can also mean l’appliquer d’office. As is 
discussed next, (l’appliquer d’office) can be reasonably taken to mean the judge 
applies the law pursuant to his duty to decide the case.  Even if this is so, 
attributing consequences to jura novit curia is not thereby precluded and the 
question is what, if any, consequences can be read into Cornu’s jura novit curia.
The significance of what may appear a rather obscure point, is that if (l'appliquer 
d'office) is considered a consequence, and d'office is understood in its senses of 
'on one's own initiative' or 'without notice', it is possible to see in Cornu's 
translation Damaška's strong jura novit curia. If (et l'appliquer d'office) is 
considered to just re-state the meaning of the adage, it states no distinct 
consequence and is just a general expression of the courts' jurisdiction, its duty 
to decide according to le droit.
188 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 138.  "Sans doute le justiciable n'a pas à prouver la règle 
de droit applicable (jura novit curia)." A similar use is seen in P. Blondel, "Le juge et le droit" in 
Vingt ans après, supra note 23, 103 at 113:  "Il est également acquis, la jurisprudence en la 
matière est abondante, que lorsqu'une partie fait état devant le juge d'une convention collective 
mais néglige de la produire ou la verse aux débats de façon incomplète, le juge ne peut refuser 
de l'appliquer sans se prononcer sur sa teneur et sur son incidence: "jura novit curia"."   see also 
Mann supra note 8 at 370 quoting the European Commission on Human Rights.  
 
189 This could be stated as, a) jura novit curia = le juge est censé connaître le droit = (le juge) 
appliquer le droit d’office, or b) jura novit curia = le juge est censé connaître le droit  (le juge) 
appliquer le droit d’office 
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A third plausible interpretation of Cornu is that, given the poetic density of many 
adages, Cornu simultaneously offers two meanings of the adage that somehow 
unite the diverging empirical and normative senses of connaître. However 
ambiguous this result may be, as an act of translation and legal scholarship, it is 
inspired for the way it captures the nuances of the Latin and French and directs 
us to the most controversial consequences attributed to jura novit curia.190 
However, much this explanation may satisfy linguists or anthropologists, I 
suspect that practitioners would agree that Cornu, an accomplished professional, 
intends the bracketed phrase to be a consequence of jura novit curia rather than 
an alternative translation.191 This interpretation means that the use of “est censé” 
does not duplicate the normative sense of connaître.192 Instead this reading 
clarifies that connaître is used in its non-normative sense, as savoir and as a 
reference to the empirical knowledge of the law the court is ‘supposed’ to 
possess.  This reading, however, impugns the force of the adage by suggesting 
the knowledge the court is ‘supposed’ to possess is not always in evidence.  
 
3.6 et l'appliquer 
The sixth point scrutinises the phrase l’appliquer, comprised of the verb 
appliquer, and the pronoun, l’, which represents le droit in Cornu’s translation and 
jura in the original Latin.  The phrase, appliquer le droit can be translated into 
English as ‘to apply the law’ or ‘to apply the right’, if we follow Black’s translation 
of jura. A problem for the native English speaker is determining when le droit is 
best read as ‘law’ and when it is best read as ‘right’.  A further problem to 
consider is whether distinctions made in French law refer to a sense of le droit 
which cannot be expressed by either the word ‘law’ or ‘right’ and is therefore 
inaccessible to la mentalité «Common law» 
The primary question posed by the phrase l’appliquer is understanding in what 
sense le droit can be ‘applied’, given the distinction between le Droit (objectif)
and le droit (subjectif).  Cornu’s jura novit curia refers to le droit rather than le 
Droit and this must be taken to mean the court ‘applies’ le droit subjectif in 
resolving the litigation.193 This understanding, however, is quite inconsistent, in 
 
190 As George Steiner has recognised, a translation approaches a work of genius when it 
faithfully conveys the ambiguity of the original language into a second tongue.  G. Steiner, After 
Babel, 2d (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992) at 312ff.   
 
191 The word “et” could be taken in its sense of ‘therefore’ to denote a consequence and it could 
be taken in its sense of “and” to indicate it is a continuation of the prior phrase.   
 
192 We have already noted that Cornu inserted a normative element (“est censé”) to his 
translation of jura novit curia which qualifies connaître, despite connaître, by one of its meanings, 
having intrinsic normativity, that is, ‘competency or jurisdiction to decide.  A similar problem, the 
duplication of intrinsic normativity is posed by the bracketed phrase.  '(et l'appliquer d'office)' 
might be taken as an alternative expression of jura novit curia, synonymous with the phrase 
''…est censé connaître…'  In this case, the definition contains three distinct references to the 
court’s duty to know the law.  A further issue that could be explored is the effect of ‘est censé’ if it 
taken to modify not only connaître but also appliquer.
193 Cornu’s distinction between le droit and le Droit may not reflect normal usage amongst la 
jurisprudence and la doctrine. Regardless of the extent of its actual use, the distinction is useful 
for illustrating the senses of le Droit to non-native French speakers.   
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different ways, with two conventional accounts of the judgement process in 
France, namely dire le droit and le syllogism.
appliquer: process and judgement  
 
In defining the phrase l'application de la loi, Cornu describes the act of applying a 
legal rule - the 'applicable legal rule' - to decide an instant case.194 In other 
words, l'application refers to judgement, the pronouncement of a decision after 
the close of process.195 This is not controversial in itself, but does direct attention 
to the distinction between judgement and process as each bears on the meaning 
of jura novit curia, the two types of knowing envisaged by the adage and the 
forms of droit that may be object of that knowing.    
 
The process-judgement distinction is important because if jura novit curia refers 
only to the act of deciding, to the disposition of the case, it does not speak to 
manner and form requirements controlling pre-judgement procedure.  L’appliquer 
concerns the final act of the decision-making process, not the interactive events 
of process through which the court impartially considers the merits of the parties 
arguments and proofs.  Objections to different types of jura novit curia primarily 
concern acts antecedent to judgement, relating to a breach of party rights such 
as le principe de la contradiction, the absence of impartiality, or bias.196 
The judgement may serve as confirmation an impugned practice has occurred 
during process.  The judgement in this sense is factual evidence that a judicial 
act attributed to jura novit curia has breached other principles which govern 
judicial conduct prior to judgement.197 These other principles, expressed in 
Motulsky’s quaternary of adages, M. Franc’s two principles or their counterparts 
in the NCPC, “delimit”, to use Motulsky’s term, the proper exercise of judicial 
office, its application of law (or right) in its judgement by subjecting the judge to 
procedural constraints.   
No one challenges the court’s responsibility for its decision, including the 
selection and application of the rule of ‘law’ on which it is based.  This 
responsibility, however, transcends the issue of intervention jura novit curia 
because the responsibility will arise even in the relatively rare situations where a 
French court is absolutely bound by the law pleaded by the parties.198 Even 
 
194 Cornu, supra note 5 at 63  
 
195 Cornu, supra note 5 at 63 “l'application de la loi” [the application of the law]. Cornu describes 
a court’s power to apply the law even where not specifically invoked by a party and also the 
remedy of ‘false application of the law’ where a court applies the law incorrectly.     
 
196 see Martin, supra note 130 
 
197 This may be retroactive, for example, in that the judicial act of Damaška’s jura novit curia 
arises after the close of process, but nonetheless colours the prior process with illegality. 
 
198 for example, NCPC Article 12 alinéa 3; annotation at §22 bis “…au contraire, pour la Chambre 
commerciale le juge de fond est lié par la prétention des parties et ne peut modifier l’objet du 
litige dont il est saisi.” [to the contrary the judge of the Court’s Commercial section is bound by the 
argument of the parties and cannot modify the remedy by which the court has been saised.] 
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when so bound, the judge still has a duty to reach her decision according to the 
terms of his saisine, that is, d’office. This suggests that while l’appliquer la loi 
may at times permit or require a court to intervene with its own point of law, even 
where intervention is not permitted, the duty to apply the correct law still exists 
because it is independent of any intervention jura novit curia.
Le Droit redux: what the court applies – le droit and its use (ius)  
 
The phrase application de la loi encompasses not only la loi but also le Droit,
inclusive of le droit coutumier and la règle de droit.199 This is consistent with 
Cornu’s primary definition of le Droit and la loi, but is not helpful understanding 
the meaning of the phrase et l’appliquer d’office. This is because Cornu’s 
translation of jura novit curia is le juge est censé connaître le droit (i.e. droit 
subjectif) not le juge est censé connaître le Droit (i.e. droit objectif).
The distinction raises a number of interpretative problems for la mentalité 
«Common law» in the light of the possibility connaître may refer either to the 
court’s empirical legal expertise, its competency to decide, or to both.  Possible 
translations of connaître le droit are first, that the court empirically ‘knows’ the 
party’s right as it ‘knows’ the la loi exists, following Roland and Boyer’s jura novit 
curia. The second possible translation is that the court juridically ‘knows’ (i.e. 
recognises) the party’s subjective right, that is, affirms it in the judgement.  
However plausible these are, in the light of Cornu’s distinction between le Droit 
and le droit, they do not square with conventional accounts of adjudication. 
 
The difficulty can be illustrated by examining two such accounts which at a 
minimum demonstrate the richness of meaning compressed into the phrase 
l’appliquer office. It is possible that the act of l’appliquer in Cornu’s definition of 
jura novit curia is incoherent if we insist on a literal interpretation of Cornu’s 
words, and that the incoherency arises primarily because appliquer is associated 
with le droit and not le Droit. It is possible that Cornu himself does not himself 
religiously follow this distinction, but here it taken as axiomatic.   
 
Dire le droit 
 
French courts are duty bound to 'dire le droit',200 but we should not take this too 
literally.  Cornu defines dire le droit as "dire et juger" or "décider" that is, as a 
euphemism for deciding, for disposing of a legal dispute by finding in favour of 
 
199 Cornu supra note 5 at 63. 
 
200 see Code Civil Article 5, “Il est défendu aux juges de prononcer par voie de disposition 
générale et réglementaire sur les causes qui leur sont soumises.” The official Legifrance website 
translates this as, “Judges are forbidden to decide cases submitted to them by way of general 
and regulatory provisions”. http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_civil_textA.htm
(A clearer translation is, “In deciding the cases submitted to them, it is not lawful for a judge to 
thereby declare any rules of general application.”)  Article 5 dates to the Revolution and 
proscribes the “arrêts de règlement”, that is, judgements of the ancien parlements that were loi in 
the modern sense of legislative regulation.  Phillippe Payen in Les arréts de règlement du 
Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle: Dimension et doctrine, Presses Universitaires de France: 
Paris 1997) at 11, asks whether Article 5 of the Code Civil was a ‘historic error?’ and notes that 
the problem of the legal weight of French jurisprudence (i.e. case law) turns on Article 5. 
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one party and against another.201 Associating jura novit curia closely with the 
power to decide limits the meaning of the adage, first to a statement about 
jurisdiction and secondly that the decision must be according to le droit. In this 
reading, l’application du droit, would simply refers to courts’ duty to decide and le 
droit is taken to simply mean the law.   
 
However, rendering Cornu’s opposition between le Droit (objectif) and le droit 
(subjectif) into English requires the use of ‘law’ and ‘right’ respectively to 
translate le Droit and le droit in order to make sense of the distinction.  The depth 
of the meaning of le droit, however, cannot be realised by using only the words 
‘law’ and ‘right’.  If we translate le droit as ‘the law’, Martin’s comment, that ‘le 
droit, c’est la loi for example, while not quite incoherent, conjures up a very 
different meaning in English than it does in French.  To say the ‘law is the law’ 
evokes a doctrine of ‘strict law’ when the French means ‘there is no difference 
between law and right.’  To say in English, ‘the law is right’ in this context verges 
on the nonsensical, or is an observation about the policy merits of a law.    
 
Le droit objectif, following Roland and Boyer’s jura novit curia, is subject to two 
regimes of proof, depending on whether le droit is expressed as a loi or as a droit 
coutumier The power of the court to recognise the le droit coutumier is restricted, 
whereas there is no restriction on the courts power to recognise the existence of 
la loi. The requirement that le droit coutumier be proven by a party suggests the 
difference between the existence of valid droit coutumier and party entitlement to 
its application.  Two uses of le droit are illustrated.  The proven custom is le Droit 
and a party’s entitlement to its application is le droit. Both touch the issue of 
‘existence’ differently, one referring to proof of underlying Droit, the other to proof 
of entitlement.   
The difficult concept for the Common lawyer is le droit subjectif, which Cornu 
defines as, “a prerogative of an individual recognized and affirmed by objective 
law which permits its holder to do, to demand, or to forbid the doing of some 
thing in his own interest.”202 Comparativists, such as Legrand, claim that le droit 
subjectif is unknown at Common Law, which means that any distinction in jura 
novit curia turning on the distinction cannot be translated.203 Legrand may be 
correct if we restrict our thoughts only to the theoretical plane where much of the 
debate occurs.204 Otherwise, the claim might be fallacious, if not literally, then 
when the function of le droit subjectif in litigation is examined in light of its 
relation to objective law and the court’s duty to dire le droit. 
201 Cornu, supra note 5 at 301 “dire le droit…juger, décider” [to declare the right…to juge to 
decide]  
 
202 Cornu, supra note 5 at 323. “une prérogative individuelle reconnue et sanctionnée par le Droit 
objectif qui permet à son titulaire de faire, d’exiger ou d’interdire quelque chose dans son propre 
intérêt” Examples of le droit subjectif include individual rights or interests arising under contracts 
or through testamentary dispositions.  
 
203 Legrand, supra note 143 
 
204 see G. Samuel, “Le Droit subjectif and English Law” (1987) 46 Cambridge L.J. 264; 
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The French lawyer, Merlin invoked both the dilemma and the solution when he 
wrote that, “what does the word matter if the thing is there?” 205 Merlin’s brocard 
suggests, in our circumstances, not the absence of le droit subjectif but only the 
lack of an appropriate word to describe it.  Whatever the doctrinal identity of le 
droit subjectif may be, Merlin’s brocard tells us that if we can find the function of 
the le droit subjectif we may find, if not its counterpart at Common Law, at least a 
way to adequately translate the concept into English.   
 
It seems plausible to argue, then, that le droit subjectif is simply an oblique 
reference to a party’s proof of entitlement.  The term le droit subjectif is applied 
less because of its conceptual nature than to permit judicial process to be 
expressed in language that descriptively comports with Revolutionary values that 
require the court to dire le droit, but prevent it from dire le Droit. Merlin’s brocard 
thus is inverted, for this asemantical use of language declares, ‘what does it 
matter what happens in practice so long as what happens is acceptably 
described.’  
 
Perhaps the most accurate literal translation into English of dire le droit is ‘to 
declare the right’, that is to declare in a judgement which of the parties’ 
allegations of right will succeed.  An equally plausible English translation, ‘to 
declare the law’, is inappropriate in the French context, however possible 
grammatically.  Both translations are misleading, because ‘to declare the right’ is 
more clearly a reference to the parties ‘subjective rights’, a concept not in 
ordinary use at Common Law.   
 
The second translation, ‘to declare the law’ speaks less to the parties’ subjective 
rights than to the law by which claims of subjective right are measured.  ‘To 
declare the law’ evokes the power of Common Law judges to create new 
Common Law rules, or binding interpretations of legislation.  In France, the 
purview of the court's duty to dire le droit can be contrasted with Dire le Droit, a
phrase not encountered in French law.  The duty of the French court to dire le 
droit does not include a power to dire le Droit for this refers to le Droit objectif and 
connotes judicial intrusion into the realm of the legislature and its sovereignty 
over the creation of new law.  
 
The phrase dire le droit in the context of process assumes the interplay of 
senses of le droit that, conceptually, are distinguished.  The court's duty to dire le 
droit is to decide if le droit subjectif alleged by a party gives rise to a règle de 
droit, derived from le Droit objectif. To paraphrase Cornu’s definition of le droit 
subjective, the question for the judge is whether the individual prerogative 
alleged by a party is ‘recognised and sanctioned’ by Droit objectif so as to justify 
the success of party’s claim.  Parity between le Droit objectif and le droit subjectif 
is expressed by a règle de droit, that is, a rule of Droit objectif applied to the 
proven droit subjectif of the successful party.    
 
The judge's duty to dire le droit, then, is to declare le droit subjectif arising 
amongst the litigants.  Thus, the court must decide which of the moyens de droit,
alleged by the parties is superior, by virtue of having been proven in fact to fulfil 
the criteria established by the le Droit objectif. The phrase moyen de droit,
205 A. Merlin, 8 Questions de Droit, 4th éd., (Remoissenet: Paris, 1830) at title “Substitution 
fidéicommisaire” §IV, 18.  “Mais qu’importe le mot, si la chose y est?” 
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however, is normally taken to refer to the parties arguments of le Droit objectif 
raised in support of arguments of fact, moyen de fait.  The moyen de fait states 
the facts which give rise to le droit subjectif by meeting the criteria set out in le 
Droit objectif which must be proven for a court to grant judgement and thereby 
affirm the subjective right claimed.  If, however, it is le droit and not le Droit 
which, as Cornu tells us, the court ‘applies’ the conventional understanding of the 
traditional judgement syllogism is inverted inasmuch as proven fact comes to 
rank above applicable law.   
 
The judgement syllogism  
 
The judgement syllogism is another paradigm commonly used to describe 
adjudication in France.  The judgement syllogism conceives of the judicial 
decision in terms of the application of a major premise, le droit to a minor 
premise, the judicially determined proven facts that results in the judgement.206 
Martin’s account of the syllogism describes the major thesis as that which is 
‘formed by the rule of law (la règle de droit) that is “applicable”.207 The minor 
thesis is constituted by “the affirmation” found in the instant facts that fulfil the 
conditions stated by the rule of law applicable.208 A successful claim involves the 
convergence of le droit subjectif, le Droit objectif through the mediation of a règle 
de droit, that is, the rule Droit objectif applied to the proven droit.209 
The syllogism, while widely invoked by scholars, is criticised as "artificial", a 
"justificatory discourse,"210 that tells us little about the "deductions préparatoires" 
of the judge which arise from consideration of the parties' arguments of fact and 
law.211 Martin’s account demonstrates the exclusion of process from the 
 
206 Merminod describes the syllogism thus, "comme on sait, la mission première du juge est 
d'appliquer à un état de fait un raisonnement de droit pour aboutir à la conclusion qui est le 
jugement." ["as everyone knows, the primary task of the judge is to apply a legal rule to a fact 
situation, the result of which is the judgement."] La mission première, c’est décider; la dernière 
mission, c’est décider.   
 
207 G Marty, La Distinction du fait et du droit, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris 1929) at 11-12; see 
also Martin, (1974), supra note 185 at §35  
 
208 Martin, supra note 124  
 
209 Cornu, supra note 5 at 759 defines règle in its primary sense as “règle de droit” which 
“désigne toute norme juridiquement obligatoire…quels que soit sa source (règle légale, 
coutimière)” [rule of law refers to all norms importing a legal obligation whatever their source 
(legal rule, customary rule)” 
 
210 B. Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence, (Deborah Charles Publications: Merseyside, 
1988), preface, writes that, "from the viewpoint of discursive semiotics, the normative syllogism is 
a justificatory discourse which attributes a particular status to adjudicatory discourse." This is to 
say, the syllogism is not an empirically accurate account of adjudication, rather it is a normative 
conception or idealisation about the result of adjudication, the judgement.  The syllogism provides 
another element that reinforces fact-law federalism, notwithstanding it is empiric inaccuracy. 
 
211 The syllogism, like the distinction between fact and law, is criticised.  Marty, supra note 207 at 
12 writes, "Il n'est pas douteux qu'il y a quelque chose d'un peu artificiel à styliser ainsi l'activité 
du juge et il suffit de lire un jugement relatif à une affaire quelque peu complexe pour apercevoir 
que l'agencement de l'argumentation qu'il contient est beaucoup plus compliqué." [There is little 
doubt that there is something artificial in characterising the activity of the judge in this way and it's 
enough to read a judgement on even a modestly complex case to see that the justifications of the 
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syllogism for he refers to a rule already determined to be ‘applicable’ and facts 
that already ‘proven’, indicating it is an account of the conceptual structure of a 
decision already reached.  Appreciation of the nature of le droit subjectif within 
this structure, however, requires examining events that precede the syllogism. 
 
Droit as fait and la règle de droit 
 
Cornu’s definition, by its apparent use of le droit in its sense as subjective right, 
precipitates an enquiry into the nature of le droit subjectif prior to judgement.  If 
jura novit curia, following Black’s translation, means ‘the court recognises rights’, 
it is important to consider aspects of the act of recognition only alluded to in the 
phrase dire le droit or by the syllogism.  Jura novit curia tells us the court ‘knows’ 
or ‘recognises’ le droit but does not speak to the nature of the knowing that the 
court does when that which it is knowing is not loi but droit subjectif.  Some 
sense of this is seen in John Bell’s translation of jura novit curia as ‘the court 
becomes acquainted with the law’,212 which here could be paraphrased as the 
‘the court becomes acquainted with le droit, in its sense of the subjective rights of 
the parties that follow from the facts which have been proven.   
 
A jura novit curia centred on le droit subjectif directs us away from accounts of 
the act of judgement to the process by which it is reached.  At issue is the 
juridical qualification of ‘bare’ facts, that is, their transubstantiation into juridically 
‘recognised’ facts that are affirmation of le droit subjectif. Principles of fairness 
require that during process le droit objectif and le droit subjectif must be neither 
‘applicable’ nor ‘affirmed’ nor ‘proven’.  If there is ‘science’ to legal process, an 
important element is the formal and factual suspension of belief in any particular 
outcome during process lest a pre-judged conclusion colour the outcome.  It is 
only with the judgement that this state of disbelief ends.  Affirmation that a droit 
subjectif has been proven cannot be declared until process has ended, and the 
matter has been remitted for deliberation and judgement.    
 
Doctrines focussing on the judge and judgement such as the syllogism, 
l’application de la loi, or dire le droit, conceal that le droit as a “individual 
prerogative” alleged, is not self-executing in any legal sense: during process it is 
an allegation and at judgement it is a conclusion.213 Le droit subjectif must be 
proven before the règle de droit can be applied.  La règle de droit must also be 
found to be applicable, for it is by definition, la règle de droit applicable. There 
can be no règle de droit in abstracto no a règle de droit inapplicable.
La règle de droit   
 
reasons for judgement reveal a much greater complexity" [than the syllogism would suggest.]  
Nonetheless, Marty, approved of the continued use of the syllogism.   
 
212 Bell, supra note 92 
 
213 Le droit may be self-executing in an extra-legal sense where a person subject to le droit 
acquiesces to its exercise, spontaneously or otherwise.  It would be incorrect to say that le droit 
subjectif that has not been recognised juridically is without legal status for this would nullify the 
effect of legislation conferring such rights and make a dispute the measure of legality.    
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In process, the distinction between fact and law is not as clear as the major-
minor hierarchy of the syllogism suggests.214 Motulsky, champion of strict fact-
law federalism, recognised that “to research the applicability of a rule of law and 
to research the existence of a subjective right, is one and the same thing.”215 
The statement illuminates for it equates a finding that a rule of droit objectif is 
applicable to a finding that a droit subjectif exists.  Le droit subjectif, Martin 
writes, again quoting Motulsky, is nothing other that the effect of a judicial 
decision.216 Existence and applicability, two burdens of proof arising from 
examination of the parties’ moyen converge in the règle de droit as sides of a 
coin.   
 
The conclusion follows: there can be no droit subjectif without proof and proof is 
a juridical decision with respect to a matter of fact.  Le droit subjectif cannot be 
deemed to exist in the way that a court can deem or ‘recognise’ the existence of 
la loi. The existence and applicability of le droit subjectif and the identification of 
la règle de droit are different names for a single event: the decision.  Le droit 
subjectif is declared by the judge as a matter as fact.  Post-judgement rights of 
enforcement confirms this facticity. 
 
The difficulty with Cornu’s definition, after all of this, is associating appliquer, that 
is, to ‘apply’, with le droit subjectif. The syllogism, it is clear, foresees the 
application of le Droit objectif to the proven facts.  It is also possible for a court to 
declare the subjective right of a party, that is, dire le droit. However, to ‘apply’ 
subjective right’ requires the major part of the syllogism be proven fact, which is 
applied to a rule of Droit objectif, the minor.  The particular rule of Droit objectif in 
any case, however, is called la règle de droit.
Le droit subjectif, however, cannot be merely a matter of fact, once parties ‘go to 
law’.  Le droit subjective alleged, is interpreted by the parties prior to jugement: 
they must know what they have to prove.  Facts are brought within the criteria 
established by le Droit objectif. In this sense there are no pure facts in litigation: 
all have been qualified by the parties, indeed as they must, because the timely 
unfolding of litigation requires the raising only that which is relevant to the proof 
on which the decision is based.   Pure facts in litigation are irrelevant facts.   
 
This conception of le droit subjectif is suggested by a maxim from Loisel, “c’est le 
fait qui fait le droit”’217 Martin, understanding that facts within litigation are never 
‘pure’, wrote, less poetically, that, “the truth appears to lie in how facts alleged by 
 
214 P. Buchez, Histoire de la Constituente 437 refers to Thouret’s conception of the syllogism in 
which the major premise was fact applied to the minor premise, law.   
 
215 Martin, supra note 185 at §26 “rechercher l’applicabilité d’une règle de droit et rechercher 
l’existence d’un droit subjectif, c’est donc la même chose.”  
 
216 Ibid,  “Le droit subjectif n’est rien d’autre que l’expression de l’effet juridique.”  Motulsky’s 
position is that there is no droit subjectif without judicial recognition.  see supra note 213. 
 
217 [it’s fact that makes the right] A. Loisel, Institute coutumière, supra note 27, cited in T. 
Grumbach, “La mise en état devant la juridiction prud’homale” in Vingt ans après, supra note 23, 
183 at 184.  A similar and equally poetic of the dynamic of fact-right, party proof and judicial 
recognition is, “la preuve double le droit comme l’ombre suit le corps.” [proof shadows a right like 
the shadow follows the body]. 
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a party are not, strictly speaking, fact, which is to say not the raw events which 
have precipitated the litigation.  Alleged facts are already qualified, or at least, 
pre-qualified.”218 For this, Martin relies on Motulsky, who wrote, “it would an 
error to believe that the fact juridically considered is ‘of right’ [droit], rather it’s 
really a material element to which the law [droit] simply attaches 
consequences.”219 Martin concludes that the juridically considered fact is, “not of 
right, but neither of fact, rather it is a step in the process of qualification.”220 
From the perspective of la mentalité «Common law», the structure of these 
accounts of the act of judgement is curious, obfuscatory, even tortuous because 
they suggest that the droit subjectif of the parties’ claims alleged is, during 
process and before judgement, a matter of fact not law.  As indeed they must 
because any suggestion to the contrary means the judge has made up his mind 
prior to judgement and has ceased to be impartial.  
 
Implicit in this account of jura novit curia, turning on the ambiguity of le droit, jura 
novit curia implies the Court must ‘hear’ the parties.  Jura novit curia means that 
a court cannot recognise rights without considering the parties’ facts. It must not 
just consider them, it must give them the proper weight demanded by the 
applicable rule. In this sense le droit, as subjective law, is argument during 
process, and implicitly refers to the equities of parties and means less the 'law' 
than 'private law rights'.  The issue in all litigation is whether the court will 
recognise the rights alleged by the parties (jura novit curia).   
 
Paradoxically, it seems to follow, that within the semantic resistance thrown up to 
the English speaker by the word le droit, Black's definition, 'the court recognises 
rights', reflects Civilian understanding of jura novit curia as a doctrine about 
process in private law.221 Perhaps this is fully understood by native French 
lawyers.  It is nonetheless curious that, apart from Black’s definition no one has 
yet reached the duality arising between ‘knowing the law’ and ‘recognising rights’ 




The seventh element of Cornu's definition is the adverb d'office which appears in 
the bracketed phrase 'l'appliquer d'office'.  D’office, as an adverb, describes the 
manner in which le droit is applied by the judge.  The primary difficulty with 
Cornu’s use of the word d'office is that it is ambiguous and ambiguous on the 
very issues which make jura novit curia controversial:  the power of a court to act 
 
218 Martin, supra note 124 at §9. “La verité nous paraît résider en ce que le fait allégué par le 
partie n’est pas à proprement parler du fait – nous voulons dire qu’il n’est pas événement brut où 
se trouve le point de départ du procès.  Il est déjà qualifié, tout au moins préqualifié. 
 
219 Ibid, citing Motulsky “C’est une erreur de croire que le fait juridique soit du droit: il s’agit bien 
d’un élément matériel auquel le droit attache simplement [sic] des conséquences.” 
 
220 Ibid, “Ce n’est pas du droit, mais ce n’est pas non plus du fait; c’est une étape du mouvement 
de qualification.” [emphasis in original] 
 
221 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 141  
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and decide propre mouvement, that is, on its own motion as opposed to acting 
pursuant to a party claim or allegation.   
 
The ambiguity arises because the core legal sense of d'office is complemented 
by other meanings that evoke controversial aspects of intervention jura novit 
curia.  The core meaning of d’office is 'pursuant to the duties’ 222 of judicial office.  
In this meaning there is no inherent distinction between an act d’office taken at 
the request of a party and an act d’office taken independently by a court without 
a party request.  The consequence of the problem is that d’office does not 
necessarily signal intervention jura novit curia but neither does it preclude it.   
 
Different senses of d’office elide the distinction between process and judgement.  
One sense of d’office speaks only to the act of ‘l’application du droit’, to the 
judgement syllogism.  This is the primary legal sense of d’office referring to the 
court’s duty to decide cases in accordance with the applicable legal rule.  In this 
sense ‘appliquer le droit d’office means judicial application or recognition of the 
‘right’ in its objective sense.  Other senses of d’office, less precisely legal, refer to 
acts taken on the court’s own motion, acts taken without notice or consultation or 
to acts that are arbitrary.  These senses are recursive for they may taint acts 
taken according to the primary legal sense of d’office. Non-legal senses of 
d’office are also recursive in that they speak to characteristics of legal process, 
distinct from the act of ‘application’.  
 
Propre initiative  
 
D’office may refer to intervention jura novit curia because it can be used to 
describe judicial acts taken on the court’s own initiative without a request from a 
party.223 In this sense d’office means propre mouvement, on its own motion, 
rather than at the request of a party. The ambiguity means there is not a precise 
term in French to distinguish the two types of acts d'office, notwithstanding 
essential issues of jura novit curia require this distinction.224 Cornu recognises 
this meaning, defining d'office as "considérer sur sa propre initiative."225 
Acts taken on the court’s own initiative are the primary locus of controversies 
precipitated by various types of intervention jura novit curia  The most common 
 
222 5 Grand Larousse, supra note 170 at 3750 defines “d’office": "automatique, 1. en termes de 
droit en vertu du devoir, des obligations de sa charge. [automatically, 1. in terms of law, by virtue 
of the duties and obligation of one’s charge responsibilities]  
 
223 Ibid  “2. sans en être requis, de sa propre initiative”. [without it being requested, on its own 
initiative]  
 
224 At common law the terms sua sponte, ex mero motu, ex proprio motu and suo moto describe 
actions taken on the court's own initiative or own motion, that is, not at the urging of a party. 
While the meaning if these terms in relatively clear that the intervention is not at the urging of the 
party, occasionally Common Law scholars lapse into usage that parallels the ambiguity of 
d’office.  see, for example, P. Legrand, “Judicial Revision of Contracts in French Law: A Case 
Study”, (1988) 62 Tulane Law Review, 963 at 970, where he speaks of, “judicially-initiated 
revisions…revisions carried out by the courts of their own motion (be they carried out sua sponte 
or at the request of one of the parties.”  B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, 2d 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001) at 838 also notes the problem.  
 
225 Cornu, supra note 5 at 607-8 
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concerns situations in which the court considers the parties' points of law to 
provide an inadequate solution to the litigation.226 A problem with this sense of 
d’office is that to “consider” in its sense of ‘reflect upon’ or ‘examine’ is an act 
antecedent to the act of judgement.  A court cannot simultaneously ‘consider’ the 
applicable law and ‘apply’ the applicable law because these are separate acts.  
 
Thus, in Cornu's definition, ‘considérer’, in its sense of 'examine,' alludes to Fox's 
account of jura novit curia in which the law applied does not necessarily have to 
derive from propositions put forward by the parties.  In its preparations for the 
application of the 'correct' legal rule, a court may or must conduct research 
d’office for it is ultimately responsible for the rule applied.  Research leading to 
intervention jura novit curia is also implicit in Damaška’s definition, which refers 
to the rejection of party legal argument in favour of a decision based on the 
court’s own.227 
Everyone seems to agree that, unless specifically bound by the provisions of 
Article 12 alinéa 4,228 because the court is responsible d’office for the application 
of the legal rule, only the court can decide.  The court ‘s primary duty, the 
essence of office du juge is its duty to ensure a ‘correct’ decision.  It is clear that 
d'office, as was used in the phrase relever un moyen de droit d'office, in the 
repealed alinéa 4 of Article 12, may refer to the application by a judge of its own 
point of law on its own initiative to dispose of a case.229 However, the ambiguity 
of d’office means the provision also envisaged intervention at the request of a 




D’office has further meanings that refer to the authoritarian and arbitrary qualities 
for which some interventions jura novit curia are criticised.230 These include 
acting without the knowledge, advice or comment of those affected and even 
against their wishes.  D’office also has a stronger sense of acting “out of hand” or 
 
226 Martin, supra note 124  
 
227 Damaška, while critical of the incipient bias of such a decision, did not colour his definition of 
jura novit curia with his own opinion. see supra note 11 at 114. Damaška might also refer to 
spontaneous intervention (if such a thing is possible in seriatim and document-based French 
procedure) not requiring a distinct act of research.  
 
228 The Dalloz NCPC continues the original numbering of the alinéa. Others writers have 
renumbered the original alinéas 4 and 5 as 3 and 4.  See for example P. Blondel, supra note 183 
in Vingt ans après, supra note 23 at 109, or Eudier, supra note 15 at 43; Martin, supra note 74 at 
560.  
 
229 ‘relever un moyen de droit d’office’ means roughly ‘to raise a point of law on the court’s own 
motion’ although other meanings are possible. 
 
230 5 Grande Larousse, supra note 222, “3. Par voie d'autorité sans demander l'avis de intéressé 
et souvent contre sa volonté;” [on the basis of inherent authority with asking for the advice of 
those concerned and often against their will] Ibid at 3749,  intervention en faveur de quelqu'un. 
[intervention in someone’s favour] This latter is credited to Voltaire.   
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peremptorily.231 The jura novit curia of Fox or Damaška can be associated 
these stronger senses of d'office in the sense of, "without consultation",232 
suggesting parties receive no prior notice of the act taken d’office.
The empirical – normative ambiguity of d’office  
 
The controversies associated with jura novit curia involve judicial acts taken 
d’office, on the court’s own initiative, without consultation, notice or argument.  
On this basis it might be concluded that an act taken jura novit curia d'office at 
the request of a party is a contradiction and such a form of jura novit curia cannot 
exist.  There are however circumstances that might still be considered 
intervention jura novit curia that refer to an initiative put to the judge by the party.  
These circumstances give rise to a distinction between intervention jura novit 
curia d’office and intervention jura novit curia d’office propre mouvement.  
 
Jura novit curia d’office at the request of a party would refer to a court’s 
judgement on a request raised by a party during process that had not been 
expressly averred in written or oral submissions or that was irregular in other but 
minor ways. For example, where a party seeks leave to introduce a legal 
argument on appeal that had not been argued in the court below or had not been 
stated in documents of which the other party had notice.233 
It is important to distinguish between meanings of d’office with normative force 
and those which while contrary to formal law may arise in practice.  Formal law is 
clear that the French judge may not normally to decide on the basis of a point of 
law applied d’office in Damaška’s sense of jura novit curia. The saine solution 
proscribes the application of a point of law d'office without notice or an invitation 
to the parties to debate the point.  A dispositive intervention taken d'office propre 
mouvement that does not involve notice and an opportunity for party debate is 
illegal, for its breach of le principe de la contradiction and les droits de la défense 
and, therefore, cannot be a valid act d'office.  This is the case whether the 
intervention d’office is propre mouvement or whether at the request of a party.   
 
The arbitrary senses of d’office provide associative meaning to d’office that may 
be encountered in practice for, as noted above, cases of Damaška’s jura novit 
curia are still reported.234 In this sense, d’office only describes how the act was 
 
231 The Concise Oxford-Hachette French Dictionary (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995) at 
408, 'd'office: (autoritairement) without consultation.  'out of hand' – ‘nos propositions ont été 
rejetées d'office’.  [our arguments were rejected out of hand] 
 
232 Ibid  at 408  
 
233 see Guerra and Others v. Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357 (ECHR) in which the Court invoked jura 
novit curia to rule admissible certain of the applicants' points of law (articles of the European 
Convention on Human Rights) which had been only raised orally before the Court, had not 
formed a part of the written application and had not been argued in the courts below. This was 
also in issue in Van Schijndel, supra note 12.  see also R. Martineau, “Considering New Issues 
on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule”, (1987) Vanderbilt L.R. 1024; Wilson and 
others v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2003] UKHL 40; and Hoecheong Products 
Co. Ltd. v. Cargill Hong Kong Ltd. [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 584 (PC) and Paterson, supra note 97 at 
45ff. 
 
234 supra note 20 
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accomplished empirically.  An act taken d’office without consultation because it is 
contrary to the requirements of the saine solution and a breach of le principe de 
la contradiction is neither a duty nor a valid exercise of discretion that may be 
exercised d’office. Nonetheless, some French judges do act in this way, and to 
the extent that this act d’office is not challenged by a party, such act retains the 
legal force of la chose jugée.
The controversy with respect to intervention occurs when the act d'office is 
executed with without prior notice to all parties and without providing an 
opportunity for parties to debate the court’s own point of law.  The normative 
question here is whether the absence of notice and opportunity for argument is 
expressed by Cornu’s use of d’office in his definition of jura novit curia.
It might be said all acts of a court are acts taken d'office and that any act not 
made d'office is outside of the judge's jurisdiction.  Cornu perhaps implies this 
because he uses d'office to modify the action of appliquer. Appliquer, we have 
seen refers to the decision, the ultimate act of judgement.  A court has no 
alternative but to “appliquer le droit d’office”, that is as a matter of course.235 This 
is true in the primary sense of d'office, that is, an act taken pursuant to a duty or 
power arising by virtue of an office. But office du juge is not an unlimited font of 
inherent jurisdiction.  Legislation, including the NCPC stipulate specific acts that 
may be taken d’office.236 Motulsky’s four adages. including jura novit curia also 
“delimit the office of the judge” meaning acts taken d’office are subject to the 
principles the adages, and formal law express.   
 
D’office is an adverb and describes the manner in which an act was taken, but 
does not itself confer any jurisdiction.  D’office merely describes the basis on 
which jurisdiction arising from other sources was exercised.  The act taken 
d’office might best be translated as ‘under colour of right’, that is, with a belief or 
assertion by the actor that its was valid.  The assertion does not confirm validity, 
while it might presume it.  The jurisprudence is extensive that an act d’office may 
be valid or invalid and, if invalid, the decision will be overturned or revised.  As 
seen in other aspects of jura novit curia, the legality of certain acts d’office is 
determined by the acquiescence of the unsuccessful party or by a party whose 
formal objection is upheld by a superior court.  Even the judicial act taken d’office 
cannot evade the normative significance of party election or initiative.  
 
Ex officio and auto-saisie 
 
D’office in another sense illustrates a fundamental limitation in its association 
with the seven definitions of jura novit curia considered in this paper. Some acts 
taken d’office are delimited by Cornu's definition of d'office as a judicial act taken 
ex officio.237 Acting ex officio, Cornu writes, means the judge acting pursuant to 
office du juge to "saisir lui-même de certaines affaires," in other words, the judge 
commences an action, ab initio.238 The French legislator has established a few 
 
235 see supra note 178 with respect to the French judge’s duty to decide. 
 
236 see supra note 168 concerning the dual uses of connaître in the NCPC.
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exceptions to the adage ne procedat judex ex officio,239 which permit a judge to 
commence certain types of proceedings on his own initiative.  This is contrary to 
the general rule, expressed by le principe dispositif and Article 1 of the NCPC 
that only a party can commence an action before a court.  
 
D’office, if understood in its sense of ex officio to refer to an act of auto-saisie,
renders the phrase l'appliquer le droit d'office as it relates to jura novit curia 
incoherent, at least in a modern context.  Jura novit curia presumes an action 
that has been initiated by a party.  The application of the law on the court’s own 
initiative (l’appliquer d’office) at the very commencement of an action initiated by 
the court suggests an extreme inquisitorial system in which a court identifies a 
breach of the law and brings the parties into court after judgement has been 
issued.  
 
My research has uncovered no account of jura novit curia that conceives of the 
adage as permitting acts d’office in its sense of auto-saisie, that is, as the 
initiation of an action by the court itself.  In the definitions of jura novit curia we 
have considered, autosaisine is not possible.  The exceptions provided for in 
Article 1 of the NCPC moreover provide that once commenced by a court, the 
process is subject to the same constrains that apply to party-initiated claims.  
However the court is saised, on its own initiative or by the parties, the court is 
duty bound (to) appliquer le droit d’office.
The ambiguity of d'office suggests a linguistic abeyance insofar as jura novit 
curia is concerned because the phrase does not on its face say either Fox's or 
Damaška's jura novit curia occurred; but neither does it rule it out.  It is 
remarkable that given the many ways available in French to express the court's 
power to decide, the act of judgement, (juger, dire le droit, appliquer le droit, 
connaître le droit), there should be such lacunae preventing unambiguous 
expression of the act of intervention jura novit curia as seen in the definitions of 
Fox and Damaška.
It is equally remarkable that the phrase which describes this intervention, propre 
mouvement, is infrequently seen in French law and scholarship. 240 The 
obscurity is compounded because of the traditional laconic nature of the French 
judgement, it being for practical purposes impossible to tell from the reading of a 
 
239 Roland and Boyer, supra note 3 at 521 "Que le juge ne procède pas d'office" [the judge does 
not proceed on his own initiative] "Cet adage condamne l'autosaisine du juge, en ce sens que le 
contentieux ne s'ouvre pas à son initiative et qu l'officium judiciis n'est déclenché qu'à la 
demande du plaideur."  [This adage prohibits the judge from conferring jurisdiction on himself to 
consider a matter, in this sense contentious litigation is not commenced on the judge’s initiative 
and that judicial office only is activated by the initiation of a claim by a party.] see Dalloz annotation 
to NCPC Article 1 for a summary of exceptions.   
 
240 See Conseil d'Etat, Section 3, 3 décembre 2003, No. 240267.  "Une telle substitution relevant 
de l'office du juge, celui-ci peut y procéder de sa propre initiative, au vu des pièces du dossier, 
mais sous réserve, dans ce cas, d'avoir au préalable mis les parties à même de présenter des 
observations sur ce point." 
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judgement whether or not the court has acted d'office in either sense of the word. 
The very act of jura novit curia is concealed. 241 
An adequate vocabulary of jura novit curia requires terminology that clearly 
describe judicial intervention.  If the application of le droit d'office can refer to 
either a judicial act made at the urging of a party or an act taken on the court's 
own motion, d'office does not adequately address procedural requirements 
established by traditional adages, by the NCPC, by fundamental principle or by 
the saine solution. 242 
3.8  V. NCPC a. 12 et 16. 
 
The eighth and final element of Cornu's definition is the annotation, "V. NCPC a. 
12 et 16." which means 'see Articles 12 and 16 of the New Code of Civil 
Procedure'.  Roland and Boyer, likewise associate jura novit curia with Article 12, 
but make no reference to Article 16.  Both Articles are essential to understanding 
the meaning of jura novit curia in France as it relates to formal law, particularly 
the status of the extreme rule Damaška attributes to the adage.   
 
Articles 12 and 16 state principles that potentially conflict. Article 12 is considered 
to contain legislative expression of the adage; Article 16, the antithesis of 
Damaška's form of the adage.  Article 12 by most accounts refers to the court's 
duty to decide according to 'correct' law, resulting in a power to intervene with its 
own points of law, at a minimum to correct obvious errors or omissions in the 
parties' legal arguments.  This is the jura novit curia provision.  Article 12, 
however, consists of 5 alinéa, a lot of words to attribute to three words of an 
adage.   
 
Article 16 refers to the necessity that points of law taken by the court d’office 
must be subject to party debate.  Article 16 unambiguously reinforces the saine 
solution and expresses le principe de la contradiction, which, in turn is an 
expression of the adage audiatur et altera pars. Article 16, by requiring party 
debate on all points of law upon which the court bases its decision also 
expresses the adage judex secundum.
Thus within articles 12 and 16 we find three of the four adages of Motulsky’s 
quaternary.  Absent is the adage, da mihi factum which plays no part in Cornu’s 
definition. Also absent from Cornu’s annotation is reference to Articles 4 and 5, 
which, expressing the adage ultra petita or judex secundum preclude intervention 
 
241 A. Benabent, supra note 19 at §2, "Toutefois, et cela ne manque de surprendre, il s'est avéré 
que les juges méconnaissaient très souvent ce devoir et étaient dangereusement portés à relever 
en secrèt des moyens d'office."  [However, and there is no surprise in this, it has turned out that 
judges very often misconceive this duty and have been inclined to raise points of law on their own 
motion in secret.]  Benabent wrote in 1977 before the primacy of le principe de la contradiction 
was declared by the 1979 Conseil d’Etat decision, supra note 18.  
 
242 One solution would be to use d'office to refer to decisions taken at the urging of a party,
perhaps the most common understanding of the term.  The phrase d'office propre mouvement, or 
simply propre mouvement could be used to refer to decisions taken on the basis of the courts' 
points of law raised on its own initiative. 
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jura novit curia, by requiring the court to decide within the frame of the fact and 
law pleaded and argued by the parties.243 
All of this Cornu, doyen of French procedure, certainly recognises.244 This final 
annotation consequently refers the reader not only to the provisions of the two 
Articles, but also to competing interpretations to which the jura novit curia-
specific provisions of the NCPC have been subject since their promulgation in 
the 1970's.  Cornu must also be taken to incorporate by reference into definition 
of jura novit curia, the extensive scholarship that evidences the controversies in 
which jura novit curia-like power have been subsumed. The result is that today 
an adequate understanding of jura novit curia requires reference to French 
positive law, la jurisprudence and la doctrine which collectively constitute the 
larger part of the ‘total social fact’ of jura novit curia in France and give it a life 
independent of that which scholars tell us the adage means.245 
It is possible to find in Cornu’s definition obfuscation or imprecision that parallel 
those of the jura novit curia provisions of the NCPC, la jurisprudence and la 
doctrine. Part II of Va savoir examines the NCPC in detail, but I will conclude 
here with a telling snapshot of jura novit curia in contemporary France.  Alinéa 3 
of Article 12 when first enacted was taken to empower the French judge to 
decide in the manner of Damaška’s jura novit curia, that is, according to the 
courts own point of law without notice and without hearing the parties.246 Alinéa 
3, annulled by the 1979 decision of the Conseil d’Etat was, however, unlike 
Article 16, neither withdrawn nor replaced.   
 
The status of alinéa 3 today is confused, like the status of the jura novit curia it 
meant to affirm.  Some scholars, legislatively, have in their writing, re-numbered 
the remaining alinéa of Article 12.247 Eudier notes, however, not only the 
dissatisfaction of some sectors of la doctrine with the 1979 decision of the 
Conseil d’Etat, but also notes that the Cour de cassation itself, has invoked the 
annulled provision in at least two cases.248 The resurrection of alinéa 3 is clearly 
miraculous and supported by devotees while mainstream positivist jurisprudence 
rightly challenges the ability of a rule to be applied after its formal repeal.  The 
 
243 Cornu does not include ultra petita in his compendium of adages.  It is also absent from 
Roland and Boyers Adages, supra note 3, but is found in Roland and Boyers companion work 
Locutions latines du droit français 4th (Litec:Paris, 1998).
244 see G. Cornu, supra note 133 
245 see Levi-Strauss and Mauss, supra note 2 
 
246 The text of alinéa 3 reads. “Il [le juge] peut relever d'office les moyens de pur droit quel que 
soit le fondement juridique invoqué par les parties. [The judge may as a matter of course raise 
points of pure law regardless of the legal bases invoked by the parties.] 
 
247 supra note 228 
 
248 Eudier, supra note 15 at 101 note 6, citing Cour d’appel de Paris, 25 avril 1986, Cour de 
cassation 26 janvier 1982 (Bull. civ. IV no 31 p24), 26 avril 1984 (Bull civ. II, no 71 p51).  Eudier, 
ibid, writes, "nombre d'auteurs considèrent qu'il conserve une "autorité officieuse" (Heron n.3) ou 
même une "existence vivace quoique fantomique" (H. Croze & C. Morel, n.4) pêut-être à titre 
coutumier".  
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ritualistic ambiguity then of jura novit curia is a phenomena that tells us, if nothing 
else, va savoir. 
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper has presented the first critical examination of definitions of the adage 
jura novit curia. I will not enter into a lengthy recitation of the characteristics 
close scrutiny reveals in the definitions and translations offered by Damaška, 
Merminod, Roland and Boyer, Fox, Engleman, Black’s and Cornu.   Their 
accounts of the adage, its consequences and effects are remarkable for the 
diversity of rules, consequences and effects each derives from the words jura,
novit and curia. The diversity supports a claim that jura novit curia scholarship 
must clearly distinguish between the meaning of the words of the adage and the 
separate consequences and effects this meaning is capable of sustaining in a 
given legal system at a particular time.  
 
Three further conclusions, surprising perhaps because they are anti-intuitive, 
warrant emphasis.  The first is the association of jura novit curia with law and 
equity, seen in Black’s alternate translations, ‘the court knows the law’ and ‘the 
court recognises rights’.  Black’s is the only source I have found that makes this 
association, surprising because on an unstrained literal reading of the original 
Latin, the translation is perfectly correct.  The jura novit curia that can 
simultaneously evoke the court’s duty to apply the law and the court’s discretion 
to ignore the law to decide in equity refers to a conception of the judiciary that is 
omnipotent indeed.  
 
Black’s translation ‘the court recognises rights’ is also important because, 
discussing the French definitions, it leads us to a consideration of the forms of 
jura which the court may or must ‘know’.  The trinity of le droit, droit la loi, droit la 
règle, droit la prérogative assists la mentalité «Common law» in seeing that 
beyond the usual conceptual translations of le droit as ‘law’ or ‘right,’ le droit may 
function as le verbe of French process that performs the transubstantiation of 
proven fact into proven right.  It is possible further research take this association 
further to reveal how le droit as le verbe might permit us to reconcile the trinity of 
le droit with Black’s equity to understand how the breath of equity, despite its bad 
name in France, manifests in le droit as an invisible spirit of French law.  
 
The third unexpected conclusion is the recurring role party election and 
acquiescence perform in the determination of the meaning of jura novit curia in 
particular procedural circumstances. When a party elects to plead no law, jura 
novit curia becomes an enforced obligation place upon the court.  When jura 
novit curia means the court is duty bound to decide according to ‘correct’ law, a 
party may elect to plead jura novit curia on appeal in order to impugn an 
‘incorrect’ lower court decision.  Party acquiescence may be most significant with 
respect to Damaška’s jura novit curia which has been found to breach le principe 
de la contradiction, as French courts make clear.  This type of decision still 
occurs in France, and when a party acquiesces and declines to appeal, such a 
decision stands as a valid judgement despite its illegality.  This dimension of jura 
novit curia is important because the stereotypic conception of jura novit curia is of 
an adage that refers to the judicial power alone.   
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It is perplexing, given these conclusions, that, apart from the generally brief 
definitions we have considered, there is little literature about jura novit curia in 
France.  The silence of scholarship suggests that, notwithstanding Merminod’s 
claim, there is really nothing essentiel about the adage in France, and even if 
there were, it would still be of no interest to legal scholars.  This seems to be 
confirmed by the universal practice amongst French scholars to debate 
controversies associated with jura novit curia in the language of black-letter law.  
The abundance this type of literature further confirms the marginal status of jura 
novit curia in France.  
 
Yet the adage is not utterly unknown.  It is accepted that jura novit curia is part of 
a larger system of adages in France, be it Motulsky’s quaternary, or some other 
configuration, perhaps inclusive of ultra petita or ut quae desunt. These adages 
juxtapose opposing principles and values, long standing tensions of French 
procedure and legal theory, values that are imperfectly reconciled by superior 
principles of French law.  Le principe de la contradiction does not in itself 
preclude the intervention jura novit curia may require but establishes the saine 
solution that formally neutralises Damaška's jura novit curia. Enigmatically, 
however, cases in which the saine solution is breached occur in France, 
suggesting that the dynamic of legal practice is an independent measure of the 
meaning and force of the adage.   
 
Jura novit curia in France is marked by a profound ambiguity.  The adage literally 
proclaims a doctrine of judicial infallibility, yet it does so in a legal system where 
generous rights of appeal subvert this conception of the adage by establishing a 
counter presumption of fallibility.  Appeals are not rare in France, a phenomena 
that precludes uninhibited affirmation of jura novit curia as an expression of 
judicial omnipotence.  Chronic intervention jura novit curia moreover speaks to a 
divergence between the legal knowledge of parties and judges that challenges 
the very knowability of law.  No legal system could extol such a result without 
admitting that its law cannot by understood by the people who are commanded 
to obey the law and who in a democracy are its ultimate authors. 
 
It might be argued that, despite these difficulties, a common denominator can be 
found amongst the diversity and inconsistency of definitions of jura novit curia.
The normative essence of the adage might be acceptably taken to say that, 
inasmuch as the court is charged with a duty to know the law, in so deciding a 
court is not necessarily bound by party argument.  The key phrase, 'not 
necessarily,' however, supports only a negative claim, that such intervention is 
not, as a general rule, prohibited.  The negative conception of jura novit curia 
must be ever contingent, for it invites rather than answers the questions that 
precipitate controversy in France: first, as to when and why a court's intervention 
with its own point of law is permitted, necessary, or desirable and secondly, what 
rules – be they rules of law – customs or etiquette, ought to govern the manner 
and form of intervention.  These are the issues which this paper has attempted to 
raise and to which I return in Part II of Va savoir. 
 
